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‘This book provides exciting new ways of thinking about how women’s rights 
policy change occurs in the Global South. Drawing on meso-level analysis of how 
six countries passed legislation to combat domestic violence, the book shows, for 
example, the importance of forming strategic alliances around the interests and 
ideas of dominant actors; the role of elite cohesion; and the politics of ideas and 
discursive framing of gender equity. It is certain to influence contemporary think-
ing about gender-related policy reform and, as such, it is a must read for interna-
tional and domestic policy makers, women’s rights activists, donors, scholars of 
gender and politics, and many others.’
—Aili Mari Tripp, Wangari Maathai Professor of Political Science & Gender 
and Women’s Studies, University of Wisconsin–Madison, USA
‘Understanding the political processes that lead to greater gender equity in the 
Global South is a first step in tackling problems such as domestic violence in a 
transformative way. This book makes an important contribution both conceptu-
ally and empirically in this highly policy-relevant field—a must read for scholars, 
activists, and policy-makers committed to promote gender equality and social 
justice.’
—Katja Hujo, Senior Research Coordinator, Social Policy and Development 
Programme, UNRISD, Switzerland
‘This book is a great addition to the literature on gender equality policies, 
focusing particularly on domestic violence in the Global South. It carefully 
demonstrates the strategies for confronting deeply entrenched power inequalities 
across institutions of the state and society. A must read for activists and research-
ers alike.’
—Nitya Rao, Professor of Gender and Development, University of East Anglia, UK
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‘This is an excellent collection of articles. Not only does it deal with a topic 
that has been prioritized by the international women’s movement, but it does so 
in an intellectually coherent way by locating empirical analysis from different 
parts of the world within a shared theoretical framework and a common research 
methodology.’
—Naila Kabeer, Professor of Gender and Development, London School of 
Economics and Political Science (LSE), UK
‘Bringing together leading experts on gender and politics, this book demonstrates 
how states come to introduce and implement GBV laws. Diverse case studies 
draw attention to broad, inclusive feminist coalitions: cultivating both high-level 
and grassroots support. Enforcement and normative change then emerge as con-
ditional upon three key dynamics: state commitment, state capacity, and state 
collaboration with civil society.’
—Alice Evans, Lecturer in the Social Science of Development, 
King’s College London, UK
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The fact that women have achieved higher levels of political inclusion within low- 
and middle-income countries has generated much speculation about whether this is 
reaping broader benefits in tackling gender-based inequalities. This book uncovers 
the multiple political dynamics that influence governments to adopt and implement 
gender equity policies, pushing the debate beyond simply the role of women’s inclu-
sion in influencing policy. Bringing the politics of development into discussion with 
feminist literature on women’s empowerment, the book proposes the new concept of 
‘power domains’ as a way to capture how inter-elite bargaining, coalitional politics, 
and social movement activism combine to shape policies that promote gender equity.
In particular, the book investigates the conditions under which countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia have adopted legislation against domestic vio-
lence, which remains widespread in many developing countries. The book demon-
strates that women’s presence in formal politics and policy spaces does not fully 
explain the pace in adopting and implementing domestic violence law. Underlying 
drivers of change within broader domains of power also include the role of clien-
telistic politics and informal processes of bargaining, coalition-building, and per-
suasion; the discursive framing of gender-equitable ideas; and how transnational 
norms influence women’s political inclusion and gender-inclusive policy outcomes. 
The comparative approach across Uganda, Rwanda, South Africa, Ghana, India, 
and Bangladesh demonstrates how advancing gender equality varies by political 
context and according to the interests surrounding a particular issue.
Negotiating Gender Equity in the Global South will be of interest to students and 
scholars of gender and development, as well as to activists within governments, 
political parties, nongovernmental organizations, women’s movements, and 
donor agencies, at national and international levels, who are looking to develop 
effective strategies for advancing gender equality.
Sohela Nazneen, Research Fellow, Gender and Sexuality, Institute of Develop-
ment Studies, University of Sussex, UK.
Sam Hickey, Professor of Politics and Development and Research Director, 
Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID), The Uni-
versity of Manchester, UK.
Eleni Sifaki, Research Associate, Effective States and Inclusive Development 
Research Centre (ESID), The University of Manchester, UK.
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Preface and acknowledgements
In recent years, we have witnessed a counter-movement against feminism and the 
promotion of women’s rights around the world. The global gag rule ushered in 
by the Trump administration, movements against sexual harassment such as Me 
Too, targeted trolling of feminist writers in the media, and the persistently high 
levels of violence against women around the world, all remind us that the gains 
made towards gender equity in the late 20th and early 21st centuries cannot be 
taken for granted. In particular, it seems clear that simply ensuring that women 
have a place at the table, in terms of political inclusion, is not enough to ensure 
that policies aimed at promoting gender equity are adopted and implemented.
In 2011, the Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre 
(ESID),1 based at the Global Development Institute, The University of 
Manchester, commissioned a systematic review of the gendered nature of the 
politics of inclusive development, focusing mainly on studies conducted on coun-
tries in the Global South. The review revealed that while women had entered 
politics and policy spaces in the Global South in ever-greater numbers, their 
ability to influence the adoption and implementation of gender equity policies 
remained limited. This in turn raised questions about the political conditions 
under which ruling elites and governments gained the commitment and capacity 
to promote gender equity and what might be done to support this, including (but 
not only) by female parliamentarians. We realized that there is an urgent need 
for mid-range theories that could explain the politics of gender equity in the 
Global South, not least because much of the contemporary literature on gender 
and politics did not seem to be well-grounded in the political realities of develop-
ing countries. This led to the development of a comparative research framework, 
integrating elements borrowed from the politics and development literature along 
with recent advances within the gender and politics literature. The project, titled 
‘Gender and Political Settlements’, was undertaken in six countries between 2013 
and 2016, with a particular focus on the case of efforts to promote policy reforms 
against domestic violence.
This book brings together the findings and analysis from this project. We have 
been fortunate to work with excellent research partners in the six case-study 
countries, all of whom were involved in co-constructing the intellectual agenda 
with us and have been very patient as we put the collection together. As editors, 
BK-TandF-9780815372356_TEXT_BRUNT-181008-FM.indd   20 14/02/19   1:07 PM
Preface and acknowledgements xxi
then, our first and foremost round of thanks goes to the stellar cast of researchers 
and authors who contributed such fascinating country case studies to the collec-
tion. From the initial meeting in Manchester in 2013, where the ideas were set 
in place, through the comparative analysis workshop in Kampala 2014 and the 
sharing of initial drafts at the conference on Gender Inequality at the University 
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we are lucky to have had the opportunity to include critical commentaries from 
two leading authorities in the field: Georgina Waylen, from The University of 
Manchester, and Anne Marie Goetz, from New York University. Our initial 
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contributes, what it misses, and where work on the politics of negotiating gender 
equity should next move.
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The politics of gender equity
Setting the scene
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Beyond the inclusion-to-
influence debate
The politics of negotiating gender equity
Sohela Nazneen and Sam Hickey
1
Introduction
Under what conditions do governments in the Global South introduce policies 
aimed at reducing gendered inequalities? Is the progress of women’s rights an inev-
itable outcome of the spread of democratization in the Global South? Does it 
depend on how many women hold positions of political influence, in parliament 
and beyond? Are women’s movements and activists significant players in this pro-
cess, and what are the most effective strategies that they deploy? What role, if 
any, is played by international actors and ideas in promoting gender equity in the 
Global South? Although it has long been recognized that women’s empowerment 
is a fundamental political challenge (Waylen et al. 2013), the fact that we are still 
searching for answers to these questions suggests that identifying the specific ways 
in which politics shapes progress towards gender equity has proved a very difficult 
task. This gap in understanding flows in part from the nature of the problem: 
progressive reforms aimed at reducing inequalities can flow from multiple sources 
and are likely to unfold in different ways in different places. The obstacles fac-
ing proponents of women’s rights—and, therefore, the most effective strategies of 
overcoming them—are likely to differ according to the specific nature of political 
power and institutions in given contexts.
However, this gap also flows from certain problems within existing approaches 
to the study of gender, politics, and development, and the predominant concep-
tual and methodological approaches that underpin these. Although there have 
been some important advances within recent scholarship on gender and poli-
tics, the field lacks a coherent and holistic conceptual framework for compara-
tive research that can reveal the multiple ways in which politics shapes gender 
equity in different political contexts. Furthermore, it is not clear that the tools 
of political analysis used to unpack the politics of gender equity in the Global 
North necessarily travel well to the Global South, where states and civil societies 
alike have undergone different historical trajectories and are inserted into global 
governance orders in different ways. The forms that politics takes in parts of the 
Global South can create particular difficulties when it comes to expectations that 
women’s political inclusion, levels of which have improved in recent years, will 
necessarily lead to improved outcomes in terms of gender equity. We argue that 
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recent advances within feminist analysis, comparative politics, and the politics of 
development can be integrated within a more holistic conceptual framework for 
exploring the politics of gender equity in the Global South.
Methodologically, there are two main problems to overcome here. The first is 
the relative absence of systematic comparative research into the politics of gender 
equity, which seeks to identify the variations in political context that may shape 
the progress of gender equity. The second has been the bias in recent gender and 
politics analysis to focus on just one amongst many important pathways through 
which gender equity might be achieved—namely, through increased female par-
ticipation in politics. This focus on whether women’s political inclusion offers an 
effective route to governments adopting and implementing gender equity reforms 
has, we argue here, distracted from identifying the multiple forms of politics that 
shape the ongoing negotiation of gender equity in the Global South.
In seeking to provide a clearer answer to this question, this volume examines 
the progress of a particular gender equity reform—policies to combat domestic 
violence—in six different countries of the Global South. Anti-domestic violence 
policy has been adopted in an increasing number of countries over the past two 
decades, but as yet, we lack a clear sense of how this process has unfolded in dif-
ferent political contexts and what the main drivers have been for these changes. 
Rather than focus on women’s political inclusion alone, we adopt a new con-
ceptual framework that identifies how underlying configurations of politics and 
power shape the broader incentives and ideas that enable and constrain progres-
sive reforms on gender equity. By focusing on how power is distributed and strug-
gled over in overlapping domains of politics and policy, our ‘domains of power’ 
approach promises to offer a more comprehensive view of the multiple forms of 
politics that shape gender equity, one that enables a focus on the role of ideas 
as well as incentives, of elite and popular forms of politics and the connections 
between them, of formal and informal institutions, and of the international as well 
as national and local drivers. Importantly, we distinguish between different types 
of national-level power domains (which we refer to as ‘political settlements’) and, 
by selecting case studies to reflect these different types, hope to offer a clearer 
sense of the different political pathways through which gender inequalities can be 
challenged. This should have payoffs, not only for theory-building within gender 
and politics, but also for feminist activists and policy actors seeking to identify 
which strategies work best in different types of political context.
The next section of this chapter begins a critical engagement with the 
inclusion-to-influence agenda. We set out the main findings generated by this 
research agenda to date, before arguing that the agenda is both problematic in 
itself and can only offer a partial view of the politics that help to shape gender 
equity. The chapter then moves on to explain why domestic violence policy has 
been selected as a case study of gender equity policy and introduces the structure 
of the volume that follows. Chapter 2 introduces the power domains framework 
that underpinned our investigations of the passage of anti-domestic violence leg-
islation in six countries and the comparative case-study methodology that we 
employed. Chapter 3 completes this opening section of the book by examining 
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the rise of domestic violence as a global policy agenda and the role of transna-
tional ideas and actors in efforts to establish a new global norm against gendered 
forms of violence. The second section of the book focuses on the progress of 
policy in what we term ‘dominant party settlements’, with case study exemplars 
of Uganda, Rwanda, and South Africa, before the third section focuses on our 
three ‘competitive’ settlement settings—Bangladesh, Ghana, and India. All 
empirical chapters investigate the same themes and follow a similar structure to 
ensure coherence of analysis and comparability of findings. The fourth section 
of the book starts with an overview chapter that brings together the comparative 
cross-country analysis and draws out the main theoretical and strategic implica-
tions that flow from this. Then, in the spirit of opening up a broader debate, the 
book closes with critical commentaries on our contribution by prominent schol-
ars of gender, politics, and development.
Moving beyond the inclusion-to-influence agenda
The past few decades have witnessed significant gains in terms of the wider pro-
gress towards gender equity in the Global South. This is evident in the achieve-
ment of reduced rates of maternal mortality, increased access to schooling for 
girls, rising female labour force participation, and an impressive rise in the level 
of women’s participation in political processes and institutions. However, contin-
uing structural inequalities—such as in wages, employment opportunities, lack 
of decent employment, and ongoing struggles such as the Me Too movement—
reveal that women’s empowerment in different societies remains an incomplete 
project. Patriarchal privileges and control over women and girls remain firmly 
entrenched and are reasserted through violence and other forms of domination, 
particularly in the Global South. Approximately one-third of women worldwide 
have experienced physical and/or sexual violence by an intimate partner or sexual 
violence by a nonpartner at some point in their lives. Intimate partner violence 
is the most common form of violence, peaking during women’s reproductive years 
in both developed and developing countries (UNDESA 2015). However, at the 
same time as fourth-wave feminism has firmly placed violence against women 
and girls firmly on the political agenda, the world is witnessing a backlash against 
the progress of women and women’s rights within the public realm (Goetz 2018).
The rise of women’s participation in political institutions has helped gener-
ate a significant amount of interest in the question of whether women’s political 
inclusion has enabled them to achieve influence over the institutions and policies 
that help shape gender equity outcomes. Efforts to identify whether descriptive 
representation leads to substantive representation have proliferated in recent 
years and have helped to generate new insights into the constraints and oppor-
tunities that women face once in positions of power (e.g. Escobar-Lemmon and 
Taylor-Robinson 2014). This section briefly explores the impressive rise of wom-
en’s political participation in the Global South before questioning whether this 
phenomenon alone should be the focus for thinking about the politics of negoti-
ating gender equity.
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Women’s participation in political institutions has been increasing in recent 
years. In 2016, women accounted for 23 percent of all parliamentarians worldwide 
and 22 percent in low- and middle-income countries (World Bank Gender Data 
Portal).1 Women are also increasingly well represented in state bureaucracies, not 
only via gender machineries, but also within more mainstream ministries and 
departments (Waylen 2010a, Krook and O’Brien 2012). This represents a consid-
erable degree of progress, although clear limits to the advances made by women 
remain, particularly in terms of the seniority of positions attained. The number 
of female heads of state or government has increased slightly from 12 to 19 over 
the past 20 years, but this remains a tiny proportion (less than 10 percent) of the 
196 states (UNDESA 2015). Only 18 percent of appointed ministers are women, 
and most of these are assigned to portfolios related to social issues. Women are 
also underrepresented amongst senior-level civil servants and seldom represent 
their governments at the international level (UNDESA 2015). Importantly, the 
long and rich tradition of women’s involvement in civil society organizations and 
social movements continues vibrantly (Waylen 1996, Molyneux 2001, Al-Ali and 
Pratt 2009, Roy 2012). However, it remains unclear whether this growing level 
of female political inclusion is reaping broader benefits, including through the 
adoption and successful implementation of policies aimed at increasing gender 
equity. States have made significant progress in implementing policies on girls’ 
access to education, maternal health care, and social safety nets targeting poor 
women (World Bank 2012). But governments have been far less willing and able to 
promote and implement policy agendas that challenge existing gender relations and 
male privilege more strongly, including on reproductive rights, family law reforms, 
domestic violence, and land rights (Waylen 2007a, Basu 2010). To what extent 
these trends reflect levels and patterns of female political inclusion remains unclear.
This suggests that, whilst largely ameliorative policies that do not seek to 
challenge gendered relations of power are proving acceptable to governments 
in the Global South, initiatives that seek to transform gender relations con-
tinue to face significant resistance (Htun and Weldon 2010, 2012). For example, 
although there has been a great deal of progress in terms of the number of coun-
tries that have adopted policies against domestic violence in the 21st century, 
significant problems remain in terms of how strongly these policies tackle both 
this and related problems (e.g. marital rape) and the extent to which govern-
ments are actually implementing the agenda. The agenda itself is under threat 
from reactionary political leaders with vested interests in stopping what they see 
as the relentless spread of ‘liberal’ values (Goetz 2018); in 2017 Russian president 
Vladimir Putin downgraded domestic violence as an act worthy of punishment 
by a fine, rather than imprisonment.
These stylized facts have helped to deepen the sense that there remains a sig-
nificant gap between women’s inclusion and their ability to influence institutional 
and policy reforms aimed at achieving higher levels of gender equity. This gap, 
identified in Goetz and Hassim’s (2003) landmark study of women’s political effec-
tiveness, now informs a growing body of research into whether the increased 
participation of women in governance processes is ‘effective’ (e.g. Chattopadhyay 
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and Duflo 2004, Childs and Krook 2009, Agarwal 2010, Franceschet et al. 2012, 
Krook 2013, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2014).
According to Goetz and Hassim’s study, women’s political inclusion needs to 
be analysed in relation to three different spheres—the formal political arena, 
civil society, and the state bureaucracy—each of which can influence gender 
equity reforms. With regard to the first sphere, the empirical evidence on whether 
descriptive representation within formal political institutions leads to substan-
tial representation is inconclusive (Childs and Krook 2009, Escobar-Lemmon 
and Taylor-Robinson 2014, Htun, 2004). Most studies agree that women repre-
sentatives tend to express more concern over ‘women’s issues’, including domestic 
violence, reproductive health, and women’s welfare, compared with their male 
counterparts (Tripp 2003, 2004, Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004, John 2007). 
However, female representatives may be reluctant to push issues that are per-
ceived as ‘women’s issues’ or risk being identified as the women’s representative 
because these may put them at a disadvantage electorally (Goetz and Nyamu-
Musembi 2008). Importantly, Rai’s (2010, 2011) research on women parliamen-
tarians in India shows that issues of women’s welfare and violence against women 
were generally not high priority issues for female members of parliament (MPs) 
until these became politicized by certain events, after which most felt compelled 
to take them up. These findings suggest a need to move beyond critical mass 
theory and focus on a broader range of reasons that explain when and how the 
substantive representation of women occurs and with what impacts.
Research that has moved beyond the ‘critical mass’ issue helps to reveal a range 
of intervening variables at play, including coalition-building. This can involve 
coalitions between women representatives in different parties, of the type that 
led to the adoption of new laws and gender equity policies during democratic 
transitions in Chile, South Africa, and Brazil (Waylen 2007a, 2010b, Haas 2010). 
Where such coalition-building strategies have reached beyond parliaments to 
build alliances with actors in broader institutional spaces, success rates seem to 
have been higher. Studies employing large-scale parliamentary datasets (Weldon 
2002, Htun and Weldon 2010) indicate that a critical mass of women in parlia-
ment is more effective when there are strong links with women’s movements and 
where the gender machinery is effective. History is also critical here, particularly 
political transitions and key moments of state formation. Women’s active engage-
ment in promoting gender equality clauses in constitutions and introducing new 
laws on domestic violence, reproductive health, inheritance law, and property 
rights in countries such as Rwanda, Uganda, and South Africa all happened dur-
ing such periods (Goetz 2003, Burnet 2008, Bauer and Burnet 2013, Nazneen and 
Sultan 2014, Tripp 2015), both because of women’s role in the movements them-
selves and because women’s rights became politicized through the widespread 
abuse women often suffered during such transitions.
In relation to Goetz and Hassim’s second sphere of civil society, much of the lit-
erature draws attention to the critical role that women’s movements have played 
in promoting gender equity policies, particularly, again, through building alli-
ances and coalitions with key actors in both political society and government 
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bureaucracy at multiple levels. In terms of the substantive policy areas within 
which women’s movements have been able to influence change, there is some 
evidence that success rates have been higher where the focus has been on policy 
issues closely related to the instrumental needs of the state, such as controlling 
population growth and increasing productivity (Basu 2010). The effects also seem 
to have been stronger in the realm of more ‘feminized’ policy issues, including 
reproductive health, education for women, child welfare, labour rights, and so on 
(Kabeer 1994, Cueva 2004).
In relation to the third sphere, the rather few studies that have examined wom-
en’s representation within national bureaucracies suggest that the effectiveness of 
national gender machineries is contingent on them having the capacity not only 
to formulate and deliver policies within their own remit (which requires that they 
have the requisite level of staff expertise, budgetary resources, and delivery mecha-
nisms), but also to influence policies formulated by other departments, coordinate 
different policies on gender across sectors, and sanction other departments if they 
fail to promote gender equity in their policies. This is a tall order and requires polit-
ical as well as technical capacity. Although the literature draws attention to some 
significant successes, there is a more general sense that these conditions are rarely 
in place. In Rwanda, the Ministry for Women played a key role in creating a clear 
gender focus within the bureaucracy and in packaging and disseminating women’s 
demands that emerge through the Women’s Councils at the village level and their 
national secretariat (Burnet 2008). In Uganda, the Women’s Ministry had strong 
links with women’s organizations, and acted to promote their demands during the 
formulation of the new constitution (Goetz and Hassim 2003). In South Africa, 
the Gender Equality Commission’s work was stretched in terms of time, staff, and 
money and so struggled to fulfil its mandate (Waylen 2010b, Fester 2014). The 
resource and capability constraints that beset governance in developing countries 
in general appear to be particularly apparent here.
More generally, these studies of whether women’s inclusion in politics, civil 
society, and bureaucracy has been effective tend to reinforce the sense that the 
inclusion-to-influence agenda is problematic in itself and can only offer a partial 
view of the politics that helps shape gender equity. It is inherently problematic, in 
that it tends to frame women’s political inclusion in instrumental terms, as being 
valuable only insofar as it leads to other outcomes, rather than insisting that 
women’s political inclusion is a valuable right in and of itself. One of the dan-
gers here is that should women’s political inclusion be found to be an ineffective 
route to achieving gender equity, we are left without a basis on which to defend 
women’s inclusion. The approach tends to reify gendered roles and responsibilities 
in ways that reflect rather than challenge unequal gender relations. On the one 
hand is the familiar problem of responsibility: it is presumed that women should 
once more do the heavy-lifting and exert their agency as the only viable means of 
addressing structural inequalities, a tendency that also relegates the role of female 
political actors to single-issue advocates. On the other hand, the agenda allows 
men off the hook because it places responsibility for achieving gender equity 
squarely with women.
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The agenda also has significant methodological and conceptual limitations. In 
methodological terms, it tends to address the politics of gender equity from a sin-
gle vantage point—that of whether women’s political inclusion can help advance 
the cause—rather than taking into account the broader range of political factors 
that shape the progress of gender equity (this includes obscuring from view the 
often central role that male political actors have historically played in promoting 
gender equity). The attention that the inclusion-to-influence agenda has gener-
ated amongst researchers risks overlooking the extent to which the problem of 
women’s inclusion has not been solved; many countries have yet to adopt quotas 
for female representatives and, once in power, women continue to face consid-
erable constraints as a result of inequitable and exclusionary gendered norms. 
In conceptual terms, most research in this area has placed a greater emphasis 
on examining the influence of female political inclusion in the Global North, 
rather than the Global South, and has done so whilst deploying frames of analy-
sis that are arguably less relevant to the ways in which politics actually plays out 
in developing countries, particularly in terms of the often pervasive influence of 
informal rather than more formal processes and the extent to which institutional 
arenas, such as politics, civil society, and bureaucracy, are seldom as differentiated 
as (Western) political theory tends to assume.
This discussion suggests that there is a need to move beyond the limitations of 
the inclusion-to-influence agenda, one that sees women’s political inclusion as a 
valuable entitlement in and of itself and adopts a more holistic approach to identi-
fying the political drivers of gender equity. In methodological terms, this involves 
starting with the outcome that needs to be explained—in this case the adoption 
and implementation of gender equity policies—and then working backwards from 
this to identify the fuller range of political factors at play in shaping this outcome. 
In pursuit of this, Chapter 2 will suggest how reconceptualizing this terrain of 
research, and adopting process-tracing methodologies, can enable fuller insights to 
emerge. We argue that recent theoretical developments within feminist political 
analysis can be usefully integrated with theoretical advances in understanding the 
politics of development, which are closely attuned to the realities of how politics 
plays out in the Global South. We elaborate this framework, which focuses on the 
interplay between overlapping domains of power, and argue that it can be applied 
comparatively to provide a more comprehensive view of how underlying configu-
rations of politics and power shape possibilities for gender equity policy reforms in 
the Global South. Before we do this, however, it is important to explain why this 
book focuses on the specific case of anti-domestic violence policy reforms.
Investigating the politics of domestic violence policy
Domestic violence: prevalence, causes, and effects
Violence against women, and domestic violence in particular, has been a central 
concern within the so-called fourth wave of feminism that has emerged over the 
past decade, a period that has also seen a rapid increase in the number of countries 
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in the Global South adopting policies and legislation against domestic violence. 
Examining the processes through which this has happened thus provides a par-
ticularly relevant and timely route through which to explore the politics of gender 
equity in the Global South. Domestic violence is defined as:
physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including 
battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related vio-
lence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices 
harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation. 
(UN 1993)
As Chapter 3 argues, the United Nations, in its resolution against domestic vio-
lence (58/147), also includes economic violence as a form of domestic violence. 
Domestic violence is not only limited to violence by men against women, but 
also includes violence against children and men that occurs within a family con-
text. A prevalent form of domestic violence is intimate partner violence. The 
World Health Organization (WHO) suggests that ‘intimate partner violence’ can 
be understood to be ‘behaviour by an intimate partner or ex-partner that causes 
physical, sexual or psychological harm, including physical aggression, sexual coer-
cion, psychological abuse and controlling behaviours’ (WHO 2012).
Despite international efforts to draw attention to the problem, including by 
numerous transnational and local actors, levels of domestic violence remain 
high all over the world. For example, according to Alhabib et al. (2010), levels 
of intimate partner violence have increased rather than decreased over time. A 
WHO study (2013) reveals that intimate partner violence affects 30 percent of 
ever- partnered women, with significant regional variations. Table 1.1 shows the 
aggregate data of the study by region, revealing that the highest rates are found in 
Southeast Asia, followed by the Eastern Mediterranean.
As Table 1.1 shows, domestic violence is a global problem, prevalent in the 
Global North as well as the Global South, and subject to significant regional 
variations. These variations become more apparent when one starts looking 
Table 1.1 Prevalence rates of intimate partner violence by region
WHO region Prevalence (%) 95% CI (%)
Low- and middle-income regions:
Africa 36.6 32.7–40.5
Americas 29.8 25.8–33.9
Eastern Mediterranean 37.0 30.9–43.1
Europe 25.4 20.9–30.0
Southeast Asia 37.7 32.8–42.6
Western Pacific 24.6 20.1–29.0
High income 23.2 20.2–26.2
CI = confidence interval
Source: WHO 2013, p. 17.
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at different rates within the regions, as the WHO study does in its appendix. The 
highest prevalence is found in Central sub-Saharan Africa, where 65.5 percent 
of women have experienced domestic violence at some point in their lives. 
Moreover, the study finds that:
all regions of sub-Saharan Africa are above the global average of 26.4%. 
The lowest prevalence is in East Asia, with 16.3 per cent of ever-partnered 
women reporting intimate partner violence. It is important to note that 
even in the case of the below-average regions, between one quarter and 
one fifth of ever-partnered women have still experienced partner violence. 
(WHO 2013, p. 46)
Inter-partner domestic violence has wide-reaching health, social, and eco-
nomic consequences—both for survivors and for wider society. In terms of 
health, for example, women ‘who have been physically or sexually abused by 
their partners’ are:
16% more likely to have a low-birth-weight baby… more than twice as likely 
to have an abortion, almost twice as likely to experience depression, and, 
in some regions, are 1.5 times more likely to acquire HIV, as compared with 
women who have not experienced partner violence. (WHO 2013, p. 31)
Domestic violence also has major economic costs. Economic costs may be direct, 
such as those incurred by health, welfare, and refuge or police and criminal justice 
services directed towards the problem, or indirect, whereby the effects of domestic 
violence on labour force participation and productivity incur costs for ‘victims, 
businesses, the public sector and society as a whole’ (Advocates for Human Rights 
2011, Day et al. 2005).
These high prevalence rates and significant long-term effects of domestic vio-
lence indicate that political action has so far fallen short of addressing the problem. 
Nevertheless, progress has been made in introducing legislation: at least 140 coun-
tries have so far introduced anti-domestic violence legislation (World Bank 2015). 
Although some countries that have not passed specific legislation against domestic 
violence offer some form of legal protection, a specific law on domestic violence 
offer (offer)s stronger prospects for increased protection through, for example, pub-
lic investment in crisis centres, comprehensive prosecution, and restraining orders 
against abusers. On the other hand, the adoption of a policy itself is not enough. 
It might not cover all forms of domestic violence, and it might be weakly enforced.
Domestic violence policy as a case study of gender equity policy
Feminist theory explains how domestic violence (and, in particular, intimate 
partner violence) is fundamentally a gendered issue that derives from unequal 
power relations between women and men (Dobash and Dobash 1979, Yllo 1993, 
DeKeseredy and Dragiewicz 2007). According to Dobash and Dobash (1979), 
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‘the use of physical violence against women in their position as wives is not the 
only means by which they are controlled and oppressed but it is one of the most 
brutal and explicit expressions of patriarchal domination’ (p. ix). Gender roles and 
constructions of masculinity (men as physically strong, aggressive) and femininity 
(women as compassionate, delicate) contribute to such manifestations of violence. 
The state as a male-dominated institution may seek to keep domestic violence as 
a private matter so as not to disrupt the gender order and broader ‘sexual con-
tract’ (Pateman 1988).2 The changing role of women in the public sphere, brought 
about through women’s increased integration into the labour market and educa-
tion, as well as women’s participation in civil society and formal politics, might 
provide the grounds for a backlash from certain forms of masculinity, including 
increased levels of domestic violence, as well as the basis for a sustained challenge 
to gender inequities. This reflects the strong sense that the road to anti-domestic 
violence policy is likely to be highly contested and fundamentally political in 
character. If and how states decide to address domestic violence reveals the depth 
of their commitment towards challenging male privilege and their willingness to 
promote gender equity more broadly.
As Htun and Weldon (2012) argue, gender equity measures can fall under 
two main categories: ameliorative policies that are less controversial and that 
seek to improve women’s condition rather than transform gender relations per 
se (e.g. policies on girls’ basic education) and transformative policies that seek 
to challenge patriarchal structures. Transformative policies tend to face greater 
challenges as compared with ameliorative policies, which often achieve political 
consensus quickly. Domestic violence legislation can be thought of as ‘transform-
ative’ because it touches on questions of family and marital relations. However, 
as the country studies in this volume illustrate, in practice, it can fit into either 
of these categories, depending on the specific nature and extent of the legislation 
introduced (which may include or omit measures such as the outlawing of marital 
rape) and the degree of its enforcement. Hence, it is illuminating to investigate 
which political dynamics contribute to more ‘transformative’ domestic violence 
legislation, and which to more ‘ameliorative’ versions.
In many countries of the Global South, politics often takes place through 
informal rather than formal means, via relations of patronage and informal 
networks that women often lack the resources and relationships to partici-
pate in (Goetz and Hassim 2003, Waylen 2007b). In contexts where ‘the polit-
ical’ remains a highly contested realm, anti-domestic violence policy rarely 
aligns with the personal and gendered interests of ruling elites, many of whom 
are more concerned with the politics of surviving in power than with more 
programmatic concerns. Promotion of gender equity concerns rarely yields 
political and electoral gain for the ruling elite. Yet, such policies have been 
successfully passed in 140 countries around the world, including, but going far 
beyond, the six country cases in this study. Hence, an investigation into this 
policy issue can unpack what incentivizes politicians to adopt and implement 
policies that enhance gender equity, including (but also going beyond) the case 
of domestic violence.
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Summary of findings
Chapter 3 places our national-level findings in their transnational context through 
an examination of the emergence, cascading, and diffusion of a new global norm 
that has challenged violence against women (VAW) since the 1990s. The chap-
ter argues that transnational women’s movements and the UN played a key role 
in promoting the emergence and institutionalization of opposition to VAW as 
a new global social norm. Women’s movements brought the issue to the global 
agenda through framing domestic violence and VAW as a human rights violation, 
including through using high-profile instances of VAW in conflict situations to 
strengthen their argument. The chapter finds that the main channels through 
which this new norm was diffused within the Global South were regional agree-
ments against VAW, the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and, crucially, the transla-
tion of this norm by local activists operating within specific political contexts.
Our case study analysis of six countries in the Global South that adopted 
anti-domestic violence policies demonstrates that a range of different political 
factors—including, but not limited to, women’s political inclusion—have shaped 
the process through which policies against domestic violence have been adopted 
and implemented. The factors that were most influential in shaping the tim-
ing and pace of adoption include the influence of international norms on violence 
against women, informal links between women’s movements and political actors, 
the ability of women’s movements to counter opposition to the proposed pol-
icy changes and to navigate their particular political terrain, and the strength 
and ideology of the ruling coalition. The degree to which these policies have 
been implemented has been further shaped by interactions between the national 
domain of power and the state bureaucracy, including the degree to which the 
bureaucracy operates amongst personalized or impersonalized lines.
In Uganda, the women’s movement suffered a defeat in the mid-2000s regard-
ing its efforts to promote a Domestic Relations Bill, which included a clause on 
co-ownership as well as domestic violence. This encouraged activists to adopt a 
different strategy for promoting gender equity, including a focus on less controver-
sial issues that were not as threatening to patriarchal notions of male autonomy 
(e.g. dropping a reference to marital rape), an effort to form a stronger and broader 
coalition, and a move to carefully align their campaign with the ideas and incen-
tives of powerful players. Using a range of informal strategies that helped to both 
reduce resistance and build alliances across civil and political society and the 
bureaucracy, the women’s coalition was able to secure the support of President 
Museveni, leading religious figures, and many male parliamentarians. However, 
although the process of passing the legislation was fairly rapid, the capacity and 
commitment to implement the law has been largely absent (see Chapter 4).
In Rwanda, the groundwork for legislation against domestic violence had been 
largely achieved through earlier gains around gender equity in the post-genocide 
era. The post-genocide settlement had established what would become Africa’s most 
heavily feminized parliament and also set in place transformative policy agendas 
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around land co-ownership in the 1990s. The case for the legislation against 
domestic violence in the mid-2000s was raised by women parliamentarians and 
swiftly gained the widespread approval of all key actors, including strong backing 
from President Kagame. The process of adoption was slowed down somewhat by 
the consultative process that formal policy-making requires in Rwanda; once in 
place, the government moved swiftly towards implementation (see Chapter 5).
In South Africa, the call for a new law addressing domestic violence was raised 
in 1996 by the Women’s National Council (WNC), which was composed of 
both political and nonpolitical organizations and women parliamentarians. This 
demand was raised immediately after the new constitution was ratified, and South 
Africa was also a signatory to various international and regional conventions that 
committed the country to addressing domestic violence in the country. The pol-
icy coalition was in a strong position, given the prominent role played by women 
in the anti-apartheid movement, women’s strong presence within the ruling party 
and parliament, and the fact that gender equality was a key idea that was linked to 
the vision of a new South Africa. The South African Law Commission (SALC) 
and the National Gender Machinery (NGM) played key roles in creating consul-
tative spaces for women’s rights activists to engage in the drafting process. The 
informal relations that existed between women’s movement leaders and femocrats 
and women parliamentarians were crucial for pushing the agenda. The support 
for the law within the dominant African National Congress (ANC) party, which 
was seen as a critical part of how the post-transition South Africa projected itself, 
meant that the law came into operation within a year after it was tabled in 1998. 
However, its implementation remains marred by various problems, including lim-
ited financial and human resources, patriarchal tendencies within the state, and 
lack of effective monitoring (see Chapter 6).
In Ghana, the process of demanding a policy on domestic violence took at 
least six years to bear fruit, and legislation was only adopted in 2007 once the 
most controversial part of it, concerning marital rape, had been removed. The 
women’s movement struggled to find support in key areas of political society, with 
female MPs constituting only 14 percent of parliament at the time, the Minister 
for Women’s Affairs opposing the policy, and the lack of programmatic commit-
ment amongst political parties to women’s rights. What seemed to tip the balance 
in favour of the campaign was the appointment of a new and more sympathetic 
Minister for Women’s Affairs in 2004, the removal of the clause on marital rape, 
a sustained campaign by civil society activists that included efforts to persuade 
other powerful actors that there were developmental and religious grounds for 
the legislation, and the evidence from local and international sources (e.g. the 
Beijing+10 Platform for Action) on the apparently high and rising level of domes-
tic violence in Ghana. To date, the legislative instrument required to implement 
the legislation has yet to be finalized, and there is little evidence as yet that norms 
around domestic violence have started to shift in Ghana (see Chapter 8).
In Bangladesh, the citizen’s coalition against domestic violence, largely com-
posed of women’s rights groups, was formed in 2007. The issue gained momentum 
with the policymakers when an army-backed caretaker regime came into power 
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in 2008 to manage the electoral process. With ‘politics as normal’ suspended, the 
bureaucrats in charge at the women’s ministry were able to open doors for civil 
society activists to formulate and promote legislation against domestic violence. 
After Bangladesh reentered democratic politics in 2009, the issue was taken up by 
the new ruling coalition. The close personal links between the Women’s Affairs 
Minister and the citizen’s coalition created opportunities for institutionalizing the 
coalition’s work within the ministry. Bangladesh was up for a CEDAW review at 
the Committee on the Status of Women (CSW) meeting in New York in 2011, 
where the government was keen to avoid embarrassment for not meeting its com-
mitment to enact an anti-domestic violence law. The political ambitions of the 
prime minister, in terms of weakening Islamist groups and the need to ensure 
support of secular groups (including women’s rights groups), and her dominance 
over the cabinet and parliament, were key factors in limiting resistance against 
the law by policymakers. However, compromises were also made in the provisions 
of the law, in order to reduce the potential for opposition from religious groups. 
The implementation of the law has been slow: it took three years for rules of pro-
cedure to be developed, and no significant steps were taken to enhance the power 
of the coordinating women’s ministry (see Chapter 7).
In India, the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (PWDVA) 
was passed after two decades of struggle in 2005 and came into effect in 2006. 
The women’s movement actors formed a broad-based coalition to advocate for 
the law in the 1990s and were invited by the National Women’s Commission 
(NWC) to develop a draft. A Committee on Status of Women (CSW) review 
of India’s progress in implementing CEDAW in 2000 pushed the government to 
table the law in parliament in 2002; however, progress was stalled. The fate of 
the law was closely affected by which political party came to power, the kind of 
informal relations the policy coalition had with femocrats inside the state, and 
coalition politics. In the early 2000s, when the law was initially tabled under 
National Democratic Alliance (NDA), led by the nationalist Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP), the provisions in the draft law were compromised. The draft law 
contained no prescription for remedies and allowed men to plead self-defence—
that is, the right to violence to protect self and property when faced with com-
plaints of domestic violence. These gaps in the law led to extensive mobilization 
by women’s movement actors. Whilst NDA MPs engaged in deliberations in the 
parliament, the draft was placed on the backburner, given the upcoming elec-
tions. In 2004, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), under the leadership of 
the India National Congress party, won the elections, which was a turning point 
in terms of enactment of the law. The UPA had left-leaning parties in the coali-
tion government, which included the PWDVA as a condition for forming part of 
the alliance. This move, along with the personal interests of Sonia Gandhi (the 
leader of Congress), other leaders of the coalition, and the National Advisory 
Council (which included many of the women leaders), meant that the law was 
quickly tabled and passed in 2006, although there were extensive debates over the 
expansive rights proposed under the law. Implementation of the law has varied 
across states. All states have protection officers, but the levels of trained personnel 
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and budget allocations are limited, leaving women’s movement organizations to 
try to fill this capacity gap (see Chapter 9).
Conclusion: what explains the gap between women’s 
inclusion and their influence?
The evidence from our case studies suggests that there are some common factors 
that facilitate the links between women’s inclusion and the promotion of gender 
equity, as we discussed earlier in terms of the three institutional arenas identified 
by Goetz and Hassim (2003). These include support for gender equity amongst 
senior party officials; the formation of issue-based coalitions that involve women’s 
movements building alliances with women representatives and male allies within 
the state bureaucracy and political parties; and a political opportunity structure 
that creates space for women’s participation and promotion of gender equity, 
including discursive as well as institutional openings for change. However, the 
weight of each of these factors varies over time and place, particularly by political 
context. Female MPs, activists, and femocrats remain heavily constrained by the 
terms of their inclusion, including the types of institutional design that secure this 
inclusion and the wider political system and context within which these operate.
The ‘inclusion-to-influence’ research reviewed here is unable to shed light on 
the multiple routes through which politics shapes the promotion of gender equity 
in these cases. Our starting point, namely the women’s political effectiveness 
framework (Goetz and Hassim 2003), offers a partial view of the politics of pro-
moting gender equity as it struggles to provide an adequate explanation for the 
role played by some of the factors identified within the chapter. This is particu-
larly the case in terms of grasping the critical role played by relationships and coa-
litions built across the three institutional arenas identified in the framework, the 
role of informal institutions and ideological/discursive factors, and the important 
history trajectories at play here.3 Three problems with the framework seem appar-
ent: first, the focus on three distinct spheres overplays the extent of institutional 
differentiation within countries in the Global South, where boundaries between 
the public and private, and political and bureaucratic, remain highly permea-
ble. More specifically, focusing on how women gain agency within each of these 
spheres risks overlooking the significance of building alliances across them, par-
ticularly in the form of coalitions that recent research has suggested are critical in 
ensuring women’s political empowerment (Hodes et al. 2011). Second, the frame-
work focuses directly on formal institutional spaces and systems and, as such, 
tends to overlook the powerful influence of informal institutions in developing 
countries (Waylen 2017, Nazneen 2017). Although Goetz and Hassim conclude 
their study by stating that informal forms of politics (including patronage) help 
explain the gap between women’s inclusion and their influence, we would argue 
that current research into the politics of women’s empowerment in the Global 
South now needs to start rather than end with the understanding that politics is 
highly informalized in such contexts. Third, ideas are only examined here inso-
far as they relate to the ideologies of political parties within the formal political 
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arena, rather than in relation to broader social norms or to ideas (including those 
promoted in transnational discourse) that can be deployed in struggles for (and 
against) women’s empowerment.
Given these problems, this book introduces a new framework to explore the 
wider forms of politics that lead to gender equity policy—a ‘domains of power’ 
approach—that we elaborate in the next chapter (Chapter 2). This approach 
draws on recent advances within scholarship on both gender and politics and pol-
itics and development, and can hopefully provide a conceptual basis for exploring 
not only the case of reforms against domestic violence, but also a broader range of 
reforms aimed at promoting gender equity in the Global South.
Notes
 1. Accessed March 2018.
 2. For Pateman, the sexual contract that characterizes social relations between genders 
flows from the institution of marriage, through which women relinquish legal per-
sonhood, equal property rights, and the right to seek redress for violence and crimes 
committed against them by their husbands.
 3. Indeed, critical historical moments can generate their own demand for gender 
equity policies, irrespective of demands derived from female political inclusion, as 
with the decision by the Bangladesh government to introduce an assistance pro-
gramme for rural poor widows and abandoned women, which was influenced by the 
famine of the mid-1970s, and the failure of the official rehabilitation programme to 
address the needs of war widows (Hossain 2007).
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Investigating the politics 
of gender equity through 
a power domains approach
Sam Hickey and Sohela Nazneen
2
Introduction
If, as we have argued in Chapter 1, a focus on women’s political participation can only 
offer a partial view of how politics shapes the adoption of policies aimed at promot-
ing gender equity, then what other forms of politics matter? And what conceptual 
approaches can help illuminate these? Going in search of a fuller conceptual frame-
work that goes beyond the inclusion-to-influence agenda, this chapter reviews recent 
developments in the field of gender and politics, including work on the role of political 
elites, institutions, social movements, and ideas. We find that, although a rich body of 
work already exists, the field currently lacks an integrated framework for undertaking 
comparative analysis of how politics shapes the progress of gender equity within the 
political and institutional realities of countries within the Global South.
Recent advances in theorizing the politics of development, which takes these 
realities as their starting point, are highly convergent with important develop-
ments in the recent feminist literature on gender and politics, particularly around 
a shared appreciation of underlying forms of power relations and informal institu-
tions. We argue that, taken together, these approaches can offer the ingredients 
for a more coherent and overarching framework that encompasses the political 
conditions under which governments adopt and implement gender equity reforms. 
We capture this convergence in our ‘power domains’ framework, which focuses 
on the interplay between the underlying configuration of power that shapes how 
polities function, on the one hand, and the more specific domain of women’s 
interests, on the other. Having established this framework, the chapter elaborates 
the methodological approach that we adopt to investigating how anti-domestic 
violence legislation was passed in the six case-study countries of the Global South 
and the central themes that this approach enables us to explore.
Theoretical approaches to explain the politics 
of gender equity: a critical appraisal
There is, of course, a much broader range of literature that considers the links between 
gender and politics than is fully reflected within the inclusion-to-influence agenda 
discussed in Chapter 1. We briefly review the four main strands of this literature 
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here—namely work that focuses on political opportunity structures, feminist insti-
tutionalism, social movements, and ideas—each of which emphasizes how different 
dimensions or forms of politics shape the possibilities for women’s empowerment. 
Although each approach has generated important insights and has much to con-
tribute, we argue that each also suffers from certain critical problems and that none, 
taken by itself, offers a sufficiently holistic grasp of the multiple political routes through 
which women’s empowerment may occur in the Global South. Rather, each offers 
important insights that can help form part of the more coherent and overarching 
framework required here.
Elites and institutions: the political opportunity structure approach
Researchers working from a political opportunities structure perspective have 
focused on how inter-elite relationships shape the institutional possibilities for 
women’s empowerment. Following the foundational work of Sidney Tarrow, 
political opportunities can be defined as ‘consistent but not necessarily formal, 
permanent, or national signals to social or political actors which either encour-
age or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social move-
ments’ (Tarrow 1996, p. 54). According to Guigni (2009, 2011), and following 
McAdam (1996), four main dimensions of political opportunity are stressed in 
the current literature: (1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized 
political system; (2) the stability or instability of that broad set of elite align-
ments that typically underpins a polity; (3) the presence or absence of elite 
allies; and (4) the state’s capacity and propensity for repression. This approach 
has made significant contributions to our understanding of a wide range of 
social movements and collective action struggles, including around the role of 
women in politics (Jeydel 2000, McCammon et al. 2001, Waylen 2007). For 
example, Waylen (2007) shows that women’s ability to secure concessions in 
South Africa was shaped not simply by the democratic transition that occurred 
in the post-apartheid era, but because the negotiated elements of the transi-
tion opened space within the political opportunity structure (POS) and ena-
bled women actors to form strategic alliances across state/civil society divides. 
Adopting this approach has also enabled research to reveal the limitations of 
women’s political inclusion as a route to gaining substantial representation of 
women’s interests on the policy agenda: ‘if the POS in a country is consistently 
structured in a way that is gendered, getting more women into the legislature 
will not be sufficient to change outcomes: broader representation in more ven-
ues may be needed’ (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2014, p. 238).
However, most applications of this approach have taken place within 
advanced, democratic contexts, thus encouraging the assumption that political 
opportunities for women’s rights to progress are strongly associated with formal, 
open, and democratic political institutions. This bias tends to downplay alterna-
tive routes through which women’s rights might be realized, including the roles 
played by informal institutions and also transnational actors, both of which are 
often significant factors within the Global South. There is also a problem of fit 
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here: most work from a POS perspective has sought to explain the conditions 
that enable movements to mobilize, rather than focusing on what shapes their 
success (Goldstone 2004). In ontological terms, political opportunity structure 
theory tends to exaggerate the dichotomy of structure and agency and ignore the 
complex ways in which institutions and mobilizing actors constitute each other, 
particularly in relation to different kinds of groups and struggle. According to 
Goldstone (2004, p. 350), ‘To understand why certain groups take certain actions 
at certain times, we need to know more about the precise relationships among 
groups and elites’. Similarly, and with reference to the advance of women’s politi-
cal inclusion in South Africa, Waylen notes that two aspects, ‘a favourable polit-
ical opportunity structure and strategic mobilizing by key women actors’ (Waylen 
2007, p. 541), were both critical, suggesting the need for an approach that can cap-
ture the interactions of political systems and social movements within a broader 
framework. Finally, scholarship on political opportunities tends to emphasize the 
incentives that might persuade elites to become more open to including women; 
for example, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2014, p. 229) argue that:
the incentives to incorporate women into politics ebb and flow as: (1) the 
organizational strength and unity of women demanding representation 
fluctuates and (2) women’s interests clash with the interests of groups with 
long-established political power.
However, such accounts fail to acknowledge the significance of ideas in shaping 
political behaviour, a failing that flows from the rational-choice underpinnings 
of much mainstream political science, including some work on women’s political 
inclusion (Driscoll and Krook 2009). In brief, then, and whilst there is much to 
take from the political opportunities structure approach (particularly the interplay 
of inter-elite power relations and institutions), the lack of sustained application in 
countries of the Global South, the normative bias towards formal over informal 
institutions, the failure to integrate a clear focus on ideas, the exaggeration of the 
dichotomy between structure and agency, and a tendency towards methodological 
nationalism, all emerge as important limitations.
Feminist institutionalism
Gender norms and informal institutions often remain unperceived or unre-
marked as they are naturalised as part of the status quo. Reforming formal 
rules may end officially sanctioned gender bias, but will not necessarily over-
come all institutionalised forms of male bias as informal rules may under-
mine formal rule change. (Waylen 2014, p. 216)
Given the significance of informal political processes in the Global South, the 
recent shift within gender and politics scholarship towards exploring how informal 
institutions shape the possibilities for women’s empowerment is very promising. 
This move began with feminists deploying a historical institutionalist perspective 
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(Thelen 1999), on the understanding that this approach can ‘…accommodate 
notions of inequality of power and resources between actors. Institutions have 
distributional effects. They reflect, reproduce, and magnify particular patterns of 
power’ (Waylen 2009, p. 248). Historical institutionalism helps to locate current 
struggles for women’s empowerment within a longer timeframe and can reveal how 
‘critical junctures’ in the establishment and upheaval of institutions can power-
fully shape opportunities for women’s political inclusion. In examining the inter-
play between formal and informal rules, and how these rules are gendered, the role 
of informal institutions—including rules and norms based on customs, illegitimate 
practices, and backdoor deals (Helmke and Levitsky 2004)—increasingly comes 
into view (Chappell and Waylen 2013, Waylen 2017). Echoing the main conclu-
sion of Goetz and Hassim’s (2003) study, Waylen (2014, p. 212) argues that ‘the 
study of informal institutions can also help gender scholars better understand the 
gap that sometimes exists between formal institutional change and its outcomes’. 
Grounded in often-hidden relations of power, informal rules can help to reinforce 
certain gendered norms that disadvantage women, despite the existence of formal 
rules that ostensibly challenge this. Nonetheless, there remains the possibility that 
informal rules can help women to challenge such inequalities, involving ‘informal 
institutions that subvert or compete with new formal institutions when attempts 
are made to implement positive gender change’ (Waylen 2014, p. 218).
This highly promising development has yet to yield significant returns: there 
remains very little work that has actually tried to unpack the specific ways in 
which informal institutions operate to preserve gendered forms of inequality, par-
ticularly in the Global South (Nazneen 2017). There are also questions around 
whether historical institutionalism necessarily incorporates a central focus on 
politics. When push comes to shove, the ontological emphasis falls on institu-
tions as the a priori focus of analysis, rather than politics: ‘Change through con-
testation is often significant, and political struggles are inevitably mediated by 
the institutional context in which they take place’ (Waylen 2009, p. 247). In 
countries of the Global South, where issues of statehood and citizenship remain 
highly negotiated and institutions are often weakly embedded (Hagmann and 
Peclard 2011), politics must be primary in explanations of institutional function-
ing (Leftwich 2005), including in terms of whether different types of political 
context shape the gendered nature of institutions in different ways. There are also 
some other grounds for concern. Historical institutionalist perspectives tend to 
downplay certain form of politics that have been shown to be significant in shap-
ing women’s empowerment. These include, for example, dynamic changes that 
take place within periods of apparent equilibrium as a result of social movement 
pressures or through the discursive deployment of certain ideas. Even proponents 
acknowledge that, for some, ‘historical institutionalism does not emphasize the 
ideational sufficiently, particularly in times of crisis and change’ (Waylen 2009, p. 248). 
Although social norms such as patriarchy are taken seriously within historical 
institutionalist analysis, this may not extend to the more immediate ways in 
which ideas are discursively employed within struggles around these norms and 
in relation to specific policy processes (Schmidt 2010), including those related to 
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gender equity. Deployed by itself, then, a historical institutionalist perspective 
may therefore struggle to fully capture the dynamic, agential, and ideational char-
acter of ‘the political’ (Mouffe 1993), issues to which we now turn.
The politics of recognition: women’s mobilization and claims-making
The literature introduced so far focuses on the structural and institutional factors 
that shape the politics of women’s empowerment. Waylen et al. (2013) note that 
research on women’s movements and feminist activism stands as a useful correc-
tive to this tendency, moving beyond institutions and structures to focus on agen-
tial factors. Feminist research that explores the politics of recognition unpacks the 
interactions between collective action and the state through examining the ways 
in which women’s movements make demands for gender equity, and the process of 
contestation and negotiation that leads to some claims being incorporated into the 
political agenda and others not. Hobson (2003) argues that identities and claims 
are not predetermined or fixed, but rather are contested and renegotiated within 
women’s movements. Several studies have explored processes of contestation over 
claims within movements, pointing out that whilst some common claims and 
interests, such as violence against women (VAW), cut across countries and cul-
tures in ways that enable women’s mobilization as a group (Molyneux 1985, 2001, 
Hill and Chappell 2006, Beckwith 2013) women are not a homogeneous group 
with uniform interests (Lake 2003, Maier and Lebon 2010, Patel 2012, Derichs 
and Fennert 2014). Reaching a consensus within feminist movements may mean 
that some groups of women will be better represented than others. Hobson (2003) 
argues that strategic choices made by social movements are shaped by national, 
regional, ethnic, and gender narratives; by historical legacies of rights; and per-
haps, in particular, by the nature and level of opposition to their claims. This may 
lead movements to change their claims to focus on less controversial or what Htun 
and Weldon (2012) call ‘non-doctrinal claims’ (in Cagna and Rao 2016).
One strategy through which women’s movements articulate and communicate 
their claims is through framing, in recognition of the Gramscian insight that an 
ideational ‘war of position’ is required alongside the ‘war of movement’ if hegem-
onic forms of power are to be challenged. Framing refers to the way in which an 
issue is interpreted and represented and how this can be (re)shaped in order to gain 
support and agreement, and to facilitate action for particular forms of change. 
Benford and Snow (2000) argue that there are three types of social movement 
framing tasks. Diagnostic framing is the identification of the problem and respon-
sible actors. For example, VAW is seen by feminist movements as having systemic 
roots in patriarchal ideologies of male dominance over women’s bodies, rather 
than simply being an outcome of individual action. Prognostic framing involves a 
proposed solution and plan of action based on the diagnosis of the problem—for 
example, through strategies such as media campaigning and protests that target 
the systemic roots of domestic violence. Motivational framing involves the ration-
ale for engaging in collective action, including the construction of appropriate 
vocabularies. An example of motivational framing is the representation of the 
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issue of VAW by transnational women’s movements as a human rights issue, draw-
ing on international conventions to gain widespread support (Friedman 1995, 
Joacquim 2003, King and Sifaki, Chapter 3). Factors that facilitate or constrain 
frames include the political opportunity structure and cultural values (Benford 
and Snow 2000). For example, Kabeer (2015) found that global anti-sweatshop 
movements, aware of reputational risk for transnational corporations, framed 
women garment workers as powerless victims of global capitalism, gaining wide-
spread mobilization and support as well. This body of work has given powerful 
insights into when women’s demands are heard, and when they are not, pointing 
to the critical role that women’s rights movements play in effecting policy change.
Nevertheless, this literature primarily focuses on the strategies of women’s 
movements and does not explore analytically the influence of a wider range of 
political factors, such as inter-elite interaction and political incentives, or lack 
thereof, on moves towards gender equity. Through the framework we propose, we 
seek to contribute to this literature by unpacking the important role that inter-
elite interactions and the character of the political settlement play in the politics 
of recognition and, in particular, in shaping state capacity and commitment to 
adopting and implementing policies aimed at promoting gender equity.
The role of ideas and discourse in shaping the politics 
of women’s empowerment
Our discussion of the three strands of the literature on gender and politics 
introduced so far has emphasized the crucial role that ideas as well as interests 
play in the negotiation of gender equity. Feminist scholars have long been 
interested in how ideas shape institutional and policy reforms around gender 
equity and have produced a significant body of work that analyses the means 
through which ideas influence these processes. Some have employed a discur-
sive approach to institutionalist analysis, placing an ‘emphasis on the role of 
ideas and discourse in influencing actor interests, preferences and behaviour; 
although both their definitions and uses of ideas and discourse vary widely’ 
(MacKay et al. 2010, p. 575). For example, Bacchi (2009) argues that the way 
in which a problem is represented affects the type of policy solutions and that 
problems are constructed in different ways depending on the geographical, his-
torical, and institutional context. For Bacchi, policy construction is a funda-
mentally political process that reflects the interests and ideas of policymakers. 
This perspective highlights the role of power relations, whereby certain groups 
and interests are excluded from this process.
According to Schmidt (2010, p. 2), both ideas and the ways in which they 
are discursively deployed play a significant role in shaping the politics of 
change during periods of institutional stability as well as institutional flux. 
Discursive institutionalism ‘is concerned with both the substantive content 
of ideas and the interactive processes of discourse in institutional context’ 
and can be used to provide ‘insights into the dynamics of institutional change 
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by explaining the actual preferences, strategies, and normative orientations of 
actors’ (Schmidt 2010, p. 1). Discursive institutionalist thinking identifies three 
main types of ideas: policy ideas that provide potential solutions to predefined 
social problems; problem definitions that provide ways of framing and under-
standing particular social issues, in doing so favouring certain types of pol-
icy solution and foreclosing the possibility of other types of intervention; and 
overarching paradigms that serve as road maps, providing ‘a relatively coher-
ent set of assumptions about the functioning of economic, social and political 
institutions’ (Béland 2005, p. 8, Schmidt 2008). A further distinction can be 
made between ideas that are cognitive, which ‘elucidate “what is and what to 
do”, and those that are normative, which indicate “what is good or bad about 
what is” in light of “what one ought to do”’ (Schmidt 2008, p. 306).
In a similar vein, Fernandez (2012) introduces a feminist policy analysis frame-
work for countries in the Global South, based on four analytical categories that 
embody different types of ideas. Constitutive contexts refers to the conditions sur-
rounding the production of policies. This involves the ‘arguments, assumptions 
and construction of policy consensuses’ within policy discourses (Fernandez 2012, 
p. 33). In other words, it involves the context in which claims are identified, con-
tested, and accepted/rejected within a given policy discourse. Policy representa-
tions refers to the gendered nature of assumptions that underpin solutions to the 
problem and the ways in which they are legitimized, and policy practices refers to 
the ways in which a political issue is recast as a scientific/technical issue and the 
modes of political intervention. Finally, policy consequences denotes the gendered 
outcomes produced.
We deploy this body of literature to grasp the multiple routes through which 
ideas and discourses shape the negotiation of gender equity, including the ways 
in which women’s movements frame issues of ‘women’s rights’ in relation to 
paradigmatic constructions of women and gender relations and the identifi-
cation of specific problems and policy responses. Drawing on Schmidt (2008) 
and Fernandez (2012), the relevance of each of these levels and types of ideas 
for women’s empowerment is mapped in Table 2.1. Importantly, we later inte-
grate this within a wider framework of analysis, one that does not treat ideas as 
free-floating constructs, but rather as being in constant interplay with the con-
struction of interests and the incentives that flow from broader configurations of 
power in particular political contexts.
Summary of existing theoretical approaches to the politics 
of gender equity
The rich theoretical literature on the politics of gender equity is undergoing a 
number of promising developments, particularly regarding the increasingly diverse 
field of feminist institutionalism (Waylen 2017). However, significant challenges 
remain in terms of drawing on this literature to frame comparative studies of the 
politics of negotiating gender equity in the Global South. In addition to some 
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weaknesses that are specific to each of the four broad approaches identified earlier, 
there are two more collective failings.
The first is the tendency for each approach to draw attention to only one form of 
politics, whether in terms of elite or activist forms of politics, ‘domestic’ or ‘external’ 
influences, formal or informal institutions, and either interests or ideas. This reflects 
a wider tendency within comparative political analysis to focus on the causal power 
of one of ideas, interests, or institutions to generate explanations for political 
change (Hay 2004). Given the compelling evidence that the politics of negotiating 
gender equity in the Global South is not defined by any one of these dimensions, 
but rather by each and by the way in which they interact (see Chapter 1), there is a 
strong case for integrating these approaches into a broader framework. As Waylen 
noted in the case of South Africa (2007, p. 541), openings within the political arena 
and mobilization by women’s movement actors were both critical to the promotion 
of women’s rights, suggesting that elites, institutions, and popular agency, and the 
interplay between them, all need to be kept firmly in view.
Table 2.1 The politics of ideas about women’s empowerment
Level of idea Type of idea Ideas around women’s empowerment
Paradigm/
philosophy
Normative What are the terms of the sexual contract, e.g. 
with regards to the status and rights of women in 
public life?
Cognitive What legitimating ideas enable these normative 
philosophies to mesh with the problem 
definitions and policy ideas below? Are these 
largely instrumental or ideological in nature?
Problem definition/
programmes
Normative What are seen as the main social problems to be 
solved/goals to be achieved regarding gender 
equity (e.g. poverty reduction, inequality, 
economic development, social harmony)? 
How is this legitimated?
Cognitive How are these problems/goals identified? 
How is consensus on these policy discourses 
achieved? Who are the winners/losers? 
What mechanisms/programmatic responses are 




Normative What assumptions underpin different policy 
responses? 
What ideas are used to (de)legitimate different 
policy responses to the above problems? 
If adopted, how are policies framed (e.g. for women 
or for broader social goals)?
Cognitive Is gender equity seen as a credible solution to the 
above problems? 
What sources of ideas and evidence are relevant 
here (e.g. policy design, policy evaluations, 
international ideas and experience)?
Source: Adapted from Schmidt (2010) by authors.
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The second cross-cutting problem concerns the limited extent to which these 
theoretical approaches have been developed in relation to politics in the Global 
South or deployed to understand women’s empowerment in such settings. In the 
following section, then, we propose a more overarching framework that seeks to 
move beyond the multiple binaries that characterize the approaches identified 
above, and which is consciously alert to the political and institutional realities 
of the countries in the Global South. Specifically, we argue that recent advances 
in theorizing the politics of development are both highly convergent with the 
most promising theoretical developments within the current gender and politics 
literature and can help address the question of contextual relevance. We there-
fore make the case for drawing on both bodies of literature to formulate an over-
arching frame of analysis for investigating the politics of gender equity in the 
Global South.
Reframing the politics of gender equity: a power 
domains approach
The question of gender equity is first and foremost a question of power and how 
it operates. As such, our thinking cannot start with the institutions and actors 
that make up any given political system, or the specific ideas that are embedded 
within institutions and over which different actors contest. Rather, it needs to 
start with the nature of power and how this shapes the form that institutions 
take and the ways in which they function, as well as which ideas and actors 
gain influence within and through different institutional contexts. For Chantal 
Mouffe (1993), moving beyond a focus on institutions involves moving political 
theory away from thinking about politics per se, to thinking about what she terms 
‘the political’. Politics here constitutes ‘the ensemble of practices, discourses and 
institutions that seek to establish a sense of social order and organization’, while 
the political constitutes ‘the antagonistic dimension that is inherent in human 
societies and which is located within the struggles of diverse social groups for 
power and resources’ (Mouffe 1995, cited in Corbridge et al. 2005, p. 257).1 The 
focus on agonism as central to ‘the political’, and is particularly useful for coun-
tries in the Global South, where many such struggles over the boundaries of pol-
itics remain close to the surface and are yet to be fully ‘settled’. As discussed later, 
this central insight converges closely with new theoretical work on the politics of 
development (North et al. 2009, Acemoglu and Robinson 2012), which similarly 
seeks to move beyond a focus on institutions, to examine the underlying forms 
of politics and power that shape how institutions emerge and function within 
given political contexts.2
The framework we propose here focuses on how configurations of power in 
distinct but overlapping domains play a causal role in shaping the possibilities 
for progressive change. Each of these domains of power is characterized by the 
interplay of incentives, institutions, and ideas, and operates over multiple scales, 
from the local through to the transnational (see Figure 2.1). There are similarities 
between this approach and recent work on strategic action ‘fields’ that seeks to 
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go beyond the limits of work in the POS tradition (e.g. Goldstone 2004, Fligstein 
and MacAdam 2012). For Goldstone (2004, p. 361),
movement actions and success depend on a complex set of relationships among 
the movement, counter-movements, allied movements, varied elites, various 
state authorities, and various publics, as well as the economic, international, 
and ideological milieu in which these actors work to influence each other.
Importantly, we integrate a focus on ideas within this framework, borrowing from 
Schmidt’s (2008) work on the multi-levelled role that ideas and discourses can 
play in shaping institutional change (see Table 2.1).
The primary domain of power within our framework operates at the level of 
the overall polity and involves institutions, actors, and ideas concerned primarily 
with issues of political stability, regime continuity, and legitimacy. This domain 
of power, which we label here as the ‘political settlement’, has a direct impact on 
the politics of gender equity, including through establishing the terms of what 
Carole Pateman labelled the ‘sexual contract’ (1988). The paradigmatic ideas 
that help bind this settlement or contract in place present feminist activists and 
other ‘challenger movements’ with their overarching target for reform within the 
broader counter-hegemonic war of position. Feminist activism exists within this 
broader political settlement, which it seeks to both navigate and transform, but 
it is also located within an overlapping but distinct domain of power, namely the 
domain of women’s interests. This domain is our second primary point of refer-



















































Figure 2.1 The ‘power domains’ framework.
Adapted by the authors from Lavers and Hickey (2016).
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specifically around concerns with gender equity and women’s rights. We argue 
here that the process through which institutional and policy reforms aimed at 
reducing gendered inequalities are adopted is primarily shaped by the interac-
tion of these two domains of power.3 However, and as recognized in Figure 2.1, 
the extent to which such reforms actually succeed in promoting gender equity is 
shaped by a final domain, which, although more social in character, is also shaped 
by the interplay of politics and the political identified here. This third domain is 
the more social and localized domain of power, where reforms actually hit the 
ground and are played out in practice, and includes the life worlds of communities 
and households.
Finally, each of these domains of power is shaped by transnational as well as 
national and local influences. The formation and governance of nation states in 
the Global South has always been a transnational phenomenon, from colonial 
projects of state-building through to international efforts to directly influence 
the ideas and institutions that such entities adopt, often in the name of ‘develop-
ment’. This transnational element is particularly significant when examining the 
politics of negotiating gender equity, given the globalized nature of many of the 
actors and ideas involved in promoting and also opposing the advance of women’s 
rights. Although framed as an overarching influence here in figurative terms, 
the transnational is also constitutive of each of these domains of power, in that 
actors and ideas from the transnational arena have, over time, become embedded 
within the institutional logics and processes of these domains in a variety of ways. 
As discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, international norms and conventions 
on women’s and girl’s rights, and international actors, such as donors and activ-
ists, influence both the national-level political settlement and the policy domain.
The primary domain of power: the political settlement4
The distinction that Mouffe (1993) made between politics and the political pre-
figured the major recent breakthroughs within development theory, whereby the 
dominance of new institutionalist thinking has given way to more political read-
ings of how development unfolds over time. This new approach articulates the 
ways in which underlying sets of politics and power relations shape the types 
of institutional arrangements that emerge and how they function in practice. 
Whether expressed in terms of ‘limited access orders’ (North et al. 2009) or ‘polit-
ical settlements’ (Khan 2010, 2017), a key focus here is on how struggle and con-
flict are fundamental to how politics unfolds in the Global South, particularly 
through processes of inter-elite bargaining. Political settlements are defined by 
the interplay of the political and politics, defined by the distribution of power 
between contending social groups and social classes (di John and Putzel 2009, 
p. 4) and a stable set of institutions that delivers an acceptable distribution of 
rents (Khan 2017). Elites will have little incentive to allow formal institutions 
to function in rules-based ways unless such struggles are (to some extent at least) 
resolved in their favour, in ways that ensure that institutions distribute resources 
and status in line with the distribution of power.
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The personalized nature of inter-elite bargaining and the reluctance of elites to 
allow rules-based forms of governance to emerge—as these may enable challenger 
groups to access the resources and attain the status that they wish to gain and 
maintain for themselves (North et al. 2009, Acemoglu and Robinson 2012)—
mean that informal institutions tend to predominate. The currency of political 
exchange in predominantly clientelist political settlements is the materialist 
exchange of goods and opportunities (e.g. contracts, jobs, other positions) for polit-
ical loyalty, mediated through social networks. The capacity to manoeuvre effec-
tively in such contexts is highly gendered, with women often lacking the financial 
and social capital required to negotiate and gain status within these networks of 
power (cf. Nazneen 2017).
Just as political regimes have been classified into different types, usually along 
a continuum from democratic to authoritarian, different types of political settle-
ment can also be identified. Brian Levy (2014) suggests two critical dimensions 
along which political settlements differ—the first with regards to the distribu-
tion of power and the second regarding the nature of institutions (see Figure 2.2). 
In terms of the distribution of power, political settlements can be more or less 
dominant or competitive, depending on the level of challenge elites in power 
(the ruling coalition) face from elites who are excluded from the ruling coalition, 
and also from lower-level actors making particular demands from within the 
ruling coalition. In particular, if elites who are excluded from the ruling coali-
tion lack the capacity to mount a serious challenge for power, the ruling coali-
tion can be described as dominant; whereas if excluded elites are well organized 
and resourced, the settlement is more competitive in nature. For one political 
settlements theorist, the presence of strong excluded coalitions in ‘competitive 
clientelist’ settlements is likely to reduce the time horizons of the ruling coali-
tion and incentivize them to undertake short-term measures in order to retain 




























Figure 2.2 A political settlements typology.
Source: Levy (2014)
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enough to adopt a longer time horizon (Khan 2010). Levy’s other dimension 
concerns the extent to which institutions (whether political institutions, such as 
constitutions and electoral processes, or bureaucratic ones involving the public 
service) operate according to personalized or more impersonalized logics. For 
example, are political parties largely personalized or programmatic in nature? 
Are public-sector jobs and promotions offered on the basis of merit or other 
criteria? When people encounter the state—whether in terms of collecting a 
pension or seeking redress for some form of injustice—can they expect to be seen 
as citizens or as clients (Corbridge et al. 2005), and are such sightings affected by 
the gender of the citizen involved?
This interaction between the organization of political power and the nature of 
institutions, between Mouffe’s ‘political’ and ‘politics’, creates different types of 
political settlement, each of which has distinctive rules of the game and thus dis-
tinctive incentives, constraints, opportunities, and risks. For example, it becomes 
clearer to see how elites operating within competitive political settings face strong 
incentives to deploy public institutions for primarily political purposes, as through 
the discretionary allocation of rents such as public employment, contracts, and 
preferential access to natural resources. Importantly, each axis operates as a con-
tinuum, which means that it is able to capture different degrees of cohesion/com-
petitiveness and personalization within as well as between particular types.
Ideas as well as interests matter to the establishment and functioning of polit-
ical settlements (Hickey et al. 2015). Ideas are mobilized to secure dominant 
interests, including gendered ideas around rights, citizenship, and status. Drawing 
on Schmidt (2008), ‘normative-paradigmatic’ ideas are particularly important at 
the level of the overall political settlement, in that certain ideas can help bind 
certain elite bargains. As noted earlier, this could include fundamental ideas 
around women’s rights and status as citizens that underpin the ‘sexual contract’ 
(Pateman 1988), such as patriarchal ideas around bodily integrity. Not all broad 
social norms around gender would be intrinsic to the political settlement per 
se—in the sense that they could be challenged without making a direct challenge 
to the binding logic of the political settlement itself—and we might expect such 
norms to be easier to change, given the reduced level of elite interest in protect-
ing them. Schmidt’s lower-level ideas—namely problem definitions and policy 
solutions—are integrated into our framework at the level of the policy domain; 
our focus here is on the specific version of this, which can be termed the domain 
of women’s interests.
The domain of women’s interests
The second key domain within our power domains framework is associated with 
specific fields of interests or concerns and is comprised of those actors, ideas, 
institutions, and policy legacies that directly govern and shape this specific field. 
Whether a domain of women’s interests actually exists is the subject of heated 
debate within feminist scholarship. As noted above, an a priori definition of wom-
en’s interests is problematic because women are not a homogenous group, and their 
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interests are shaped by class, caste, ethnicity, religion, race, and other group iden-
tities (Molyneux 1985, 2001). There is a danger here of adopting a biological read-
ing of what concerns women, as opposed to a more social reading of gender-related 
concerns. Here we would side with those who challenge ‘the entire enterprise 
of defining women’s interests’ in any ‘natural’ or ‘essentialist’ sense, and instead 
align ourselves with ‘a social perspective that allows us to think of women as able 
to organize in solidarity because of collective experiences of inequalities, without 
positing that there is a shared interest’ (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 
2014, p. 11, with reference to Weldon 2011). This approach brings the critical role 
of women’s movements, and the wider coalitions that they seek to build in pursuit 
of gender equity (Leftwich 2010), into sharp relief. According to Dahlerup (2014, 
p. 70), by focusing on what women choose to mobilize around in given temporal 
and spatial contexts, ‘…instead of trying to define what women’s interests are a 
priori, this approach points to empirical studies of historical coalition formations 
among women’s organisations and groups’, including those around domestic vio-
lence that we focus on here.
This approach also enables a strong focus on the ideas that women mobilize 
to advance their cause. Women’s movements are often seeking to challenge the 
paradigmatic ideas that predominate within given political settlements, as when 
women’s movements contest the basis of the sexual contract or other manifes-
tations of patriarchy. For Goldstone (2004, p. 357), ‘…every movement faces its 
own group- and issue-specific fields of external relations’, and the main objective 
of social movements here is to navigate and (if possible) shift the configuration of 
power within the political settlement in ways that open possibilities for progres-
sive change. Drawing on discursive institutionalist thinking, Schmidt’s (2010) 
other two levels of ideas are particularly relevant here—namely, problem defini-
tions and policy solutions. If women’s movements are able to cast their interests 
as being aligned with a recognized problem that powerful actors have already 
accepted needs to be resolved (such as development), then their concerns are 
more likely to find a receptive audience. More radically, women’s movements 
may seek to challenge dominant notions of which problems need to be solved, as 
through efforts to gain recognition for women’s rights. Proposing new and action-
able policy solutions involves discursive activities that reframe issues of gender 
equity as being worthy of solution and of efforts to identify specific policy actions 
towards their resolution, whether these are transformative or ameliorative of gen-
der relations (e.g. from property rights to girls’ basic education).
The local/social domain5
Whether processes of institutional and policy reform are adopted by elites is, we 
argue, primarily determined by the interaction of the political settlement and 
the policy domain. The interplay of these two domains also shapes the extent 
to which such reforms are implemented, in ways that lead to gendered conse-
quences (Fernandez 2012). For example, even if government agencies and budg-
ets are aligned with policy goals in favour of greater equity for women, informal 
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institutions may operate in ways that mean that resources are diverted away from 
such programmatic concerns in favour of political goals. In contexts where cli-
entelism rather than citizenship is the norm (Chatterjee 2004), the incentives 
for local actors are to focus on those interventions that can generate political 
benefits, usually through offering local brokers the opportunity to deliver rents 
in exchange for political loyalty. However, the question of whether these reforms 
actually achieve their intended aims also requires attention to the more localized 
domains of power within which reforms hit the ground and through which they 
must be filtered before they can change the lives of individuals. For example, 
whether women feel able and willing to use anti-domestic violence legislation will 
depend more on the configuration of power within households, communities, and 
local government jurisdictions than on the national-level political settlement. 
Although our case studies do not explore questions of local-level implementation 
in depth, we do uncover some evidence that the success of anti-domestic violence 
legislation may hinge on how women resolve a long-standing tension between the 
different subject positions they occupy (Mouffe 1992). That women who wish to 
use the legislation to protect themselves against domestic violence need to press 
their claims as individual rights bearers seems to conflict with the more relational 
subjectivities that they are also expected, and may sometimes prefer, to adopt, 
such as those of wife, daughter, and mother.6
Having set out our theoretical framework for capturing the ways in which pol-
itics shapes the progress of gender equity in the Global South, which we hope 
may be of some use to scholars undertaking similar work, the remainder of this 
chapter describes the methodological approach that we adopted to explore the 
process through which specific countries came to adopt legislation against domes-
tic violence.
Researching the politics of gender equity: a comparative, 
process-tracing approach
Current research into the politics of VAW and anti-domestic violence legislation 
is constrained by certain methodological tendencies within the field of gender 
and politics, and within comparative politics more broadly. In particular, the field 
remains characterized by either large-n survey-based work (e.g. Htun and Weldon 
2010, Richards and Haglund 2015) or by one-off case studies (e.g. Cagna and Rao 
2016). Although these different types of study each provides valuable insights, 
they struggle to identify the causal pathways through which different types of 
political context shape the possibilities for gender equity, either because their 
large-n statistical focus can only identify correlates, rather than causal pathways, 
or because the sample is limited to a single case.7 We draw here on the growing 
recognition within the social sciences that relatively small-n comparative analysis 
can provide an important route through which to build stronger causal stories 
that are relevant to particular places and wider theory-building, and also to policy 
actors concerned with identifying effective strategies that may work in different 
types of context. For George and Bennett (2005, p. 254), ‘This iteration between 
BK-TandF-9780815372356_TEXT_BRUNT-181008-Chp02.indd   35 08/02/19   10:38 AM
36 Sam Hickey and Sohela Nazneen
theory and data and between within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons is 
a key advantage of typological theorizing as compared to comparative methods 
used alone’. Moreover,
…typological theories can guide researchers towards questions and research 
designs whose results will be pertinent to problems faced by policymakers. 
One of the chief goals of political science…is to provide policymakers with 
‘generic knowledge’ that can help them form effective strategies (ibid, p. 7).
By seeking to specify how policy reforms have played out in different types of 
context, we hope to be able to generate recommendations for political and policy 
actors involved in promoting gender equity that are attuned to particular types of 
context, rather than rely on making either catch-all claims or the disclaimer that 
‘context’ is everything.
Our selection of six countries in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa was made 
using the political settlements typology introduced earlier (see Figure 2.2). We 
sought to identify most-likely cases that would exemplify the main four types that 
predominate in the Global South, as detailed here:
• Box 2: Dominant-personalized. This type involves personalized elite bar-
gains and limited institutional complexity, with a dominant party/leader. 
However, different countries within this type may reflect different levels of 
dominance and/or commitment to building impersonal institutions, includ-
ing our own cases:
• Rwanda: highly dominant, higher commitment to impersonality.
• Uganda: weakly dominant, highly personalized.
• Box 3: Competitive clientelism. Personalized elite bargains and limited institu-
tional complexity within a competitive setting (Ghana and Bangladesh, with 
Bangladesh moving towards greater dominance since around 2010).
• Box 4: Dominant-institutionalized. Characterized by more impersonalized elite 
bargains and greater institutional complexity within a relatively dominant 
setting (South Africa).
• Box 5: Competitive-institutionalized. More impersonalized elite bargains and 
greater institutional complexity within a relatively competitive setting (India).
It is important when making such characterizations to be alert to the inherent 
dynamism of political settlements, whereby shifting sets of power relations and 
related processes of institutional change can lead to different tendencies and con-
figurations emerging. Figure 2.3 draws specific attention to the kinds of move-
ments and perhaps transitions that some cases seem to be going through, along 
both the dominant–competitive and the personal–impersonal axes. Our inclu-
sion of countries from two different regions within the Global South will, we 
hope, offer a clearer test of the framework and also help extend the strategic 
implications of the findings to a wider range of countries.
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The research project on which this book draws attempts to trace the politi-
cal processes through which each country, and each type of political settlement, 
moved to adopt and implement policy on domestic violence. As a first step, each 
country research team undertook an historical study of the trajectory of women’s 
political inclusion and the progress of gender equity policies in their specific con-
text. They then undertook a desk-based analysis of the political settlement within 
their country, before going further and mapping out the dominant actors and 
ideas within each political settlement in relation to the domain of women’s inter-
ests. This allowed the analysis of anti-domestic violence legislation to be contex-
tualized within the political history and institutional structures of each country, 
the history of women’s political participation, and the ideas and discourses that 
shaped claims for gender equity. To try and identify the causal mechanisms at 
work here, we used a process tracing approach that involved mapping key events 
or critical junctures within the policy adoption process and tracking them back 
to their originating drivers.
Multiple methods were deployed to uncover the key actors, ideas, and pro-
cesses at work here. Documentary analysis included relevant academic journals, 
books, non-governmental organization (NGO) reports, and policy documents 
that were produced on the drafting, passing, and implementation of the domestic 
violence policy. Secondary analysis gave insights into the process of events that 
led to the adoption and implementation of the domestic violence policies. It also 
helped to understand the challenges and opportunities created by the type of 
political settlement, the history of women’s inclusion within each type of settle-
ment, and the embedded ideas and discourses that are used to advance or block 
gender equity. Above all, though, it was through undertaking interviews with 
the key actors identified in the mapping process that we uncovered the clear-
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Figure 2.3 Political settlement type by case-study country.
Source Authors, following Levy 2014
BK-TandF-9780815372356_TEXT_BRUNT-181008-Chp02.indd   37 08/02/19   10:38 AM
38 Sam Hickey and Sohela Nazneen
directly involved in the policy processes examined here—namely, politicians, 
bureaucrats, and women’s movement activists, including academics, lawyers, and 
leaders of civil society organizations (CSOs). These interviews allowed us to cap-
ture the inside story of the strategies being deployed, relationships being formed, 
and obstacles being raised, and to triangulate between different perspectives. 
Each initial country report was also subjected to an anonymous peer review pro-
cess, whereby country and sector experts provided a critical review of the draft 
report to help revise and strengthen the versions carried forward for publication.
Our comparative approach involved in-depth analysis across as well as within 
cases. At key stages of the process, we held comparative analysis workshops that 
involved all project team members sharing evidence, analysis, and ideas. This 
process involved putting the evidence gathered from each country study into con-
versation with the broader conceptual framework, which we narrowed down in 
order to focus on some central variables. In line with methodological guidance 
on typological analysis (George and Bennett 2005), this involved the construc-
tion of comparative truth tables, which place key outcome variables alongside key 
independent variables. Given that all of our countries adopted domestic violence 
legislation, the key outcome variables we examined in order to assess the level of 
elite commitment to this process in our countries focused instead on particular 
features of the adoption and implementation process. On adoption, we examined 
the length of time that it took for governments to adopt legislation following the 
onset of calls for new laws from feminist activists; in terms of implementation, we 
looked at how long it took governments to start the process of implementation 
and the rate and level of progress, in terms of establishing centres from which 
women suffering from domestic violence can receive support (a shared character-
istic of all the laws passed here). These outcomes were then correlated with key 
variables drawn from our framework, including the type of political settlement, 
shifting political settlement dynamics, the strength of the women’s movement, 
the proportion of female parliamentarians, and the mobilization of paradigmatic 
ideas. This enables us to identify important variations in the level of elite com-
mitment to gender equity between cases and to examine how far our conceptual 
framework helped to explain this. This truth table and the results of our compar-
ative analysis are presented in Chapter 10.
Conclusion
Researching the politics of gender equity in the Global South constitutes a par-
ticular type of conceptual and methodological challenge, one that involves try-
ing to track the complex interplay of interests, ideas, and institutions within 
wider and shifting relations of power. This certainly applies to the specific 
example that we focus on here, regarding how anti-domestic violence policies 
were passed in a range of countries in the Global South. In this chapter we 
argued that, despite some important advances, current conceptual approaches 
to investigating the politics of gender equity fail to offer holistic approaches that 
are sufficiently attuned to the political and institutional realities of countries 
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in the Global South. We argue that a power domains approach—which places 
recent advances in theorizing the politics of development into conversation 
with convergent developments in the recent feminist literature on gender and 
politics—can offer such a framework. The power domains framework focuses 
on the interplay between the underlying configuration of power that shapes 
how polities function, on the one hand, and the more specific domain of wom-
en’s interests, on the other. Applying this conceptual approach to six carefully 
selected country cases through a rigorous methodological approach, involving 
process-tracing and comparative case-study analysis, helps move beyond current 
accounts of anti-domestic violence policies that have tended to rely on either 
aggregated accounts drawn from cross-national survey data or one-off case stud-
ies. In particular, our case-study chapters reveal the actual causal mechanisms 
through which gender equity policies were passed in particular types of context. 
This includes shedding light on the ways in which the coalition-building and 
discursive framing approaches of feminist activists engaged with dominant ideas 
and interests. We show that this often involved informal rather than formal 
strategies and showed how the pace of reform was strongly influenced by the 
types of political settlement involved and the shifting configuration of power 
within these. As Chapter 10 discusses, these accounts seek to make an impor-
tant contribution to current debates around the politics of gender equity and 
offer important clues for political and policy actors seeking to promote gender 
equity in specific types of context.
Notes
 1. This approach fits closely with Leftwich’s (1994) definition of politics, which also 
includes a focus on both the material and ideational issues around which political 
struggles are based.
 2. See Hickey et al. (2014) for a review of this literature.
 3. The World Bank’s 2017 World Development Report on Governance, Law and Devel-
opment adopts a similar schematic framework.
 4. With reference to the theoretical approaches reviewed earlier, this dimension of 
the framework helps capture the main insights from work on political opportunity 
structures, regarding the interplay of elites and institutions, and also incorporates 
the focus of historical institutionalists on the interplay between formal and infor-
mal institutions. This domain also includes the work discussed on the paradigmatic 
or higher-level role of ideas and discourse.
 5. Given that policy adoption is the primary focus of this volume, we have spent more 
time here setting out the constitutive elements of the first two domains of power in 
detail, whilst only briefly sketching some of the constitutive features of the social 
domain. A fuller analysis of this domain would probably need to break it down fur-
ther, including a recognition of the household as a critical domain of power when 
it comes to questions of gender equity, and particularly to the issue of domestic 
violence that we discuss here.
 6. This reflects an earlier debate between Bina Agarwal (2003) and Cecile Jackson 
(2003). See Ahikire and Mwiine (Chapter 4 in this volume) for a sense of how this 
played out in one of our cases.
 7. The timing and nature of the excellent study by Htun and Weldon (2010) means 
that it was not able to capture some of the legislative developments that we focus on 
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here (e.g. Uganda did not adopt until 2010), the process through which this actually 
occurred, or the extent of the effort made to implement the legislation. Unfortu-
nately, the later analysis that Htun and Weldon performed was published too late 
(2018) to be incorporated here, although the commentary chapter from Georgina 
Waylen (see Chapter 11) usefully sets out the ways in which their analysis relates to 
our own.
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3
Introduction
Globally, domestic violence affects women in vastly disproportionate terms 
compared with men, and it affects women across social classes, races, castes, 
ethnicities, and nationalities. The first systematic review of global popula-
tion data finds that ‘35% of women worldwide have experienced either phys-
ical and/or sexual intimate partner violence or non-partner sexual violence’ 
(WHO 2013, p. 2). Global social attitudes data suggest that ‘in 17 out of 41 
countries, a quarter or more people think that it is justifiable for a man to beat 
his wife’ (UN 2011, p. 32). Beyond the often severe and long-term health con-
sequences for victims and survivors, domestic violence has widespread social 
and economic costs. Despite its high prevalence rates and damaging effects, 
domestic violence emerged relatively recently as an issue in international dis-
course, not becoming an object of UN activity until the 1980s, following 
transnational advocacy on the issue (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Once on the 
agenda, however, domestic violence swiftly became an important focus from 
the 1990s onwards, through a range of international and regional agreements 
and official meetings. In response to international and local pressures, gov-
ernments worldwide started to introduce laws against violence against women 
(VAW) in the same decade. So far, 125 countries have laws on sexual harass-
ment and 52 have laws on marital rape (UN 2015), while at least 140 countries 
have passed laws on domestic violence (World Bank 2015). Close observers 
suggest that the emergence of such international norms has been critical to 
action to address VAW, because ‘norms create standards in global civil society, 
create shared expectations in regional communities of nations … and mobi-
lise domestic civil society’ (Weldon and Htun 2013, p. 239).
In this chapter, we seek to account for the rapid spread of national legisla-
tion against domestic violence around the world since the 1990s, examining 
the politics that underpinned the emergence, cascading, and diffusion of a 
new global norm against VAW and domestic violence. First, we introduce 
our conceptual framework, drawing from Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) work 
on global norm diffusion. Then we move on to discuss the process of norm 
emergence and contestation, including the role of transnational advocacy 
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networks and the UN in norm emergence against VAW. In the next section, 
we identify the channels through which norms cascade, examining the influ-
ence of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW), regional agreements, and regional diffusion. We 
also discuss the role of transnational actors in processes of national policy 
adoption and the challenges of translating the global norm to different cul-
tural contexts.
Defining domestic violence
Finding a universally applicable definition of domestic violence is a complex 
and perhaps unachievable endeavour. In the broadest sense, violence against 
women has been interpreted as comprising four principle forms: psychological, 
physical, sexual, and in addition, economic—although this latter category is 
not always recognized directly within discussions of VAW or domestic violence. 
For example, Article 1 of the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women defines VAW as:
any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, phys-
ical, sexual or mental harm or suffering to women, including threats of such 
acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public 
or in private life. (UN 1993)
Likewise, domestic violence is defined as:
physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including 
battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related vio-
lence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices 
harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploita-
tion. (UN 1993)
However, the UN General Assembly’s Resolution on the Elimination of Domestic 
Violence Against Women in 2003, recognizes that ‘domestic violence can include 
economic deprivation and isolation and that such conduct may cause imminent 
harm to the safety, health or well-being of women’.
A further conceptual distinction of importance here pertains to causal con-
ceptualizations of the challenge. A feminist critique suggests that, whilst impor-
tant advances have been made, framing domestic violence as a criminal act to 
be resolved by judicial means fails to recognize that man-on-woman intimate 
partner violence results from unequal gender relations, embedded within wider 
unequal superstructures (Weissman 2013). As we will see in the sections to follow 
in this chapter, the incorporation of a human rights framing of VAW in the UN, 
following international advocacy on the issue, led to the recognition of the struc-
tural causes that underlie violence.
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Mobilizing against VAW: the emergence of a global norm
What accounts for the fact that, in 1990, only three UN member states had a 
national law in place that specifically targeted domestic violence,1 whereas by 2016, 
140 countries had passed laws specifically addressing domestic violence? In search 
of an answer to this question we draw on Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) lifecycle 
of norms framework (see Figure 3.1), which attempts to capture the process by which 
‘global social norms’, defined as ‘standards of appropriate behaviour shared by a crit-
ical mass of states’,2 emerge, cascade, and become internalized at local levels.
Stage 1: Emergence Norm entrepreneurs (activists) use organizational 
platforms (NGOs/IOs/media) to frame issues within 
existing, contested, normative space. They mobilize 
expertise, information, and the media to persuade state 
actors (norm leaders) to endorse their norm and to gain its 
institutionalization within specific international rules and 
organizations.
REACHES TIPPING POINT (one-third)
Stage 2: Cascade Rapid adoption of the norm in response to international or 
regional ‘contagion’ or ‘socialization’ in response to 
ongoing work by norm entrepreneurs. After the tipping




Gradual process whereby the norm becomes accepted 
practice within the law, professional and public service 
bureaucracies, and the wider public. At the extreme end of 
the process—norms become ‘taken for granted’.
Figure 3.1  The ‘lifecycle of norms’ framework (adapted from Finnemore and Sikkink’s 
framework).
Source: Adapted from Finnemore and Sikkink (1998)
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Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) suggest that global norms become institu-
tionalized through the establishment of international agreements. When a 
large number of states sign up to such agreements, a tipping point is reached 
(which they estimate to be one-third of the members of a particular commu-
nity of states) beyond which such norms begin to cascade downwards into 
national institutions and agreements, finally becoming ‘internalized’ within 
bureaucracies, the judicial system, and providers of services (Hulme and 
Fukuda-Parr 2009). The literature on global norm diffusion also highlights 
the constellations of actors that are involved in creating and spreading norms. 
These are the norm entrepreneurs, comprising a range of transnational and 
local activists, often operating within or through nongovernmental organi-
zations (NGOs) and other international organizations (IOs) (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998).
Although the literature on global norm diffusion is useful in unpacking the 
process by which international norms emerge and spread, it has received some crit-
icism. According to Zwingel (2016), it runs the risk of assuming that global norms 
are fixed, rather than changing over time, and are imposed from above, with states 
and local actors being portrayed as passive recipients. As a result, processes of 
contestation and renegotiation of norms at transnational and domestic levels are 
not sufficiently unpacked. For example, Zwingel (2016) argues that the concept of 
norm internalization suggests a one-way process, whereby states accept and insti-
tutionalize international norms as they are. However, as all the case-study chapters 
in this volume illustrate, norms are contested and renegotiated in domestic con-
texts before they are institutionalized. In Uganda (see Chapter 4) and, eventually, 
Ghana (see Chapter 8), for example, domestic violence was framed not as an issue 
of women’s rights, but as one that threatened family life and developmental 
progress. In responding to this critique, we unpack the complex politics behind 
each of the three stages of global norm diffusion, highlighting the contestation 
and negotiation of norms in this process and the interaction between trans-
national, regional, and local actors. We hence adapt Finnemore and Sikkink’s 
(1998) framework to emphasize the interactive, complex, and changing nature 
of global norm diffusion on domestic violence. Figure 3.2 shows the adapted 
framework.
In stage 1, we emphasize the politics behind global norm emergence, which 
involves the framing, reframing, and contestation of global norms by global 
and national activists and opponents. In stage 2, contrary to Finnemore 
and Sikkink, we argue that domestic pressure is also an influencing fac-
tor in international and regional norm cascading, as the empirical chapters 
(Chapters 4–9) will later illustrate. Stage 3 of the lifecycle of norms on VAW 
involves norm internalization, which entails the incorporation of the norm 
into law, public services, and wider acceptance in society. In this stage, we 
emphasize the complex and dynamic process of translation that underpins 
internalization, whereby norms are reframed by norm entrepreneurs (such 
as femocrats and local women’s rights activists), based on local justice prin-
ciples (Merry 2006a).
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Emergence and institutionalization: norm entrepreneurs, 
frames, and platforms
International mobilization for the eradication of VAW has been driven for-
wards by interlinking movements for the protection of human rights following 
the horrors of World War II and successive waves of international feminism 
in support of equal rights for women (Weldon 2006, Bhattacharjya 2013). 
Table 3.1 presents a timeline of the international and regional events and 
agreements that contributed to the emergence and institutionalization of 
opposition to VAW as a global social norm, as set against a background of 
critical global junctures in the second half of the 20th century. The follow-
ing sections of the chapter analyse—as per Finnemore and Sikkink’s adapted 
framework—the critical norm entrepreneurs, platforms, and issue framings 
that catalyzed these processes of institutionalization. They also analyse the 
key leaders and opposers and the shifting global political opportunities that 
shaped the kinds of advances that have been achieved. The actual influence 
of transnational factors within specific domestic contexts is discussed in the 
empirical chapters of this book (see Chapters 4–9).
Stage 1: Emergence Norm entrepreneurs frame, negotiate, and reframe
domestic violence and VAW issues in the face of 
opposition by norm resistors, for the norm to be adopted at 
the global level.
REACHES TIPPING POINT (one-third) 
Stage 2: Cascade The global norm on VAW is rapidly adopted as a result of 
domestic and regional advocacy and the ratification of 
regional and international conventions.
Stage 3: 
Internalization
The internalization of norms occurs through a complex  
process of translation of norms into the vernacular, 
whereby activists reframe the issue of VAW in terms of 
local justice ideas to reach citizens and governments.
Figure 3.2 The politics of global norm diffusion on VAW.
Source: Adapted from Finnemore and Sikkink’s framework (1998)
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The UN and the global women’s movement
The UN has been a critical enabling force behind the formation of an interna-
tional movement against VAW. It created space for the issue to emerge and be 
debated and fostered alliances between feminists across the North and South 
(Weldon 2006). These spaces enabled interactions between activists directly 
affected by the issue with experiential resources and experts or professionals with 
scientific, technical, and institutional resources (Joachim 2003). At the same 
time, dissatisfaction and opposition to these formal procedures amongst some 
activists catalyzed the establishment of alternative deliberative spaces, within 
which counter-hegemonic agendas and alliances were formed around similar con-
cerns, including violence against women.
A key contribution in the emergence of global opposition to VAW was the 
UN Decade for Women 1975–1985. This included three international World 
Conferences on Women, beginning with one in Mexico in 1975, which was plagued 
by political tensions and divisions, such as the Cold War and anti-imperialist sen-
timent in the last years of colonialism. The gathering was dominated by Northern 
Table 3.1 Norm emergence and institutionalization











• UN Decade for Women (Mexico 1975, 
Copenhagen 1980, Nairobi 1985)
• ‘Global Campaign on Women’s Human Rights’ 
emerges at Nairobi (1985)
• 300,000 strong petition from 123 countries 
demands ‘women’s rights as human rights’ (1991)
• ‘16 days of activism’ (1991)
• UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
Against Women at Vienna (1993)
Legacy of the 1960s and 
feminism’s second wave















• Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, 
Punishment and Eradication of Violence against 
Women (1995)
• Beijing Platform for Action adopted by 
189 states (1995)
• Optional Protocol to CEDAW (1999)
• Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa (2000)
• UN General Assembly Resolution on the 
Elimination of Domestic Violence Against 
Women (2003)
• Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Violence Against Women and 
Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention 2011)
End of Cold War and 
democratization
Rape as weapon of war
Feminism’s fourth wave
Source: Compiled by authors.
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actors and rejected by many feminists. The following year, partly in response to 
dissatisfaction with UN processes, a group of Northern feminists organized an 
International Tribunal on Crimes Against Women in Brussels, which brought 
together more than 2,000 women from more than 40 countries (Joachim 2003) 
to hear testimonies about crimes and violence against women. The event suffered 
from further internal divisions and a contested agenda, but ultimately led to state-
ments of transnational solidarity and the formation of new transnational alliances 
and networks, such as the International Feminist Network, and an increased focus 
on VAW among Southern delegates (Joachim 2003).
The UN decade for Women led to formulation of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 
1979, a landmark convention on women’s rights (UN 1979). In 1981, women 
activists marked 25 November as an International Day for the Elimination of 
Violence Against Women in remembrance of the three Mirabal sisters, politi-
cal activists in the Dominican Republic, who were brutally assassinated under 
the Trujillo dictatorship. Coming into force in 1981, CEDAW represents a 
watershed moment as the first time that ‘different categories of rights affecting 
the status of women’ had been brought together under one common agenda 
(Oloka-Onyango and Tamale 1995, p. 714). Whilst many commentators feel 
that CEDAW was a critical early step towards a global anti-VAW agenda, at this 
stage it contained no specific provisions about violence against women. In fact, 
VAW was not mentioned at all, neither implicitly nor explicitly. Nonetheless, 
CEDAW marked the entry of women’s rights into the international human 
rights framework.
Women continued to organize, both within, outside (in parallel NGO 
forums), and between the three General Assembly meetings throughout this 
decade, which culminated in the Third World Women’s Conference in Nairobi 
in 1985. It was here that the Global Campaign on Women’s Human Rights 
emerged as a coalition of a wide range of regional advocacy networks, includ-
ing the Latin American Committee for the Defence of Women’s Rights; the 
Asia-Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development; and Women in Law and 
Development in Africa (WiLDAF), as well as training institutes such as the 
US-based Institute for Women, Law, and Development, which began to train 
women activists around the world in how to use the law to promote women’s 
rights (Friedman 1995, p. 24). Thus, despite conflict and opposition, the World 
Women’s Conferences contributed to bringing together diverse women’s groups 
from across the world to form transnational networks on women’s rights. The 
conferences also brought the issue of VAW to the UN for the first time. The 
Nairobi conference went a step further, to recognize the important role that 
states should play in preventing and eliminating violence against women, giving 
specific recommendations for action.
The International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women 
became key to the galvanization of a transnational women’s movement in the 
run-up to the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. A coalition of 
BK-TandF-9780815372356_TEXT_BRUNT-181008-Chp03.indd   50 11/02/19   9:56 AM
Ending domestic violence 51
women’s organizations—led particularly by the International Women’s Tribune 
Centre, the Centre for Women’s Global Leadership, and the International 
YWCA—announced ‘16 days of activism’ between the International Day 
against VAW on 25 November and International Human Rights Day on 
10 December and launched an international petition demanding that ‘the UN 
World Conference should “comprehensively address women’s human rights at 
every level of its proceedings” and recognize gender-based violence “as a viola-
tion of human rights requiring immediate action”’ (Friedman 1995, p. 28). The 
petition attracted more than 300,000 signatories across 123 countries and was 
submitted to a preparatory UN conference in 1991. This acted as a recruitment 
drive for the movement, with the 16 days of activism repeated annually in the 
run-up to the Vienna meeting. By 1993, women’s movements were observing the 
16 days campaign in 50 countries, demonstrating how this transnational agenda 
was able to tap into existing regional and local women’s movements around the 
world. Regional women’s rights coalitions began organizing satellite meetings 
in the run-up to Vienna, where they developed lists of demands, and, by this 
point, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International had carried out inter-
national fieldwork to collect evidence of women’s rights abuses. The Centre 
for Women’s Global Leadership organized a strategic planning meeting that 
brought together regional networks of women’s movements to develop a com-
mon set of demands. Despite initial resistance, they managed to gain agreement 
for their list of recommendations to be included in the draft to be considered 
at the World Conference. In December 1993, the UN General Assembly passed 
the Declaration to End Violence Against Women and appointed a Special 
Rapporteur to monitor progress.
Between Vienna in 1993 and the Fourth World Women’s Conference in 
Beijing in 1995, a series of UN events provided the space for the nascent Global 
Campaign for Women’s Human Rights (Bunch and Frost 2000) to gather pace 
and develop a coherent international agenda, one that included a focus on 
protecting women from violence. These included the World Conference on 
Population and Development in Cairo in 1994, which linked VAW with repro-
ductive health and rights, and the UN’s 50th anniversary celebrations and 
World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen in 1995. In Beijing, 
delegates agreed the Beijing Platform for Action—a concrete set of com-
mitments, including on violence against women, that state representatives 
could ‘translate into policy and legal reform’ within their own national con-
texts (Bhattacharya 2013). In 1999, the Optional Protocol to CEDAW, first 
discussed at Vienna in 1993, was introduced, giving the Convention greater 
enforcement power. As Weldon (2006, p. 61) explains: ‘the Protocol permits 
complaints to be made on behalf of individuals who have exhausted remedies 
available in their countries. CEDAW reviews the complaint, and at the end of 
a consultative process renders a judgment’. As Zwingel (2016, p. 127) argues, 
this marked the turn of CEDAW from a rhetorically accepted treaty to an 
international monitoring tool.
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Issue-framing and mobilizing strategies
Identifying the absence of women’s lived experience from the international 
human rights architecture, and promulgating the message that governments 
could be held accountable for condoning human rights abuses experienced by 
women, was critical to the rise of opposition to VAW as a global norm (Friedman 
1995, Bhattacharya 2013). The tactics adopted by movement ‘entrepreneurs’ in 
framing violence against women in these terms were significant (Joachim 2003). 
The preceding discussion highlighted the convening role played by the US-based 
Centre for Women’s Global Leadership (CWGL) in the emergence of a global 
movement to protect women from violence. Key to its initial success was a dual 
strategy of activist mobilization alongside the formation of an epistemic com-
munity capable of making the case for women’s rights to be seen as a politically 
salient issue. The mobilization process included emotive testimony from female 
victims of human rights abuses, the convening of counter-hegemonic spaces, and 
building the capacity of feminist networks in the Global South. Forging an epis-
temic community involved grounding a discourse of ‘women’s rights as human 
rights’ within social scientific and policy networks through robust research and 
publication. On the one hand, CWGL catalyzed and facilitated the international 
16 days of activism to link 15 November—a day of remembrance for victims of 
gender violence—with Human Rights Day on 10 December; on the other,
Charlotte Bunch, Director of the CWGL at the time, published an arti-
cle entitled ‘Women’s Rights as Human Rights’ in the prestigious journal 
Human Rights Quarterly in 1990, providing a scientifically grounded explana-
tion for why women’s rights were human rights. (Joachim 2003, p. 94)
Linking women’s rights with human rights also facilitated the mobilization of 
an international constituency…it resonated with people in different cultural 
contexts…Moreover, the frame had strategic advantages: it helped to gain 
access to institutional resources and win allies because human rights was an 
already accepted framework (Joachim 2003, p. 259).
Other critical tactics in the success of transnational activists in keeping VAW 
high on the global policy agenda have been the strategic use of the media, including 
hiring their own media consortium in the run-up to Vienna in 1993; building legit-
imacy through alliances with respected research and advocacy organizations such 
as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch; and the strategic targeting 
of critically influential actors within international negotiations. Anne Walker of 
the International Women’s Tribune Center in New York describes how, at Vienna, 
‘Women’s rights activists were the ones who camped in corridors, outside the draft-
ing rooms, and offered delegates better paragraphs. They tried to catch state rep-
resentatives during their tea and coffee breaks or even in the bathrooms’ (cited in 
Joachim 2003, p. 259). Both Sen (2006) and Weldon (2006) find, however, that 
the most critical factor underpinning the success of the global movement against 
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VAW was internal to the movement itself, in terms of the ability of its members 
to both articulate and implement ‘norms of inclusivity’ (Weldon 2006, p. 55). The 
tensions between Northern and Southern feminists around contentious issues 
such as female genital mutilation and Northern imperialist hegemony ran deep, 
posing serious threats to the viability of a legitimate and substantively representa-
tive transnational movement in the 1970s and early 1980s. Weldon explains that 
significant international agreements in support of action to protect women from 
violence were absent prior to the Nairobi conference. This was when activists took 
explicit steps to ensure the equal representation of Southern voices and to insti-
tutionalize dissent, rather than focus always on consensus; ‘thus, it was not until 
the late eighties and early nineties that women could develop the frameworks and 
strategies that they implemented with such success’ (Weldon 2006, p. 62).
Framing domestic violence within the VAW agenda
As Meyersfield’s (2010) systematic review of international law reveals, there is not 
at present any international instrument that legislates directly against domestic 
violence. This is linked to a challenge that Joachim (2003, p. 257) refers to as: 
‘the normative frame of the family’—in other words, the family as a private realm 
where states and international institutions should not intervene. Nevertheless, 
the issue of domestic violence increasingly gained visibility in international doc-
uments as the issue of violence against women was explicitly addressed in official 
documents, from the late 1980s onwards. This was a result of the framing of VAW 
including domestic violence as a human rights issue, which broadened the human 
rights perspective of perpetrators from states to include private individuals (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998, Morgaine, 2007). Table 3.2 shows the chronology of interna-
tional conferences and agreements that incorporated the issue of domestic vio-
lence explicitly into their agenda.
The first time domestic violence was explicitly mentioned in a UN document was 
in the report on the Second Women’s Conference in Copenhagen in 1980, where 
violence in the family was identified as a problem with ramifications for human 
dignity and health, and states were urged to take action to combat it. The Third 
Conference in Nairobi in 1985 also urged governments to take action to identify, 
prevent, and eliminate domestic violence. Following the Nairobi Conference, an 
expert group was established in Vienna to generate more systematic evidence about 
the causes and consequences of the problem. There was a recognition that both 
problem and solution frames were inadequate, based around the assumption ‘that 
domestic violence was a societal ill and that the victim as well as the perpetrator were 
abnormal or sick’, giving rise to therapeutic or welfare regimes that neither explained 
the extent of the problem nor gave adequate protection to victims (Joachim 2003, 
p. 257). The expert panel achieved a radical reframing of domestic violence as a mat-
ter for criminal prosecution and gained widespread acceptance for this within the 
UN on the basis of scientific evidence from developing and developed countries and 
symbolic representativeness in terms of the panel being comprised of experts from 
24 countries, many of which were located in the Global South.
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Alongside the reframing of domestic violence as a punishable crime, the UN 
continued to frame the issue as a human rights issue, as Table 3.2 illustrates. 
The 1995 Beijing Platform for Action states that domestic violence is a human 
rights violation: ‘Violence against women [in the public and private spheres] both 
violates and impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of their human rights 
and fundamental freedoms’ (UN 1995). The human rights framing enabled a 
broader understanding of the structural causes of violence, which a narrow crim-
inal justice framing does not incorporate: in 1992, General Recommendation 19 
was introduced in CEDAW, which explicitly mentioned VAW including domestic 
Table 3.2 International conferences/agreements that address domestic violence
Event/agreement Year Description
Second UN Women’s Conference, 
Copenhagen 
1980 First time domestic violence was explicitly 
mentioned in a UN meeting; stated that 
legislation should be enacted by states to 
address it. 
Third UN Women’s Conference, 
Nairobi
1985 Recommended that governments establish 
policies and legislative measures to ascertain 
causes of VAW, including domestic violence, 
and to prevent and eliminate it.
UN Expert Group Meeting on 
Violence in the Family with 
Special Emphasis on Women, 
Vienna
1986 Domestic violence was recognized as a 
matter of criminal prosecution.
Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women 
General Recommendation 19 on 
VAW
1992 VAW was explicitly acknowledged, 
including within the family. 
World Conference on Human 
Rights 
1993 Vienna Declaration highlighted the 
importance of combating VAW in both 
public and private life.
Declaration of the Elimination of 
Violence Against Women 
(DEWA)
1993 Domestic violence is defined and recognized 
as a violation of human rights.
Beijing Platform for Action 1995 Recognizes domestic violence as a human 
rights issue, stating that much of VAW 
occurs within the household, and 
highlights measures to address it.
Special Rapporteur on VAW Model 
Legislation on Domestic Violence
1996 Presented a framework for model legislation 
on domestic violence.
Beijing +5 2000 Conference to review the progress on 
addressing women’s rights since the Beijing 
Conference. It documented among others 
progress and obstacles on addressing 
domestic violence and measures to address it.
General Assembly Resolution on 
Elimination of Domestic Violence 
Against Women
2004 Domestic violence recognized as a violation 
of human rights with long-term 
consequences; called for elimination of 
violence in the family.
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violence and acknowledged that the underlying causes of domestic violence 
included structural inequalities:
Family violence is one of the most insidious forms of violence against women. 
It is prevalent in all societies. Within family relationships women of all ages 
are subjected to violence of all kinds, including battering, rape, other forms 
of sexual assault, mental and other forms of violence, which are perpetuated 
by traditional attitudes. Lack of economic independence forces many women 
to stay in violent relationships … (UN 1992)
Traditionally, human rights treaties were applicable only to states, but with the 
inclusion of violence against women as a human rights issue, states have a duty 
to protect victims from violence by private individuals. The legal obligations of 
the state in regards to domestic violence were highlighted by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on VAW in 1996, who presented a model legislation on domestic 
violence, urging states to adopt legislation (UN 2009). 
In time, these developments led to the passing of UN General Assembly 
Resolution on the Elimination of Domestic Violence Against Women, which 
among many more detailed issues, calls upon states to:
adopt, strengthen and implement legislation that prohibits domestic vio-
lence, prescribes punitive measures and establishes adequate legal protection 
against domestic violence and periodically to review, evaluate and revise 
these laws and regulations so as to ensure their effectiveness in eliminating 
domestic violence. (UN 2004)
Leaders, opponents, and shifting political opportunities
Analysts of the rise of the VAW agenda within international human rights law and 
global policy spaces highlight a series of wider political and institutional oppor-
tunities that supported the emergence of this issue as one requiring international 
attention. Support from powerful governments and international organizations 
has been key, and this opened up following the rise of the human rights agenda in 
the post-war era, democratization’s third wave, including the end of the cold war, 
and the horrors of the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda that brought the use of 
rape as a weapon of war starkly into the limelight (Joachim 2003, Weldon 2006). 
Other studies have focused on the important role played by femocrats within the 
UN system in ensuring that agreements were translated into international gender 
machineries and resources invested into implementation (Sandler and Rao 2012). 
Post-Beijing implementation has been challenging, however, and such gender 
machineries have in practice been severely under-resourced, with UNIFEM, for 
example, having to generate much of its own resource base (Bhattacharya 2013).
Beyond the UN’s Decade for Women, Weldon (2006) highlights the support 
provided by the Canadian government to the Inter-American Convention on 
Violence Against Women, and the strong leadership provided by the United States 
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to the global movement in general, and particularly to the CWGL in the run-up to 
Vienna in 1993. American diplomats have played the role of both leader and resis-
tor, however. Sen (2006, p. 49) highlights how neo-conservative US administra-
tions and also the Holy See have, at times, served to bolster opposition to gender 
equality and women’s human rights, particularly around questions of sexuality and 
reproductive rights. The Holy See is widely recognized as having played a criti-
cal and oppositional role throughout the first decade after the 1994 International 
Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, although Sen suggests that 
the Vatican passed this mantle to the US delegation in the early 2000s. Hulme 
(2015, p. 39) similarly draws attention to an ‘unholy alliance’ between a small group 
of conservative Islamic states and the Holy See during the failed attempt to have 
reproductive rights included within the Millennium Development Goals. And as 
recently as March 2013, Egypt, Iran, Russia, and the Vatican all stood in opposi-
tion to a declaration put forward by the UN Commission on the Status of Women 
urging an end to violence against women and girls because of the inclusion of 
issues such as sexual, reproductive, and gay rights (Filipovic 2013). This resist-
ance to the promotion of women’s rights has been further bolstered by the rise 
of authoritarian populism and illiberal democracies in recent years (Goetz 2018).
Norm cascading: investigating the different channels
Unpacking the process by which global norms emerge, cascade, and become institu-
tionalized using the adapted lifecycle of norms framework helps to uncover the chan-
nels or mechanisms at the global and regional levels through which international 
norms on VAW influence domestic legislation. According to Weldon and Htun 
(2013), there are three main channels through which transnational norms influence 
domestic policy: regional diffusion, regional agreements, and global treaties.
Regional contagion and tipping points
Although activism against gender-based violence was initiated within what has 
become known as feminism’s ‘second wave’—which is usually associated with rad-
ical activism in the West—movements in Africa, South Asia, and Latin America 
were making strides towards regional agreements and action in advance of major 
international developments such as the UN Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence Against Women in Vienna in 1993 and the Beijing Platform for Action 
in 1995 (Weldon 2006). A number of studies highlight the influence of regional 
agreements and of neighbouring country policies within the same region on 
the timing of policy adoption in relation to VAW (Meyer 1999, Friedman 2009, 
Weldon and Htun 2013, Richards and Haglund 2015). Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show 
the correlation between nation states’ ratification of regional agreements and the 
introduction of national legislation against domestic violence in Latin America 
and the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa. The tables indicate that as more 
states ratified regional agreements, the number of countries that adopted domes-
tic violence legislation also increased.
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Friedman, for example, highlights how: ‘Between 1993 and 2000, nearly every 
democracy in Latin America passed a law prohibiting domestic violence. Between 
2001 and 2006, five countries strengthened their legislation, and Brazil passed its 
first law’ (2009, p. 349). Htun and Weldon (2012) recount how, following Nairobi 
in 1985, there was an explosion of Africa-wide as well as sub-regional organizing, 
including 1993 in Kampala, and the Fifth UN African Regional Conference on 
Women in Dakar in 1994.
Regional feminist networks played a key role in the diffusion of the norm 
against VAW, both regionally and nationally. In Africa, Adams and Kang (2007, 
p. 460) describe the critical role played by regional advocacy networks, such as 
Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF), and the inter-governmental 
organization, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), 
in bringing activists and national state representatives together to plan for the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. These organiza-
tions actively participated in the drafting of the Protocol, which included inno-
vative provisions on abortion, contraception, and the rights of widows and the 
elderly that were not addressed by CEDAW (Adams and Kang 2007). Their study 
suggests that three factors were critical in getting the regional Protocol institu-
tionalized: the ability of the regional advocacy network to build alliances with key 
politicians and civil servants; the fact that organizations like WiLDAF, among 
others, were able to secure observer status participation within inter-governmental 
Table 3.3 IAC ratification and domestic violence legislation in Latin America 
and the Caribbean
Latin America and Caribbean (n = 33) 1995 2000 2005 2010
Ratifying Inter-American Convention (1994) 15 29 31 31
Domestic violence legislation introduced 11 26 28 31
Notes: Dates for the passing of domestic violence-specific national legislation have been 
gathered using the Advocate for Human Rights (www.stopvaw.org) and Refworld 
(http://www.refworld.org) websites and related Internet searches on particular 
countries.
Source: Data on ratification of the Inter-American Convention has been taken from http://
www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic14.Conv%20of%20Belem%20Do%20Para%20Ratif.htm.
Table 3.4 Ratification and domestic violence legislation in sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa (n = 49) 2000 2005 2010 2015
Ratifying Protocol on African Charter (2003) n/a 16 28 34
Domestic violence legislation introduced 4 9 18 24
Notes: Dates for the passing of domestic violence-specific national legislation have been gath-
ered using the Advocate for Human Rights (www.stopvaw.org) and Refworld (http://
www.refworld.org) websites and related Internet searches on particular countries.
Source: Data on ratification of the Protocol to the African Charter comes from http://
www.achpr.org/instruments/women-protocol/ratification/.
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decision-making processes; and an opportune alignment between ACHPR’s and 
regional activist concerns (Adams and Kang, p. 451). Tripp (2010) argues that 
Africa-wide and intra-regional feminist networks are one of the key channels of 
regional diffusion of norms related to women’s rights as reflected in their role in 
the Maputo Protocol adoption. Similarly, Nazneen (2018) argues that regional 
feminist networks use a range of strategies to foster collaboration and norm dif-
fusion, such as participation in regional and multilateral policy forums. In South 
Asia, although legally binding regional conventions have yet to be introduced, 
regional advocacy networks have played a key role in the adoption of laws against 
VAW. The People’s SAARC, a network of NGOs and movements, has lobbied 
against violations by states of people’s rights and has focused on policy change to 
protect women’s rights (Chhachhi and Abeysekera 2015).
In their statistical analysis of the drivers of VAW policy adoption, Htun and 
Weldon (2012) find ‘regional diffusion and regional agreements’ to be ‘substan-
tively important’ in relation to national adoption of policies in response to VAW, 
and that together they ‘accounted for between one and two additional areas of 
policy action’ in their panel data sets (p. 562). They suggest that ‘policy diffu-
sion tends to occur among states in the same region…with similar characteris-
tics…that have regular contacts in inter-governmental political and economic 
organisations’, including through processes of ‘elite learning’, ‘emulation of other 
nations’, and ‘connections in civil society’. As Friedman (2009, p. 351) highlights, 
however, ‘there is no automatic institutionalization of these [regional] norms at 
the national level’; across Latin America, ‘conservative gender regimes were not 
transformed through pressure from above and below, but intervened in the process 
of policy development’. The character of politics, culture, and society is therefore 
critical in shaping the extent to which regional agreements and the cascading of 
international and regional norms becomes internalized within a given state.
Ratification of CEDAW
Some studies have found that the ratification of international treaties by states 
can lead to norm cascading through a wave of institutionalization of interna-
tional human rights norms to the domestic level (Landman 2005, Simmons 2009). 
CEDAW was adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly and acknowledges 
the rights of women, stating what discrimination against women entails and the 
actions that need to be taken by governments to prevent and eliminate it. Although 
CEDAW did not explicitly mention VAW, it was later included in the Optional 
Protocol. CEDAW provisions clearly state that countries that ratify the treaty are 
obliged to incorporate it into domestic law. Thus, countries that have ratified or 
acceded to the treaty are legally bound to implement its provisions. So far, CEDAW 
has been ratified by 187 countries, with only seven countries yet to ratify it, includ-
ing the United States. Some studies have found a positive relationship between 
CEDAW ratification and state policies that promote gender equity. Weldon and 
Htun (2013) argue that after 2005, CEDAW began to have direct effects on domes-
tic policy and was invoked in domestic policy discussions. Hill (2010) and Englehart 
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and Miller (2014) found that CEDAW had positive effects on women’s political 
rights, mixed effects on their social rights, and no effects on their economic rights. 
Richards and Haglund (2015, p. 124) found that the greater the number of years 
a country has been party to CEDAW, the greater the county’s legal protections 
against domestic violence, which might suggest that CEDAW may have opened up 
space for greater mobilization on women’s rights.
However, as argued previously, the global norm on VAW is not diffused 
unchanged, but rather travelled through a process of contestation and renego-
tiation. This is reflected in the reservations introduced by some countries when 
ratifying CEDAW. Countries can either accept the treaty as a whole or place 
reservations to specific articles. As Zwingel (2016) argues, article 16 on marriage 
and family life has received the majority of reservations, largely on religious 
and cultural grounds. Article 2 on state obligations to eliminate discrimination 
against women has also received a substantial number of reservations from states. 
Reservations on grounds of cultural difference reflect the extent to which global 
human rights norms are internalized in countries, and the process of translation 
that they undergo in different contexts. These reservations can affect the pas-
sage of legislation on domestic violence. Moreover, Richards and Haglund (2015) 
found that countries that hold reservations to article 2 of CEDAW are 26.2 per-
cent less likely to adopt full domestic violence legal protections; in other words, 
they tend to have weaker laws on domestic violence. Bangladesh, one of the case-
study countries in this text, placed reservations on article 2 on the obligations of 
states to take measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination against women, 
on the grounds that it is incompatible with religious personal law. Nevertheless, as 
Chapter 7 of this text demonstrates, it successfully passed the domestic violence 
law in 2010, albeit without the controversial issue of marital rape. These examples 
suggest that CEDAW ratification alone does not explain norm cascading and 
domestic institutionalization and indicates the important role played by women’s 
rights movements and norm resistors. The case-study chapters will unpack these 
processes in greater detail.
Transnational actors and domestic institutionalization
This final section takes a brief look at the ways in which transnational actors 
continue to play a role in such processes and touches briefly on some of the chal-
lenges involved. Existing research suggests that the UN, nongovernmental organ-
izations, state representatives, or policymakers from neighbouring countries along 
with transnational social movement activists have been the most prominent 
transnational players within the process of norm cascade and diffusion on VAW.
The creation or facilitation of interactive spaces between international and 
domestic policy communities, alongside international agreements, is critical to 
cascading norms and institutionalization at the national level. Htun and Weldon 
(2012) find that ‘the impact of global norms on domestic policy-making is con-
ditional on the presence of feminist movements in domestic contexts, point-
ing to the importance of ongoing activism and a vibrant civil society’ (p. 548). 
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Their statistical analysis of 70 country case studies finds that ‘When CEDAW is 
ratified, a strong autonomous feminist movement produces an additional one to 
two areas of policy on VAW (Htun and Weldon 2012, p. 563).
Merry (2006b) describes how international training programmes have sup-
ported the development of domestic institutional infrastructure for the protection 
of women’s rights (such as human rights commissions and women’s commissions) 
and the importance of UN and other international events for bringing together 
state officials, ministers, and NGO representatives within alternative spaces for 
alliance building, the sharing of ideas, and the deliberation of policy and insti-
tutional solutions. Weldon and Htun (2013) suggest that, when supported by a 
strong autonomous feminist movement, national gender machineries can, and 
have, had important impacts on the extent of policy adoption and implemen-
tation. In contexts where both formal and informal institutions obstruct wom-
en’s empowerment (Waylen 2014), and the political settlement offers a highly 
constrained space for social movement organizing, the provision of training, and 
channelling financial resources to organizations attempting to foster incremental 
shifts in gender norms within grassroots, bureaucratic, and more senior arenas, 
may be the best—or only—strategies open to transnational actors.
Conclusion
In attempting to account for the rapid and broad spread of a new global norm 
against domestic violence since the 1990s, this chapter has identified the particu-
lar importance of activist mobilization combining with scientific expertise within 
international governance institutions at opportune moments within the late 
20th century. Transnational and regional women’s movements must be lauded for 
their achievements in carving out space within the ascendant human rights and 
democratization agenda, including opening up space within the UN and forg-
ing alliances across key divides therein, including between activists and tech-
nocrats and between Northern and Southern actors. UN femocrats have clearly 
played critical roles in responding to these calls and pursuing implementation of 
agreements made. As Weldon (2006) has attested, the transnational movements’ 
ability to recognize and respond to its internal challenges and create a move-
ment grounded in equality and inclusivity has been critical, as has the strategic 
approach of mobilizing both experiential and scientific knowledge behind the 
cause. Women’s movements were also instrumental in the drafting and emer-
gence of international and regional treaties on women’s rights and VAW, such as 
CEDAW and the Maputo Protocol. Such agreements, in conjunction with con-
tinued domestic and transnational lobbying by women’s organizations, led to the 
cascading of the global norm on VAW.
The speed and rigour with which different countries in the Global South 
adopted this new global norm has varied greatly, and it is the national-level pol-
itics of this process of adopting and implementing anti-domestic violence leg-
islation that we turn to next. However, what is clear is that these overlapping 
transnational and national processes have not as yet transformed the experience 
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of women at the local level when it comes to domestic violence. At the moment, 
lack of data availability linked to the character of the problem makes it difficult 
to judge change over time. Nonetheless, it is clear that levels of domestic violence 
remain unacceptably high across the world, particularly in certain parts of the 
Global South. The gains achieved so far remain a far cry from the kind of trans-
formations in structural inequality across the world that would be needed for the 
elimination of violence against women.
Notes
 1. UK (1976), Canada (1982), Sweden (1988)—dates for the passing of domestic 
violence-specific national legislation have been gathered using the Advocate for 
Human Rights (www.stopvaw.org) and Refworld websites (http://www.refworld.org) 
websites and related Internet searches on particular countries.
 2. Khagram et al. (2002, p. 15).
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The power of strongmen 
and ruling coalitions
Promoting gender equity in 
dominant settlements
BK-TandF-9780815372356_TEXT_BRUNT-181008-Chp04.indd   65 14/02/19   1:17 PM
BK-TandF-9780815372356_TEXT_BRUNT-181008-Chp04.indd   66 14/02/19   1:17 PM
Contesting ideas, 
aligning incentives
The politics of Uganda’s 
Domestic Violence Act (2010)
Josephine Ahikire and Amon Mwiine
4
Introduction
In the early 1990s, Uganda was counted among the trailblazers on the African 
continent in terms of women’s inroads into policy-making (Goetz 2003). Together 
with South Africa, Uganda was one of the few countries with a parliament made 
up of more than 20 percent female members and an apparent commitment to 
securing women’s engagement with the state more broadly, including through 
the significant processes of constitutional reform being undertaken at the time. 
Since that point, and as Uganda’s political settlement has shifted from away 
from the broadly dominant-developmental mode that the National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) established on coming to power in 1986, optimism concern-
ing women’s influence as political actors in Uganda has steadily waned, as an 
apparent paradox has emerged. On the one hand, women have made significant 
inroads into important political and policy-making spaces, whereas, on the other, 
their ability to act autonomously in pursuit of women’s rights and gender equity 
within these spaces seems to have declined substantially. Critics have focused in 
particular on the process through which female parliamentarians have come to 
serve as a vote bank for the ruling coalition, with little room to advance women’s 
interests (Goetz 2003, Muriaas and Wang 2012, Josefsson 2014). With the wom-
en’s movement in Uganda apparently severely constrained in terms of making 
significant breakthroughs (Isis-WICCE 2014), questions are increasingly raised 
about the levels of political commitment from Uganda’s political elite to gender 
equality and women’s political empowerment.
In line with the argument established in Chapter 1 of this book, then, we take 
a different turn from the now-dominant question of whether women’s presence 
in parliament is in itself making a difference. Rather, we seek to uncover how 
the broader organization of political power within Uganda’s political settlement 
shapes efforts to promote gender equity through national policy processes using a 
case study of the Domestic Violence Act of 2010. Our investigation of this process 
involved a multi-method approach, starting with a desk-based literature review 
that tracked the evolution of Uganda’s political settlement over time against the 
claims made by women for political and social inclusion. To bring this up-to-date, 
we undertook a gendered mapping of Uganda’s contemporary political settlement, 
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whereby key actors and ideas on gender equity were positioned in relation to the 
dominant actors, incentives, and ideas of the ruling coalition. With this con-
text in place, we deployed a process-tracing approach to examine the extent to 
which the adoption and implementation of the law on domestic violence policy 
was shaped by Uganda’s political settlement. This relied in part on documentary 
analysis, but more heavily on key informant interviews and focus group discus-
sions (FGDs) with approximately 20 of the main stakeholders who played a direct 
role in the policy process. These key actors included parliamentarians, academ-
ics, civil servants, and women activists (see Appendix 1). This process-tracing 
approach enabled us to relate specific gender-related policy processes to wider 
shifts regarding the organization of political power in Uganda.
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we present an his-
torical overview of moves to promote gender equity in Uganda, from the late 
colonial era onwards. We then locate the trajectory of women’s political inclusion 
within Uganda’s changing political settlement over time, up to and including the 
moment at which activists started to promote legislation against domestic vio-
lence in the late 2000s. The following section provides an account of the ideas, 
incentives, and interests that influenced the actions of the key actors, with a 
particular focus on the alliance-building and discursive strategies deployed by the 
women’s movement to promote the adopting of the Domestic Violence Act of 
2010. We then analyse the key factors that led to the adoption of the law and the 
compromises made, and we discuss the slow rate of progress that has so far been 
made in implementing the law.
Critical junctures and the history of women’s engagement 
in politics in Uganda
The domain of women’s interests in Uganda became politicized in the 1940s, 
with women actively promoting women’s rights as a public issue and seeking to 
reconfigure the basis of women’s citizenship in the country. Women’s mobiliza-
tion, in which elite women specifically played a vital role (Tamale 1999), cen-
tred on contentious issues such as voting rights and property rights in marriage, 
especially inheritance after the death of the husband. Women formed coalitions, 
such as the pioneering Uganda Council of Women (UCW) in 1947, which served 
as melting pots for women’s engagement and schools of political mobilization. 
During the first decades of independence, the women’s movement continued to 
gain momentum, despite continued exclusion from formal national politics and 
the narrowing of political space under increasingly authoritarian forms of politi-
cal rule and civil conflict from the late 1960s onwards (see Mutibwa 1992). From 
this point onwards, Uganda’s political settlement was characterized by succes-
sive ruling coalitions’ militaristic tendencies that excluded groups based on eth-
nic and religious identities (Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey 2013, p. 14) and largely 
excluded women from political power. For instance, Idi Amin’s regime banned all 
women’s organizations in 1978, and, consequently, a state-controlled structure—
the National Council for Women (NCW)—was formed. The effect was to drive 
BK-TandF-9780815372356_TEXT_BRUNT-181008-Chp04.indd   68 14/02/19   1:17 PM
Contesting ideas, aligning incentives 69
underground all women’s mobilization, networking, and advocacy for women’s 
rights. Individual elite women, some in government departments, ensured that 
UCW activities remained alive, at least at the district level. In 1980, the second 
government of President Obote sought to co-opt the NCW as the women’s wing 
of the ruling Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) party, although many female par-
ticipants resisted this manipulation of the Council (Tripp 2002).
The mass guerrilla struggle of 1981–1985, led by the NRM, brought about a 
reconfiguration of the public, with a large number of women, peasants, middle 
class, and notables alike drawn into the armed struggle at different levels. A new 
language of representation concerning women, youth, and people with disabil-
ities (PWD) was deployed through mobilization within the Resistance Council 
system, which was first established in war zones and later generalized to the entire 
country. As participatory structures for local governance that institutionalized the 
participation of marginal groups, this marked a turning point in the construction 
of women’s citizenship in Uganda (Ddungu 1994, Ahikire 2007). The end of the 
guerrilla war in 1986, which directly followed the 1985 UN World Conference on 
Women held in neighbouring Kenya, presented a window of opportunity for mak-
ing direct demands for women’s citizenship and entitlements on the basis of their 
contribution to the struggle (Tripp 2002, Ahikire 2007). In what Goetz describes 
as a ‘hastily compiled women’s manifesto’, women in Uganda:
… called for the creation of a women’s ministry, for every ministry to have a 
women’s desk, for women’s representation in local government at all levels, 
and for the repeal of the law linking the National Council of Women to the 
government. (2002, p. 555)
These early demands were specifically focused on entry into existing political 
structures and made directly to the president, a move that perhaps played into 
the increasing propagation of a politics of patronage (rather than citizenship) 
that was by now coming to characterize the NRM government (Goetz 2003). 
The politics of mobilization focused particularly on consultations for the consti-
tutional reform process from 1988 to 1995 (Goetz 2003). The Ministry of Women 
in Development, established in 1988, together with the women’s movement, 
organized nationwide consultations, whose outcome was a memorandum to the 
Constitutional Commission seeking the repeal of legislation that discriminates 
against women on the basis of gender, particularly in relation to marriage and 
property rights (Goetz 2003).
This process offered an opportunity for bargaining amongst elites, and between 
elites and organized groups, around the rules of the game. It also enabled women 
to demand a range of rights and provided a focus for those engaging in the politics 
of mobilization and recognition (Tripp et al. 2009). Reforms around decentraliza-
tion also opened up further space for women’s inclusion to be addressed in a direct 
manner. One outcome was article 31 of the new Constitution, which stipulated 
that both men and women aged 18 years and above have the right to marry and to 
found a family and are entitled to equal rights in marriage, during marriage, and 
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at its dissolution. The conversation and mobilization around family law affected 
the political discourse and largely formed the origins of the need to criminalize 
domestic violence hitherto constructed as a norm. In the analysis that follows, we 
attempt to locate these reform processes within the understanding of Uganda’s 
political settlement using domestic violence law as our entry point.
Women’s inclusion within Uganda’s shifting political 
settlement: short-term dividends, long-term losses
Drawing from the typology of political settlements presented in Chapter 2, 
Uganda under the NRM can be characterized as having started out as a strongly 
dominant-personalized form of political settlement, with developmentalist and 
institution-building tendencies. From 1986 until the early 2000s, there was little 
chance of power changing hands, and the relative stability enjoyed by the ruling 
coalition enabled it to develop and implement reforms and policies aligned with a 
longer-term vision. For well over a decade after the NRM came to power in 1986, 
it was lauded for building an inclusive ruling coalition and implementing major 
economic and political reforms that helped generate both pro-poor growth and 
significant investment in social services. As Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2013, 
p. 14) argue, the rise to power of Yoweri Museveni and the NRM party:
marked a crucial turning point in the country’s politics, particularly with 
his rejection of multi-party politics in favour of an ‘all-embracing’ movement 
political system, a system designed to avoid the sectarian conflicts associated 
with political party competition in Uganda.
However, from the early 2000s, Uganda has progressively moved towards a weakly 
dominant form of political settlement, characterized by an increasingly person-
alized approach to governance (Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey 2013, 2016). Rising 
levels of inter-elite conflict and also demand-making from below have altered 
the configuration of power in Uganda, leaving the ruling coalition more vulner-
able and less willing to adopt and implement a long-term vision for the country. 
The return of multiparty elections and the abolition of presidential term limits 
in 2005 helped cement this vulnerability and an increasingly populist reliance 
on patronage-based forms of rule (Whitfield et al. 2015). During this period, the 
president has increasingly relied on an inner circle of family and loyal followers—
creating a narrow core within the ruling coalition—and enhanced his political 
powers (Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey 2013). Moreover, the public bureaucracy has 
been increasingly sidelined in favour of more personalized forms of governance, 
with goods and services delivered within the logic of clientelistic deals, rather 
than rights-based claims.
Uganda’s post-conflict political settlement involved women becoming highly 
visible within the political sphere, underpinned by their role in the armed strug-
gle, an active women’s movement, as well as the broader politics of transition that 
was more amenable to a politics of inclusion. Goetz (2003) shows how the initial 
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suspension of party politics, and the institutionalization of what was known as 
‘the movement system’, freed women for over two decades from the constraints 
of party patronage, and helped establish the domain of women’s interests within 
the wider public realm. This, together with the policies of affirmative action1 
that created reserved seats for women, saw an historic growth in the numbers of 
women, especially in parliament and local councils (see Table 4.1). Accordingly, 
the special seats, taken together with special appointments of women to impor-
tant positions in the public administration and judiciary, by the president himself, 
‘seemed to make a major crack in the glass ceiling which so often holds women 
back’ (Goetz 2003, p. 111). Special seats for women have clearly delivered in terms 
of numbers, from a situation where there was only one woman in a legislature of 
126 members in 1980 (Tamale 1999), to 34.3 percent of parliamentarians being 
female in 2018 (Inter Parliamentary Union 2018). This is well above the regional 
average for sub-Saharan Africa, which currently stands at 23.73 percent (Inter 
Parliamentary Union 2018). Nonetheless, there have long been concerns about 
the ghettoizing effect of reserved seats and the danger that women as a group may 
be treated as a vote bank for the ruling party on whose patronage they rely. This 
perception has deepened from the mid-2000s onwards through the government’s 
incessant creation of electoral districts; given that every additional district auto-
matically creates a new post for a female MP, women have been constructed as a 
primary beneficiary of ‘districtization’ (Green 2010).
However, concerns over the terms of women’s inclusion and their declining 
influence grew steadily as Uganda’s political settlement became increasingly char-
acterized by the politics of patronage after the first decade of NRM rule (Goetz 
2003). As the NRM became increasingly used as a means to reproduce the power 
of the regime, as opposed to undertaking reforms to state–society relations, and 
with political competition based on individual merit and strategizing, rather than 
Table 4.1 Trends in women’s numbers in Uganda’s National Assembly
Year
Number 
of districts Assembly AA Open seat Others Total women Total MPs % women
1989 39 NRC 39 2 9 50 280 18
1994 39 CA 39 8 3 50 286 17.4
1996 39 Parliament 39 8 4 51 276 19
2001 56 Parliament 56 13 6 75 304 24.4
2006 79 Parliament 79 14 1 100 319 31
2011 112 Parliament 112 11 8 131 375 35
2016 112 Parliament 112 18 13 143 427 33.5
Sources: Isis-WICCE (2014), Ahikire (2017), Madanda (2017).
Key: AA = affirmative action; NRC = National Resistance Council; CA = Constituent Assembly.
Notes: Under the affirmative action policy, each of the districts sends a woman representative to the 
national legislature. Consequently, the number of districts determines the number of women 
that will enter into the national legislature through the women’s quota system.
‘Others’ includes representatives of people with disabilities (PWDs), workers, youth, and presidential 
nominees.
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a programmatic platform, the movement became increasingly characterized by 
‘intrigue and clientelism’, as people competed for access to opportunities to dis-
pense patronage (Goetz 2003, p. 115). The return to multiparty democracy in 
2005, and the rising threat to the ruling party from the oppositional Forum for 
Democratic Change, increased the incentives for the NRM to tighten its grip on 
power through clientelist means, and further de-institutionalize state power, as 
well as to atomize social struggles that may otherwise have created momentum 
towards redistributive justice.
This is not to underestimate the gains that women have made in policy-making so 
far. From the constitution-making process in the mid-1990s onwards, women MPs, 
operating through the Uganda Women’s Parliamentary Association (UWOPA), 
have been able to push through several measures aimed at increasing gender equity, 
including the Equal Opportunities Act of 2010 and gender-responsive budgeting. 
However, we would argue that the architecture of power in Uganda only allows for 
a particular kind of policy-making—one that is heavily encumbered by populist 
and clientelist incentives and that struggles to result in programmatic policy plat-
forms that are delivered effectively by the state bureaucracy. In very specific ways, 
Uganda’s political settlement limits the parameters of a gender-inclusive agenda and 
severely constrains women’s capacity to develop a long-term gender equality agenda, 
as also seen elsewhere (Rai 2008). As Castillejo (2011) notes, political business in 
clientelistic political settlements is conducted through informal networks and infor-
mal spaces, thereby structuring political negotiation around individuals, as opposed 
to institutions. This closely shapes the extent to which women’s mobilization can 
occur and have meaningful and enduring effects. As Fraser rightly argues, when the 
politics of recognition is devoid of redistributive politics, there is an inherent danger 
of displacement leading to misrecognition—a situation in which the collective is 
denied the status of a full partner in social interaction (Fraser 1998, p. 3). In this 
sense, women as a collective have increasingly become part of the group of cli-
ents who are on their knees, while gender equality concerns are equally channeled 
through a populist and atomized political process (Ahikire 2017).The establishment 
of the Domestic Violence Act in 2010, we argue, was directly shaped by Uganda’s 
political settlement dynamics in ways that rendered it a compromised and populist 
law, with little prospect of being effectively implemented.
Tracing the domestic violence policy-making in Uganda
The Domestic Violence Act (DVA) came into force in 2010 as an Act of 
Parliament after a prolonged period of activism and negotiation that we detail 
later. The Act provides for the protection and relief of victims of domestic vio-
lence, punishment of perpetrators, procedures and guidelines to be followed by 
the court in relation to the protection and compensation of victims of domestic 
violence, jurisdiction of court, and related matters. It defines domestic violence 
to encompass various forms of abuse—including economic, physical, sexual, 
and emotional—and adopts a similarly broad definition of what constitutes 
a domestic relationship. Domestic relations here encompass, inter alia, family 
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relationships by consanguinity, affinity, or kinship; marriage; shared residence; 
and also employment status (e.g. the house servants or a relationship determined 
by court to be a domestic relationship). The DVA constitutes a landmark as the 
first instance of the state in Uganda passing legislation specifically relating to 
the domestic sphere.
The story of the law
Waylen (2009) alerts us to the need to go beyond recounting institutional change 
as an outcome to specifically characterize how and why institutional change 
occurs. This, she argues, is in recognition of the fact that political contestation 
is mediated by the institutional context in which it occurs, thereby signifying 
the important role of both structure and agency in shaping outcomes (Waylen 2009, 
p. 247). From this perspective, the story of the law on domestic violence in 
Uganda emerged from women’s struggles around domestic relations, as located 
within a particular configuration of political power. The process through which 
this institutional change occurred highlights the need to examine how different 
actors seek to negotiate their perceived interests, including through the deploy-
ment of discursive framing strategies that deploy particular types of ideas.
The story of the domestic violence law stretches back to the 1940s and can 
take as its first landmark the 1959 Private Members Marriage Registration Bill, 
tabled by Hon. Sarah Ntiro, a member of Uganda’s first parliament (the Legislative 
Council). The bill requested a government enquiry into the status of women gen-
erally and specifically into marriage, inheritance, and family property. In 1964, a 
commission chaired by William Wilberforce Kalema produced a report on mar-
riage and divorce, which made recommendations for improving married wom-
en’s rights (including over property), although little action followed. In 1974, the 
marriage and divorce laws reform project was established within the Ministry of 
Justice and had, by 1980, produced a working document, commonly referred to 
as the draft Domestic Relations Bill (DRB). However, the political turmoil at the 
time meant that no action was taken until the NRM took power in 1986. 
The debate on the Domestic Relations Bill resurfaced in the 7th Parliament in 
2003,2 largely as a result of the optimism and momentum created by the constitu-
tional review process. However, the bill came under severe attack from religious 
leaders and conservative organizations on several counts, including issues of mar-
ital rape, polygamy, and the proposed move to accord cohabitation equal status 
with marriage. This resistance reflected the fact that female activists had sought 
to move their claims for gender equity into the terrain of redistributive justice, as 
opposed to the ‘add-on’ approaches embedded in, for instance, affirmative action 
in politics or education. In other words, the women’s rights lobby was attempting 
to unseat institutionalized male privilege in the domestic space. In 2005, the bill 
was subject to a sustained attack by key religious and cultural lobby groups, includ-
ing the national coalition formed by the Muslim women’s group, Uganda Muslim 
Women for Dawaa and Development (UMWADD). However, the most promi-
nent actor against the bill was the president, who took personal responsibility for 
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withdrawal of the bill from the 7th Parliament, deeming it to be an anti-African 
and elitist document. The president criticized middle-class women for seeking to 
turn marriage into ‘a business’.
The stiff resistance to the DRB, particularly the position of the president, led 
to it being split into three separate pieces of legislation—namely the Domestic 
Violence Bill, the Marriage and Divorce Bill, and the Muslim Personal Law Bill. 
The splitting of the DRB was animated by consultations among the women’s 
rights activists, the Uganda Law Reform Commission (ULRC), the Ministry 
of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, and the Ministry of Gender, Labour, and 
Social Development. The intent of splitting the DRB was to make it less contro-
versial. In 2008, the ULRC drafted the Domestic Violence Bill, which constituted 
the first attempt at drafting legislation to deal exclusively with domestic violence 
in Uganda and to provide a legal definition for the problem. This was based on 
the ULRC’s 2006 nationwide study, which found high levels of domestic violence 
in Uganda.3 Now shorn of its more controversial elements, the bill was wholly 
endorsed by the president.
Coalition-building and informal negotiations
The key moments in the passage of law included the formation of a policy coali-
tion in 2008,4 initiated by the Uganda Women’s Network (UWONET) and later 
CEDOVIP (Centre for Domestic Violence Prevention), which included women’s 
civil society organizations (CSOs); human rights organizations; academics; the 
Ministry of Gender, Labour, and Social Development (MGLSD); and the Uganda 
Women’s Parliamentary Association (UWOPA). The policy coalition spear-
headed the framing of ideas around the Domestic Violence Bill, mobilizing the 
public through workshops and peaceful demonstrations and engaging the media 
to ensure that the bill remained in the limelight. This coalition was also able to 
bring a range of actors on board, including the president himself, religious leaders, 
male MPs, and rural women. Following the controversy of the DRB, the coalition 
adopted a different discursive strategy by framing the need for legislation not in 
terms of rights, but in terms of the developmentalist benefits and protection of fam-
ily values that would flow from the protection of women from domestic violence.
The advocacy campaign for legislation against domestic violence was led by a 
coalition of actors that was formed specifically for the task at hand by the Uganda 
Women’s Network (UWONET), which, since its formation in 1993, had focused 
on the elimination of violence against women.5 Known as the ‘Coalition of the 
24’, with reference to the number of organizations involved, the coalition was 
chaired by the Centre for Domestic Violence Prevention (CEDOVIP) and had 
at its core organizations working directly on women’s rights, such as Action for 
Development (ACFODE), FIDA-Uganda, Akina Mama Wa Africa (AMwA), 
Mifumi, and the Council for Economic Empowerment for Women in Africa 
(CEEWA). However, the coalition pursued a deliberate strategy of extending its 
support base by enrolling a much wider set of actors as the campaign moved for-
ward. This included international actors, such as UN Women, the United Nations 
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Population Fund, Club de Madrid, and Care International, which funded the coa-
lition’s awareness-raising, research, and mobilization efforts, but also extended to 
less likely actors, such as the Catholic Church of Ireland. International events in 
support of ending violence against women were also drawn on, particularly the 16 
Days of Activism on Violence Against Women and International Women’s Day.
Importantly, the campaign was shaped by the coalition’s own political analy-
sis of whether key actors within Uganda’s political settlement that were for and 
against the bill. This power mapping identified both the most powerful actors and 
the means of gaining their support, with a particular focus on making personal 
contact with key players involved in Uganda’s political and policy process and 
through framing the proposed legislation in ways that would be persuasive to 
them. The key categories identified were those within official positions of polit-
ical and policy-making power; those who had a direct influence over them, par-
ticularly women with a vested interested in supporting the bill; and those with 
political influence, but not holding formal office, including religious leaders and 
the media. The mapping of those with official power over the legislative pro-
cess included (in descending order of significance) the president, the speaker and 
deputy speaker of parliament, the state minister for justice and constitutional 
affairs, and individual legislators. The key route to influencing these actors was 
through the Uganda Women Parliamentary Association (UWOPA). Although 
not a direct instigator of the bill, once it was mobilized by the civil society coa-
lition, UWOPA worked tirelessly to mobilize women MPs to ensure that they all 
actively supported the bill, lobbying cabinet ministers and developing position 
papers together with the coalition.
Top of the list was the president, whose support was identified by the coalition 
as critical to the campaign’s success. As soon as March 2008, in the early months 
of the campaign, the president called for expediting the law on domestic violence:6
… by battering their wives, men are breaking the laws of Uganda which advo-
cate for equal rights and protection of people. Therefore we need legislation on 
domestic violence. I hear there is one in the pipeline, so we need to expedite it.
That the president talked more than once about domestic violence greatly raised the 
profile and credibility of the campaign. Closely attuned to the nature of power within 
Uganda’s dominant party political settlement, the coalition repeatedly replayed the 
recorded voice of the president on domestic violence during their campaign.
Within parliament, the then deputy speaker, Hon. Rebecca A. Kadaga, was seen 
as a key point of entry, both as a woman in a powerful position and because she 
had already demonstrated her capacity for raising issues of women’s rights in the 
previous parliament. The chair of the coalition noted that in the 8th Parliament:
She had a clear strategy on the three key pieces of legislation: domestic violence, 
female genital mutilation, and the one on trafficking in human persons—all 
passed in 2010. The deputy speaker at that time kept raising these issues on the 
floor of parliament and helped in creating space for discussions.7
BK-TandF-9780815372356_TEXT_BRUNT-181008-Chp04.indd   75 14/02/19   1:17 PM
76 Josephine Ahikire and Amon Mwiine
UWOPA members undertook a specific mapping of male MPs to identify those 
known as gender-sensitive men and those with considerable power over parlia-
mentary debates. Concerted efforts were made to frame the bill as being for men 
as well as women and to work through informal networks and spaces, given the 
highly personalized nature of political relationships in Uganda’s type of political 
settlement (Castillejo 2011). Women MPs would target specific male MPs in par-
liamentary corridors and canteens and strategically sit in the House with selected 
male MPs, especially those with a track record of determining the direction of 
debate in the House, to win them over. More formally, men who held critical 
positions in the passing of the bill, such as the state minister for justice and con-
stitutional affairs and the chairpersons of relevant parliamentary committees, 
were targeted, including the chairperson of the standing committee on legal and 
parliamentary affairs, Stephen Tashobya, who made a significant intervention 
during the second reading of the bill, on 11 November 2009.
Within the bureaucracy, obvious alliances were made within the MGLSD, 
which was responsible for initiating the process to have a law on domestic vio-
lence. The ministry worked closely with the coalition in facilitating the drafting 
of a bill by the ULRC and the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. 
According to UWONET’s executive director,
The Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs was very helpful. They 
understood and apparently appreciated the need for the domestic violence 
law, so they were always at the forefront of explaining and defending the need 
for this law. The minister of state, Fred Ruhindi, was key—he was receptive, 
more approachable… We knew he would front the bill.8
More innovative relationships were also built, including with the police force, 
which was considered to be a critical actor in the implementation of the law. The 
coalition worked with the police to develop a pilot project in Kawempe, one of 
the more populous divisions in Kampala city. This project yielded results that the 
coalition used to demonstrate the workability of the proposed law.
Given the increased extent to which the NRM leadership had to be responsive 
towards the concerns of voters under the return of new multi-partyism in 2005, 
and the specific reliance on voters in rural areas, the success of the coalition in 
mobilizing significant numbers of rural women behind the campaign was a signif-
icant coup. Also keen to avoid the usual charge of being ‘elitist’, the chair of the 
coalition recalled how they mobilized rural women:
Each of the 24 organizations was requested to go through their networks to 
gather views and petitions from local women on the need for the bill. Local 
petitions were then delivered to area members of parliament and the speaker 
of parliament. The coalition got children to deliver their petitions.9
In a significant moment in 2010, which campaigners felt helped to accelerate 
the legislative process, the coalition mobilized more than 1,000 women from 
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rural districts to march to parliament protesting the high levels of violence and 
demanding to have a law. According to the chair of the coalition, ‘We filled the 
parliamentary gardens; we filled the gallery in parliament. The government was 
shaken’.10 Officials within the MGLSD and the ULRC also noted that the physi-
cal involvement of rural women in large numbers was a turning point because of 
the convergence with the 2011 general elections that were due the following year.
The role of discourses and ideas: framing domestic violence 
as an ameliorative policy agenda
Ideas as well as interests played a key role in securing the institutional changes 
associated with the passage of the Domestic Violence Bill. Buttressed by the 
international discourse on gender-based violence as a development issue, pres-
sures to ratify the Maputo Protocol, and moves by other states in Africa to adopt 
anti-domestic violence legislation as part of their commitment to the Protocol, 
the momentum of the campaign against domestic violence gained legitimate 
ground. The Maputo Protocol was ratified by Uganda a few months after the 
adoption of the Domestic Violence Bill, and other legislation on women’s rights 
was introduced in that year, indicating the interaction and mutual reinforcement 
between domestic feminist movements and transnational and regional norms and 
agreements (see Chapter 3).
The discursive strategy adopted by the coalition was strongly informed by the 
problems experienced by the campaign to promote the Domestic Relations Bill. 
Members were keen to remove the ‘rough feminist edges’ from their campaign. 
The overarching or ‘paradigmatic’ ideas (Schmidt 2008) that the bill became 
associated with were therefore not concerned with women’s rights per se, but 
with more instrumental ideas around the developmental benefits of tackling 
domestic violence and a broader appeal to ‘family values’. Advocates argued that 
ending domestic violence would increase women’s productivity and thus help 
achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The appeal to family val-
ues was intended both as a means of bringing on board powerful religious and 
traditional actors who might otherwise have opposed the bill and as a means of 
bypassing (rather than challenging) patriarchal tendencies by showing that men, 
as well as women, stood to gain from the bill. This discursive shift would, during 
the campaign, converge in unforeseen ways with events that helped accelerate 
the legislative process, particularly through framing men as also being potential 
victims of domestic violence. The bill was tabled in June 2009 and was due for its 
second reading in November, when news of the murder of General Kazini by an 
ex-girlfriend was announced.11 The case of Kazini’s death on 10 November 2009 
seemed to redefine domestic violence and add momentum to its passage, with 
the Domestic Violence Bill coming to be termed ‘the Kazini Law’ and passing 
into an act of parliament on 11 November 2009. This helped relocate domestic 
violence into a different frame to that of the DRB, which was constructed as a 
women-only issue that would yield few direct benefits to men or the institution 
of the family.
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These messages were actively promoted through a range of discursive chan-
nels, including the media and parliamentary speeches. Wary of the tendency for 
journalists to report negatively on gender issues, and on gender-based violence 
in particular, efforts were made by the coalition to integrate them into the advo-
cacy strategy, including by parliamentary press training on gender-based violence 
(GBV) and the Domestic Violence Bill in September 2008. The policy coalition 
collaborated with the Uganda parliamentary media association to help ensure 
that the media did not present issues in a sensational or biased way. Within par-
liament, women MPs tried to move the debate away from domestic violence as an 
issue of women’s rights and also to render it more relevant to the political elite, 
through the use of high-profile cases:
In our mobilization, we used cases of violence against prominent people—
the case of General Kazini, the police officer who killed his wife, and many 
others. We know that there are very many people in rural areas dying of vio-
lence, with undocumented cases, but when violence started affecting promi-
nent people, it became a national concern.12
The messaging around family values was deemed critical to winning over influen-
tial religious leaders, to the extent that several became leading proponents within 
the campaign. This included the imam of the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council 
and the influential Catholic archbishop of Kampala archdiocese, who devoted 
his 2009 Easter sermon to the relationship between violence and the Bible, spe-
cifically advancing the idea that it was sinful to keep quiet about violence in the 
home.13 For the first time in the history of Uganda, the issue of domestic violence 
was constructed as a sin and integrated into the preaching of the different reli-
gious discourses.
This discursive reframing helped to align legislation against domestic vio-
lence with dominant paradigmatic ideas on gender, the family, and development 
amongst Uganda’s political elite. For one proponent,
The narrative was clear. It was not controversial at all. What we have real-
ized over time is that for those bills that are controversial, it’s because men 
have a high stake in such issues, e.g. issues of sexual offences, property, and 
inheritance. They [men] would protect it and defend it strongly, but men did 
not have a high stake in domestic violence.14
Whilst this move certainly seemed to help advance the progress of the bill, this 
nonthreatening and instrumentalist narrative tended to undermine the bill’s 
more transformative elements and directly shaped the substantive content of the 
law, which, for some observers, constituted a watered-down version of the orig-
inal ideas as envisaged by the women’s movement and its allies. For example, 
the final version of the bill that was passed into law largely focused on physical, 
psychological, and economic violence. Offences of a sexual nature were removed, 
on the basis that other existing pieces of legislation on rape and defilement could 
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take care of the issue. The Domestic Violence Bill (2010) identifies sexual abuse 
as one of the offences, but sexual offences are not unpacked in the interpretation 
(section 2) in the way that economic, physical, and emotional violence aspects 
are. A former member of parliament had this to say:
The most controversial issue was sexual violence. Men were opposed to 
the idea of including marital rape as an aspect of violence. Male legislators 
argued: ‘how can a woman say she does not want to have sex with her hus-
band?’ Even the president one time opposed that provision, saying that we 
cannot start legislating on bedroom matters.15
The fact that marital rape does not explicitly appear in the written text of law 
limits the protection role of the state in this regard and reflects the problems that 
the politics of compromise can create for the enforcement of gender equity poli-
cies (Waylen 2014). A standard argument for giving way to opponents in this way 
when promoting a transformative agenda is that getting something onto the policy 
books is better than nothing and that this may open up space for more radical 
progress down the line. Here, the fact that the state has pronounced itself on 
domestic violence, deeming it illegal, may enable other purportedly private mat-
ters to become issues of public concern. It is too soon to draw definite conclusions 
on this, although the early signs are not positive. For example, most of those male 
champions who supported the DVA would later be at the forefront of shooting 
down the Marriage and Divorce Bill that was tabled in 2013, to the extent that 
it could not even be debated on the floor of parliament. This may suggest that, 
rather than opening up a new front on women’s rights, the passage of ‘ameliora-
tive’ rather than ‘transformative’ legislation on domestic violence has, if anything, 
further entrenched norms of male privilege within Uganda’s political settlement.
Beyond advocacy: the politics of implementation
On 27 August 2014, the Daily Monitor Newspaper reported that the Minister of 
Gender, Labour, and Social Development, Mary Karooro Okurut, was expected 
to appear before the gender committee of parliament to explain the slow pro-
gress regarding the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act 2010. Over a 
year earlier, in June 2013, Justice Stella Arach Amoko of the Supreme Court of 
Uganda, and also president of the National Association of Women Judges, had 
reported on research that revealed some judges and magistrates had not even 
accessed the DVA 2010, whilst others had ignored this Act as they considered it 
to fall under the heading of ‘women’s issues’ (Mujuzi 2014, p. 267). Here we explore 
the limited enforcement of the law to date, through a focus on the efforts made 
by the lead MGLSD; the broader capacity and commitment of the government to 
support this, and of the implementing agencies to deliver on the ground; and the 
uptake of the law by victims of domestic violence themselves.
The law gave the MGLSD two key roles, the first being to draw up regulations 
to guide enforcement, which was done on 6 July 2011. The regulations identify 
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the responsibilities of different actors concerning the Act’s enforcement. This 
oversight role has involved the ministry collaborating with the police, Ministry of 
Health (medical practitioners), Justice, Law and Order Sector, local governments, 
and NGOs to monitor the response to GBV prevention programmes, including 
through a reference group on GBV formed for this purpose. The ministry has 
also provided training to implementing agencies, including the police, around 
the reporting of cases, health practitioners, and state attorneys, with regards to 
how to keep and present evidence on domestic violence cases. A ministry source 
claimed, ‘We have done training in almost 30 percent of Uganda’, whilst acknowl-
edging, ‘Unfortunately, in all the areas where we have done training and sensi-
tization, it is under the support of development partners such as Irish Aid, UN 
Women, the Norwegian Embassy, and UK Aid’. This meant that government had 
not substantively invested in the implementation of the domestic violence law.16
The second role of the MGLSD was to design guidelines for operationalization 
of ‘shelters’ as custodial places to which victims of violence are referred while 
investigations are being carried out, or while waiting for further referrals. Through 
intensive consultations, the ministry came up with GBV shelter guidelines that 
are now being used by NGOs (sometimes with minimal inputs from local gov-
ernments) in sheltering victims of violence. However, the fact that, according to 
Mujuzi (2014), there is not a single state-run shelter points to the government’s 
half-hearted approach towards addressing domestic violence. Similarly, there are 
no state-run one-stop crisis centres, with the few that do exist in the country 
being run by NGOs.
The two key institutions for enforcement of the DVA at the local level are 
the police and local government. Observers note that the role of local council 
courts as primary duty bearers in the implementation of the DVA has proved 
to be a major obstacle. In addition to lacking the basic human and financial 
resource capacities to implement legislation, the fact that the lowest two levels 
of the local council system did not hold elections between 1996 and 2018 had 
severely reduced their political legitimacy. Although the law provides for a pro-
tection order restricting a person from harassing, threatening, or even contacting 
another person, the post-legislative phase did not involve adequate resourcing to 
ensure such elaborate responses to the survivors of violence. As noted in earlier 
research on the gendered politics of justice in Uganda (Khadiagala 2001), local 
councils and courts are ill-equipped to handle cases of domestic violence because 
they are heavily embedded in unequal and highly gendered power relations at the 
local level.
The police force appeared to take its new responsibilities seriously in the first 
few months of the legislation being passed, including through the upgrading of 
its family and child protection department into a directorate. Police respond-
ents note that significant energy has been invested in training them, including 
expanding their view on domestic violence towards a more holistic appreciation. 
Some CSOs have helped specific police posts by enhancing the infrastructure of 
the family and child protection units. UN Women prepared a compendium of 
laws on sexual and GBV to aid police in their work. UWONET also worked with 
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the police and Ministry of Health to amend Police Form 3 in ways that facilitated 
swifter processing of cases.17
There are, however, structural problems in relying on the police to enforce 
this legislation in Uganda, given the broader institutional failings that have 
increasingly characterized the country under its weakly dominant and highly 
personalized form of political settlement. Police officers observe that the DVA 
presents a very broad agenda that goes beyond the limits of what the police force 
as currently configured could handle, particularly given the lack of investment 
in human and financial resources from government. Police respondents reported 
feeling overwhelmed by having to deal with this new legislation and by the lack 
of the preparation and facilities to do this effectively:
By the time the DVB was enacted into law, the duty bearers did not know what 
to do. We had many police officers arresting perpetrators of domestic violence 
and charging them under assault, using the Penal Code … We used to look for a 
wound for us to know that you have been abused. Our understanding of domestic 
violence before the Act came was a victim coming to police with a wound. But 
later, we were made to understand that the Act covers economic violence, phys-
ical violence, and psychological violence—that it’s not about having a wound.18
The kind of office space is also limiting. Look at our office space here; it is 
like a classroom. All officers are seated together, listening in to what is being 
discussed, yet issues of domestic violence are sensitive…In our recording of 
cases, we ask many details which victims cannot reveal when others are lis-
tening. For example, if you come to report that you were raped, we shall ask, 
what happened, how did he rape you? Then you state he forced himself on 
me, removed my clothes … All this cannot be revealed in this setting.19
There are also other broader concerns about the enforceability of the law. On 
the one hand, the numbers of cases of domestic violence being brought forward 
since the Act was passed has increased greatly, with reports of domestic violence 
increasing by almost 500 percent between 2008 and 2013 (see Figure 4.1).
Although the vast majority of cases are brought by women, there is some anec-
dotal evidence that the number of men reporting domestic violence has also 
increased, although we could not find any concrete data to support this.20 This 
increased level of reporting is very likely to have saved many women from further 
abuse—and perhaps saved their lives. According to the director of gender in the 
MGLSD, ‘The law has taken domestic violence into the public realm—it is no 
longer private and “acceptable”’.21 Accordingly, the increase in reporting is a clear 
indicator of rising consciousness about domestic violence.
However, and on the other hand, serious challenges remain in terms of the 
process through which victims have to go in bringing forward cases of domestic 
violence. Police officers note that most victims, especially women, are compro-
mised by cultural ties that tend to hinder investigations. Married women often 
live amongst their husband’s relatives, including parents, which makes it very 
difficult to speak out against their son and bring in officers to investigate.
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According to one local police commissioner, many cases are abandoned at this 
point: ‘You will call the concerned woman and say, “The file is ready, come and 
make a statement,” and the woman replies, “Oh no! Now we are ok” … she can 
even hang up on you as you are still talking to her on the phone’. The same com-
missioner notes that:
Victims who report cases of violence do not want you to open up a file and 
proceed with the case. They will tell you, ‘I want you to talk to him,’ or 
‘I have come for advice, what do I do?’ And when you want to follow up, 
they will withdraw. People value families, they value their relationships, and 
would not want to go as far as a court case.22
The relatively hazy implementation architecture of the law reflects a series of 
problems. One is that the DVA is a complex law that involved several compro-
mises along the legislative path and also involves multiple stakeholders for its 
adequate implementation. For one state attorney in Masaka, the law is quasi-civil 
and quasi-criminal, which makes it difficult to implement, especially from the 
perspective of the courts.23
The story of implementation of the DVA is therefore one of broken lines. 
The DVA is too broad and would need heavy investment of human and finan-
cial resources, as well as capacity building of the police and service providers, 
which, according to many observers, is not a priority for government (Mujuzi 
2014). Overall, the reason for inadequate implementation of the law could well 
be located in what many actors identified as the institutional collapse of the state 
bureaucracy under an increasingly personalized approach to governance.
Furthermore, implementation depends heavily on reporting and pursuance of 
criminal procedures. Once women refuse to pursue cases on a criminal basis, this 
































The trend of domestic violence cases
reported to police in 2008–2013 
Figure 4.1 Trends of reporting domestic violence in Uganda.
Source: ROU (2013)
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Secondly, the energy that was invested in the adoption process was not invested 
in equal measure when it came to implementation, with little pressure from par-
liamentarians, civil society groups, or donors on government to address the signif-
icant gaps that emerged in terms of implementation. Thirdly, implementation has 
been poorly resourced, both by donors who did not follow through their catalytic 
role into funding implementation, apart from the shelters, and by government 
itself. This in turn reveals an inability within government to actively pursue a 
policy that was perhaps only agreed to under duress and does not fit within the 
dominant interests and ideas of a ruling coalition that lacks a substantive pro-
grammatic concern with women’s rights. DVA implementation, then, has not 
been promoted either as part of the ‘goodies’ to be dispensed by the ruling elite or 
as a means of actively promoting the rights of women.
Conclusion
The domestic violence law in Uganda constitutes a double-edged victory for the 
promotion of gender equity in the country. On the one hand, the existence of this 
law represents a stand against domestic violence and signals at least some degree of 
change within Uganda’s norm-setting arena. On the other hand, the DVA emerges 
more as a tokenistic legislation that has barely moved from the statute books and 
was perhaps offered merely as a means to appease a marginal constituency upset by 
the loss of more radical legislative reforms (around DRB) than through any genuine 
commitment to gender equity. It is striking that the feminist activists campaigning for 
the DVA had to go to great lengths, both to form a coalition capable of securing the 
legislation and to reframe the issue of domestic violence as nonthreatening to male 
interests. The limited progress made by government to ensure the implementation 
of this relatively diluted law reflects the increasingly low levels of state capacity and 
elite commitment to promoting justice in Uganda within a political settlement that 
has become increasingly weak and personalized in nature. Within this context, the 
domain of women’s interests has been increasingly and adversely incorporated into a 
wider configuration of power that is inimical to more transformative forms of change.
The domestic violence law and the circumstances surrounding its passage and 
implementation confirm the need for those campaigning for what might be seen 
as transformative change not only to generate a clear understanding of what 
influences the ability of the political system to channel women’s interests and 
representation into effective policy formulation and implementation, but perhaps 
also to think through more carefully the trade-offs between getting something 
accepted and this being too diluted to achieve the original objectives. The case 
of the DVA also strongly suggests that campaigners need to plan much more 
carefully for the post-adoption phase, with a much stronger focus on trying to 
generate the capacity and commitment required to inform effective levels of 
implementation. Finally, policies need to be monitored and evaluated in order 
to generate the evidence of positive impacts required to sustain them over time, 
including in relation to the kinds of arguments used to promote the policy in the 
first place (e.g. the developmental benefits of the reforms).
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Furthermore, the story of the domestic violence law also seems to undermine 
the use of a distinction between ameliorative and transformative gender policies 
as hard-and-fast categories. For some, legislation on domestic violence falls within 
the category of transformative legislation because domestic violence is largely 
embedded in patriarchal power relations that would be challenged in potentially 
transformative ways by such legislation. In the process of the research, however, 
it was found that the DVA, and the manner in which it was cast in instrumen-
talist terms, progressively evened out the final legislation, thereby emptying it 
of its transformative potential. The momentum built towards the enactment of 
the DVA could not be maintained through to its implementation, thus further 
undermining its potential for challenging the unequal nature of gender relations 
in Uganda. Of course, we are not yet in a position to judge the extent to which 
matters will improve over time, including the possibility that the law constitutes 
a starting point for longer-term institutional change and an opening through 
which more radical interventions can be promoted—even if the strong opposi-
tion mounted to the Marriage and Divorce Bill offers a salutary warning against 
being overly optimistic on this front.
Notes
 1. See Tamale (1999) and Ahikire (2007) for the extended treatment of the emergence 
and character of reserved seats in Uganda. Overall, the reserved seats are traced 
from the post-conflict outcomes in the mid-1980s, where the language of representa-
tion in the guerilla struggle, as well as the international movements at the time, 
emphasized women’s participation in decision making.
 2. The object of DRB 2003 was to reform and consolidate the law relating to marriage, 
separation, and divorce; and to provide for the types of recognized marriages in 
Uganda, marital rights and duties, grounds for breakdown of marriage, and rights of 
parties on dissolution of marriage.
 3. Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) and Macro International Inc. (2007). This 
report estimated that 60 percent of people in Uganda experience domestic violence.
 4. This was the same year that the ULRC was beginning to formulate the domestic vio-
lence law, more or less as a smooth transition from the DRB coalition formed in 1999.
 5. Interview with the executive director, UWONET, March 2014.
 6. The Daily Monitor Newspaper, 9 March 2008. Available online: http://www.
unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/take-action/16-days-
of-activism [accessed 16 July 2018].
 7. Interview with senior member, Centre for Domestic Violence Prevention 
(CEDOVIP), 20 February 2014.
 8. Interview with senior member, Uganda Women’s Network (UWONET), 21 March 
2014.
 9. Interview with senior member, CEDOVIP, 20 February 2014.
 10. Interview with senior member, UWONET, April 2014.
 11. Hansard, Wednesday, 11 November 2009.
 12. Interview with former leading member of Uganda Women Parliamentary Associa-
tion (UWOPA), 26 March 2014.
 13. Archbishop Cyprian Kizito Lwanga has been a powerful voice on Uganda’s political 
scene, not only based on the historical fact that Catholics are the majority in terms 
of demographics in the country, but also on the fact that he has political influence 
in his own right.
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 14. Interview with senior member UWOPA, 9th Parliament, 14 April 2014.
 15. Interview with former members of parliament, 8th Parliament, in FGD, 23 June 
2014.
 16. Interview with a female civil servant from MGLSD, 3 April 2015.
 17. Police Form 3A constitutes the basic component of the charge of violence that 
indicates the nature and extent of injury.
 18. Interview with senior officer, Family and Child Protection Department, Police 
Headquarters, Kibuli, Uganda, April 2014.
 19. Interview with senior officer, Family and Child Protection Unit, April 2014.
 20. According to the Official, child and Family Protection Unit, there is an increasing 
trend of men reporting emotional violence as a result of their uncertainty about 
paternity of their children (interview, March 2015).
 21. Interview, 3 April 2015.
 22. Interview with senior officer, Family and Child Protection Unit, Uganda Police, 
April 2014.
 23. Interview with state attorney, April 2015.
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Appendix 1 List of participants in the Uganda study
1. Civil servant, Ministry of Gender, Labour, and Social Development (MGLSD)
2. Senior civil servant, Ministry of Gender, Labour, and Social Development (MGLSD)
3. Programmes officer, Ministry of Gender, Labour, and Social Development (MGLSD)
4. Senior member of the Uganda Women Parliamentary Association (UWOPA)
5. Senior officer, Uganda Law Reform Commission
6. Senior officer Child and Family Protection, Uganda Police Force, Kampala
7. Senior member, Uganda Women’s Network (UWONET)
8. Senior manager, Centre for Domestic Violence Prevention (CEDOVIP), Kampala
9. Senior manager, Uganda National NGO forum, Kampala
10. Professor at the School of Law, Makerere University
11. Former member of parliament (female)
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12. Former member of parliament (female)
13. Former member of parliament, 8th Parliament (female)
14. Former member of parliament, 5th and 8th Parliaments (female)
15. Former member of parliament, 8th Parliament (male)
16. Former district member of parliament, 8th Parliament (female)
17. Former district member of parliament, 8th Parliament (female)
18. Former member of parliament, 8th Parliament (male)
19. State attorney
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Establishing a strong political 
commitment to gender equity
The politics of Rwanda’s law on 





In the past decade, Rwanda has become one of the global leaders in terms of 
expanding women’s inclusion in politics and promoting and securing women’s rights. 
In 2008, only 14 years after the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, Rwandans 
elected a female majority to the national legislature. Women realized this 
achievement thanks, in large part, to a gender quota system that encompassed 
all levels and branches of government, although these quotas are themselves 
part of a wider process through which women’s rights have been institutional-
ized in Rwanda. Four significant pieces of gender equity legislation were passed 
before the gender quotas started to have an impact: the 1996 law on genocide;1 
the 1999 amendment to the civil code on matrimonial regimes (i.e. ‘inheritance 
law’);2 the 2001 children’s rights law;3 and the 2003 constitution, which created 
the gender quotas. Indeed, if anything, fewer pieces of gender equity legisla-
tion have been passed since the introduction of gender quotas than occurred 
beforehand. In addition to the 2008 law on domestic violence that we examine 
here, these include the 2004 Land Policy and accompanying 2005 Land Law, 
which clarified women’s property rights under the 1999 inheritance law, includ-
ing their rights to own and inherit real estate. This policy helped alleviate 
gender-based class inequities in terms of land ownership (Carpano 2011, Simons 
and Schulze, 2011).
Scholars have attributed Rwanda’s success in enhancing and protecting wom-
en’s rights and increasing women’s representation to numerous factors, including 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s (RPF) long-term commitment to gender main-
streaming; Rwanda’s vibrant women’s organizations; the use of behind-the-scenes 
lobbying of potential male allies to convince them to support policy initiatives and 
laws; and a transformation in the international development context, whereby 
aid agencies have mainstreamed women’s rights and gender equity approaches 
(Newbury and Baldwin 2001, Powley 2005, Longman 2006, Powley and Pearson 
2007, Burnet 2008, Devlin and Elgie 2008, Burnet 2011, Coffe 2012).
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In this chapter, I explore the quality of women’s inclusion and participa-
tion in formal political institutions and informal processes and the women’s 
movement’s ability to negotiate gender equity concerns in terms of legislative 
reform and policy formulation in the area of gender-based violence (GBV). I 
use the power domains framework to understand the ways in which Rwanda’s 
dominant-party settlement shapes the institutional arrangements and ideas 
that govern the pursuit, adoption, implementation, and outcomes of gender 
equity policies. In this investigation, I emphasize the ways in which key actors 
and both formal and informal institutions interact with each other, the ways 
in which power is wielded in a dominant-party settlement, and the ways these 
structural formations and power relations affect gender equity outcomes. From 
this analysis, I conclude that Rwanda’s success in terms of women’s rights rests 
not only on top-down political will and a vibrant women’s movement, but 
also on the role of highly qualified professional technocrats in the government 
administration, and the system of performance-based contracts and accounta-
bility, which shapes bureaucratic behaviour through to the frontline of service 
delivery.
In order to identify the key features of Rwanda’s political settlement, 
and the important ways in which it is gendered, I constructed a timeline 
that identifies the key junctures in Rwanda’s history. A desk review was 
conducted to analyse women’s roles during these critical moments and the 
shifts in balance of power between the various social groups and factions. I 
used process tracing to construct my policy case on GBV law. This included 
the construction of a policy timeline and the review of various secondary 
documents, including scholarly literature; Rwandan government reports, 
documents, and legislation; and international and nongovernmental organ-
ization (NGO) reports and documents to identify the key players, formal 
processes for negotiation between these actors, and policy ideas that were 
forwarded by different groups. Key informant interviews were conducted 
with a strategic sample of 26 of the key state and nonstate actors who were 
at the heart of this policy process. The interviewees included women and 
men representatives from the ministries, legislators and elected officials, the 
national police, civil society actors, international NGOs, and the United 
Nations (UN). For a full list of participants, please see Appendix 2. Key doc-
uments on the selected policy areas and the data from the semi-structured 
interviews were systematically analysed for content and discourse, based on 
a set of relevant themes developed in collaboration with the research teams 
from the other country cases.
In this chapter, I first trace the evolution of Rwanda’s current political settle-
ment and women’s historical exclusion from—and then gradual inclusion in—
the political settlement. Then, I present my findings from analysis of the adoption 
and implementation of the 2008 anti-GBV law policy case. Finally, I reflect on 
these findings and outline the important outcomes that emerge from adding a 
gender analysis to the political settlement framework.
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Women’s inclusion and influence in politics and policy-making 
in Rwanda
Critical junctures and history of women’s engagement in politics
To understand Rwanda’s current political settlement it is important to under-
stand certain critical junctures since the end of colonialism. The decolonization 
process in Rwanda (1952–1961) polarized divisions that had emerged during the 
colonial period. Belgian colonial administration had concentrated power in the 
hands of Tutsi chiefs while excluding Hutu from administrative positions and 
the education system. As a result, two political conflicts emerged: (1) Hutu and 
Tutsi nationalist elites jointly pursued the end of Belgian colonial rule and its 
replacement with self-rule, and (2) Hutu nationalists pursued emancipation for 
the Hutu majority from Belgian rule and what they claimed was Tutsi colonialism 
(Golooba-Mutebi 2013, p. 4). By the end of the transition in 1963, Rwanda had 
a democratically elected Hutu president, Grégoire Kayibanda. During the decol-
onization process, women and women’s issues never emerged as national issues.
Under President Juvénal Habyarimana’s government (1973–1994), women 
began to emerge as leaders as they gained access to higher education (albeit in very 
small numbers) and as the international feminist movement changed the global 
political climate for women’s rights. By 1982, there were four women parliamen-
tarians out of a total of 70 in Rwanda (Muberanziza 2003, Burnet 2008, p. 370). In 
1983, the number of women in parliament more than doubled to nine and women’s 
representation in the legislature under President Habyarimana peaked in 1988 at 
nearly 16 percent (Muberanziza 2003, Burnet 2008, p. 370).
In 1989, several political parties that had been dormant under the single-party 
state and dictatorship of President Habyarimana reemerged and began demand-
ing political liberalization. Along with a few civil society organizations (CSOs) 
that were also pushing for change, their pleas coincided with increasing pressure 
in the international community for authoritarian states to democratize. Although 
the political liberalization movement was dominated by men, women were not 
completely absent. Women played an active role through the women’s wings of the 
political parties. There were also several key female politicians. Agathe Kanziga 
Habyarimana, wife of President Habyarimana, held a great deal of informal power 
in the Habyarimana regime because she hailed from a powerful family. Among 
the national leaders of the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR) party 
was Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who was named minister of education in 1992 and 
then prime minister of Rwanda in 1993.
On 1 October 1990, the country entered a civil war when the RPF invaded. 
The 1993 Arusha Peace Accords brought an official end to hostilities and out-
lined a transition plan to move the country to multiparty politics and democratic 
elections. The transition, which had been limping along, was brought to a violent 
halt in April 1994, when President Habyarimana was assassinated by unknown 
assailants. Immediately, Hutu extremists took control of the government and 
perpetrated a genocide against Tutsi and others defined as ‘enemies’ of the state, 
including many Hutu and Twa. At the same time, the RPF resumed the civil war 
BK-TandF-9780815372356_TEXT_BRUNT-181008-Chp05.indd   90 08/02/19   11:22 AM
Establishing political commitment to gender equity 91
against the government army, which was also involved in the genocide. The gen-
ocide ended when the RPF took military control of the majority of the territory, 
driving the Hutu-extremist government, militias, and army into exile. On 19 July 
1994, the RPF named a transitional government, which it called the ‘Government 
of National Unity’, whose composition reaffirmed the RPF’s commitment to power 
sharing outlined in the Arusha Accords. In 2003, a new constitution was approved 
in a national referendum, and for the first time since 1994, multiparty elections for 
parliament and president were held. In the parliamentary elections, the RPF and 
parties in its coalition won 96 percent of the seats in the lower house.
The current political settlement and women’s 
inclusion in politics
Rwanda’s current political settlement comprises the dominant party type. The 
critical juncture of the current political settlement was the 1994 genocide of Tutsi 
and its aftermath, whereby the RPF became the dominant party in a governance 
system characterized by regular elections with very limited competition between 
political parties. In its second dimension regarding the degree of institutional-
ization (see Chapter 2), Rwanda’s political settlement can still largely be char-
acterized by personalized relations and institutions, in that the political agenda 
and decision-making are dominated by a particular dominant ruler, President 
Kagame, and the rule of law has yet to be fully established (Pritchett et al. 2018). 
However, there is also compelling evidence that a process is under way to estab-
lish more formal institutional arrangements that operate along impersonal log-
ics, with observers drawing attention to the strong ideological campaign against 
patronage politics and very low levels of corruption within the country’s public 
sector (Golooba-Mutebi 2013, Chemouni 2017).
A key aspect of Rwanda’s post-genocide political settlement has been a top-to-
bottom effort to transform gender relations, increase representation of women in 
every branch and level of government, and increase protection of women’s rights. 
The nature of women’s involvement in politics changed dramatically as President 
Kagame and RPF created scope and space for women to participate in politics 
during the transition period. Among the fundamental principles articulated in 
the 2003 constitution (article 9) was ‘the equality of all Rwandans and between 
women and men reflected by ensuring that women are granted at least thirty 
percent of posts in decision-making organs’. The constitution delineated reserved 
women’s seats in the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of parliament. Since 
the first parliamentary elections under the new constitution were held in 2003, 
women have made remarkable gains in their representation in the Rwandan 
parliament. This can be seen in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, which show women in the 
Rwandan parliament in the years until 1994 (before the quotas) and following 
2003 (following the quotas). In every election, women captured seats well beyond 
the 24 reserved women’s seats in the Chamber of Deputies. In the 2013 elections, 
women candidates were well represented among the candidates on all party lists 
and comprised 48 percent of candidates on the RPF coalition of candidates.
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Despite the constitution’s clear instructions for representation of women through-
out the government, the goal of at least 30 percent women in all decision-making 
organs has not yet been reached in all government bodies. Table 5.3 summarizes 
women’s representation in various parts of the government, as of September 2013. 
Women’s representation in the highest levels of the executive branch and the judi-
ciary exceeds the quota, whereas the provincial and district levels of the local gov-
ernments has not yet reached 30 percent.
In terms of other aspects of inclusion, the key actors in Rwanda’s ruling coali-
tion, including the RPF-ruling party and President Paul Kagame, have advocated 
for greater representation of women (Longman 2006). President Kagame has reg-
ularly spoken on gender, women’s rights, and the importance of equal opportu-
nities for girls and women as cornerstones of the nation’s development. Women 
hold influential positions in the major political parties, including the RPF, its 
coalition parties, and opposition parties.
Beginning shortly after the genocide, women’s CSOs rose to prominence in 
Rwanda, lobbying on behalf of women’s rights and needs in the aftermath of the 
genocide. The women’s movement had several significant successes before gender 
quotas came into effect, including codifying rape and sexual violence as among 
the most serious genocide crimes in the 1995 genocide statute and the 1998 
amendment to the civil code, giving women and girls greater financial autonomy 
in marriage, and the right to inherit property. Women’s ability to claim these and 
other entitlements—including that of political inclusion—flowed directly from 
Table 5.1 Women in Rwanda’s national parliament (1961–1994)
National parliament
Year Total seats Number of women % women
1961 44 0 0
1965 47 1 2.1
1969 47 0 0
1982 64 4 6.3
1983 70 9 12.9
1988 70 11 15.7
1994 70 8 11.4
Source: Burnet (2008), p. 370
Table 5.2 Women in Rwanda’s national parliament after gender quota (2003–2013)
Chamber of Deputies Senate
Year Seats Women % women Year Seats Women % women
2003 80 39 48.8 2003 26 9 34.6
2008 80 45 56.3 2011 26 10 38.5
2013 80 51 63.7 2013 26 9 34.6
Source: Burnet (2008), p. 370, and parliamentary website (http://www.rwandaparliament.gov.rw/).
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both the horrific violence and suffering that many women experienced during 
the 1994 genocide, and also the active participation of many women within the 
RPF’s armed struggle.
After the creation of the gender quotas in all decision-making bodies of gov-
ernment in 2003, many women’s CSO leaders took positions in the government. 
The majority joined the RPF political party, attracted by its willingness to pro-
mote gender equity policies, a move that contrasted strongly with the approach 
of the other main parties, which had generally ignored women in the past. Thus, 
the establishment of Rwanda’s current political settlement was a highly gendered 
process, characterized by the recognition of women’s entitlements and rising 
levels of female political participation.
The gender machinery within the Rwandan state expanded gradually after the 
genocide and then rapidly during the first decade of the 21st century, and femo-
crats (feminist bureaucrats, whether female or male) would play a significant role 
in influencing gender-equitable policies and outcomes. In late 1994, the transi-
tional government created the Ministry of Gender, Family, and Social Affairs 
(MIGEFASO), the first government ministry dedicated to gender issues. The min-
istry was reorganized in 1999 and renamed the Ministry of Gender and Family 
Promotion (MIGEPROF). Technocrats and gender specialists within the ministry 
were key in collaborating with the Forum of Women Parliamentarians (FWPs) to 
develop the 1999 inheritance law. By the early 2000s, femocrats— comprising not 
only women, but also men with explicit gender training or who had bought into 




2013 2015 2013 2015
Cabinet Ministers 20 12 (65%) 11 (60%) 8 (35%) 9 (40%)
State 
ministers
8 5 (62.5%) Data 
unavailable




19 12 (63%) Data 
unavailable






5 4 (80%) 3 (60%) 1 (20%) 2 (40%)
Mayors 
(districts)
30 27 (90%) 27 (90%) 3 (10%) 3 (10%)
Parliament Chamber of 
Deputies
80 29 (36.3%) 29 (36.3%) 51 (63.7%) 51 (63.7%)
Senate 26 17 (65.4%) 16 (61.5%) 9 (34.6%) 10 (38.5%)
Judiciary Supreme 
Court




7 4 (57%) 4 (57%) 3 (43%) 3 (43%)
Intermediate 
courts
99 60 (60.6%) 60 (60.6%) 39 (39.4) 39 (39.4)
Source: Data collected in Rwanda.
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the gender agenda—had become a critical mass. Femocrats within MIGEPROF 
would play an important role during the drafting of the 2008 GBV law and also 
conducted a national grassroots consultation as the law was being revised. The 
state gender machinery continued to expand throughout the early 2000s, with the 
creation of the Gender Monitoring Office and mandates for all budgets within all 
state entities to include gender mainstreaming. The following section sets out in 
more detail how these key actors within the realm of Rwanda’s domain of wom-
en’s interests played a key role in the adoption of the GBV law.
The politics of domestic violence policy-making in Rwanda
The story of the law
According to Htun and Weldon’s (2010) typology of gender-specific policy 
reforms, anti-GBV legislation can be understood as a ‘transformative’ policy that 
challenges fundamental notions of gendered roles. Rwanda’s 2008 GBV law fits 
this definition because the legislation directly challenges deeply entrenched cul-
tural notions that subjugated women’s rights in Rwanda, not only by outlawing 
domestic violence, but by going further to define nonconsensual marital sex as 
rape and a punishable crime. In criminalizing all forms of GBV, it constituted one 
of the most comprehensive laws to be passed in sub-Saharan Africa. Importantly, 
it has been vigorously implemented and has transformed numerous institutions in 
Rwanda, including the National Police, and led to the creation of GBV one-stop 
centres that holistically address GBV survivors’ needs (legal, economic, physi-
cal, and emotional). It was also the first piece of legislation on gender equity in 
Rwanda that was initiated by the legislative branch rather than in the executive 
(Coffe 2012, p. 289).
After the efforts in 1995 to amend the genocide code and place rape and sex-
ual torture among Category 1 crimes, the issue of sexual violence faded from 
everyday discussion. It returned to prominence from 2001, when numerous cases 
of child rape reported in the media raised public awareness about sexual violence 
as a contemporary problem. Although not yet labelled ‘GBV’, these instances of 
sexual violence against minors initiated a public discussion of sexual violence. 
Interviewees said that GBV became an important issue between 2003 and 2005. 
During this period, MIGEPROF conducted a study on GBV, published in 2004, 
which established the severity of the problem (Powley and Pearson 2007, p. 20). 
Then, in 2005, a national conference on GBV was held in Kigali (Powley and 
Pearson 2007, p. 19). As we go on to explain in more detail, a small group of 
parliamentarians—mostly, but not exclusively, female—drafted the bill after the 
conference. In early 2006, the GBV bill was first introduced into parliament, but 
it was not adopted until 2008, due to a long grassroots consultative process and 
numerous revisions. At the time, some observers feared that the consultative pro-
cess was being used to delay the bill, while others saw it as necessary to achieve 
national buy-in to the law and improve the text so that it would bear up under 
scrutiny by the courts (Powley and Pearson 2007).
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The key actors and institutions centrally involved in drafting, revising, and 
advocating for the law included women’s CSOs unified under Pro-Femmes Twese 
Hamwe, the umbrella organization for women’s CSOs; the FWP; MIGEPROF; 
and Judith Kanakuze, a member of parliament (MP) who had emerged from wom-
en’s CSOs and who had a keen feminist desire to enhance women’s rights. During 
the implementation phase, key actors and institutions grew to also include the 
National Police, the judiciary, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Local 
Governance, and local government officials.
Coalition-building and informal negotiations
The issue of GBV initially came to prominence through the work of women’s 
CSOs. Haguruka, a legal aid society for women, received many victims of domes-
tic violence and child sexual abuse who were seeking legal assistance.4 Other 
CSOs encountered instances of GBV in their fieldwork. As a result of this knowl-
edge, women activists began to advocate for a law on that issue. Women’s CSOs’ 
activities in support of the GBV bill focused on awareness-raising activities, advo-
cacy, research, and monitoring and evaluation (UNFPA and GOR, 2008, p. 21). 
Haguruka played an important role in terms of legal expertise and advocacy.5 
These activities helped provide women MPs with the information they needed 
to advocate for the GBV bill and provided forums for advocacy around GBV 
through informal channels.
Interviewees disagreed over whether it was women’s CSOs or MIGEPROF that 
first presented the issue to the parliament.6 In practice, there has been a great deal 
of overlap in the membership of women’s CSOs, MIGEPROF staff, and women 
parliamentarians. Many of the first women parliamentarians came directly from 
women’s CSOs or MIGEPROF to take their seats. Almost all interviewees men-
tioned the coalition between CSOs and MPs who were aware of gender issues. 
Although they had resigned their CSO positions, they remained in close con-
tact with their former colleagues, reflecting the significance of informal networks 
in pushing the GBV agenda (Nazneen and Masud 2017) and of having a criti-
cal mass of women in multiple institutional sites (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-
Robinson 2014).
Virtually all interviewees named MP Judith Kanakuze and the FWP as instru-
mental in the process of both drafting the GBV law and lobbying to ensure its 
passage. Kanakuze was an MP who had risen to political prominence through her 
lifetime engagement with women’s CSOs. In drafting the GBV law, Kanakuze 
was joined by seven other MPs, including Aimable Niyibishaka, a man with a 
record of offering leadership on gender issues.7
Once the law had been presented in parliament, MIGEPROF played a prom-
inent role in sensitizing other MPs.8 MIGEPROF led a national grassroots con-
sultation process to present the draft bill to citizens throughout the country 
and receive feedback. The consultation process was used because parliamentar-
ians were worried that people might reject certain aspects of the law, such as 
the criminalization of marital rape. During the consultation process, however, 
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they encountered few objections and instead heard people calling for much more 
severe punishments than those proposed in the draft law.
The main objections came over the conjugal rape clauses, because some men 
insisted that rape in marriage is impossible since spouses give consent when they 
marry. In public outreach about the GBV law, the FWP and their allies further 
sought to defuse opposition by fielding men as spokespersons for the new law. One 
male parliamentarian involved in the grassroots consultation process reflected on 
his experience,
I was in charge of delivering this particular message [on gender sensitivity]. 
At the end of the meetings, local leaders, local male leaders, were shaken 
up. Hearing the message from a man was an added value, [they were] more 
convinced, more able to take the message seriously. But if the message had 
come from a woman you [would have] found them saying, ‘Oh, yes we know 
the story,’ but they [wouldn’t have] given it much weight. They tend to be 
more concerned with gender issues when a man delivers the message. (cited 
in Powley and Pearson 2007, p. 19)
The RPF supported the bill throughout the process, in keeping with its reputation 
as the champion of women’s rights and gender equality. The most powerful key 
actors promoting the GBV law were either members of the RPF or members of 
parties within the RPF coalition. For example, Aloisea Inyumba, who was a sen-
ator at the time the law was passed, and a founding member of the RPF, offered 
leadership on the GBV issue and sought partner funding for studies and the grass-
roots consultation process.9 However, it was President Paul Kagame’s support for 
the reforms that carried the most weight, both within and outside the party.10
Apart from the national actors, donors played a significant role by providing 
resources and technical support to women’s organizations that were active on 
GBV issues and by producing research to establish the facts required to make a 
case for the GBV bill. UN Women provided technical support throughout the 
legislative and implementation processes. In 2006, the Women’s Legal Rights 
Initiative Rwanda and Chemonics International conducted a GBV programming 
study. In 2008, MIGEPROF and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) con-
ducted a GBV mapping exercise to prepare the way for implementation of the 
GBV law. In 2010, UN Women hired a consultant to draft a GBV policy and 
implementation plan.
The role of discourses and ideas in shaping domestic 
violence framing
The definition of GBV and what it encompasses was influenced by how Rwandan 
women had experienced sexual and gender-based violence during the genocide 
against the Tutsis. GBV became a mobilizing issue immediately after the geno-
cide, given the enormously high rates of rape, sexual violence, sexual enslavement, 
and sexual torture during the 1994 conflict. Although CSO activism around the 
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genocide law brought sexual violence to the national consciousness in Rwanda, 
the term gender-based violence was used by the women’s organization and the FWP 
once the idea of drafting a GBV law was put forward.11 The wide-scale nature of 
sexual and gender-based violence opened up space for framing GBV in a way that 
included sensitive matters (such as marital rape), as primacy was given to women’s 
bodily integrity.
The FWP consciously framed the issue of GBV in an inclusive manner that 
identified men not as perpetrators, but as protectors of women, and promoted the 
legislation as a means of protecting familial relations. When advocating publicly 
for the GBV bill, women MPs and CSO representatives appealed to protective 
modes of masculinity, seeking to ‘engage men as fathers and sons, not as hus-
bands’, and encouraging them to think about their daughters’ or their mothers’ 
safety and security (Powley and Pearson 2007, p. 19). They had used similar tactics 
with great success when advocating for changes to the inheritance laws before 
women occupied the majority of seats in parliament (Burnet 2008). As Powley 
and Pearson (2007, p. 19) explain, ‘men were invited into the discussion as cham-
pions of victims’ rights, not as the target of the legislation’.
The anti-GBV law and advocacy efforts surrounding it were strongly influ-
enced by international discourses that had started to establish a new norm against 
gender-based violence (Chapter 3). For example, several interviewees under-
lined the influence of both the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Beijing Platform for Action 
on the women CSO members and women MPs who pursued the anti-GBV law 
and drafted the initial bill. According to a women’s civil society leader and a 
director in the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC), the GBV bill was also influ-
enced by UN Security Council Resolution 1325, the International Conference of 
the Great Lakes Region on Sexual Gender Based Violence (ICGLR-SGBV), the 
Kampala Declaration,12 and the Maputo Protocol.13
The politics of implementation
Unlike many other countries that have adopted domestic violence or GBV laws 
(see our chapters on Uganda, Bangladesh, and Ghana—Chapters 4, 7, and 8, 
respectively), Rwanda has moved further to implement its anti-domestic violence 
legislation. Achievements to date include the establishment of 30 Isange ‘One 
Stop’ Centres for GBV survivors (one in each district) that provide holistic inter-
vention and support; elaboration of a national strategic plan related to United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1325; enactment of gender-sensitive laws 
and review of existing discriminatory laws; creation of anti-GBV and child pro-
tection committees in every jurisdiction, from the grassroots level to the national 
level; creation of the Gender Desk in Rwanda National Police, Rwanda Defense 
Force, and the National Public Prosecution Authority; and creation of a free 
hotline to Rwanda National Police, Rwanda Defense Force, and National Public 
Prosecution Authority (Republic of Rwanda 2010, pp. 10–11). While reported 
rates of GBV have increased since the adoption of the GBV policy in 2011, these 
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increases may be attributed to increased identification and reporting of cases due 
to an institutional framework primed to record these data accurately or to the 
increased empowerment of women to report (Thomson et al. 2015, p. 3). Rwanda’s 
success on this front can be attributed to three main factors: (1) a well-established 
process for converting laws into practice; (2) the presence of professional tech-
nocratic corps at all levels of the government administration that operate within 
a strong system of accountability; and (3) the political will of ruling elites and 
power, buttressed by the ongoing support of CSOs. These factors, each of which 
directly reflects the dominant and increasingly institutionalized nature of its 
political settlement, have contributed to the broad and in-depth application of 
the GBV law, which has transformed the legal and institutional framework for 
victims of GBV.
Law implementation framework
The first reason for Rwanda’s success is the government’s technique for imple-
menting complex laws. When such laws are adopted, a complementary policy is 
crafted to lay the groundwork for implementation. The same strategy has been 
applied to other laws, including the National Decentralization Policy, and helps 
to ensure a close alignment between the de facto and de jure state of affairs. In 
the case of the GBV law and GBV policy, the GBV policy was crafted after the 
law had been adopted. Initially, a comprehensive GBV policy was drafted in 2008 
and 2009. Funded in part by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 
this draft policy covered GBV for adults and minors.14 Given the very different 
needs of adult and minor victims, it was determined that the draft policy was 
deficient, and a new effort to draft separate policies for adults and minors was 
undertaken in 2010.15
The National Policy Against GBV was adopted in July 2011 (Republic of Rwanda, 
2011). The document grounded the ideas and strategies of GBV national policy in 
the MDGs, the Vision 2020 strategic plan, the Economic Development and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (EDPRS), and the National Decentralization Policy. Most impor-
tantly, the policy recognized that GBV was a multifactorial problem that required a 
holistic implementation approach (Republic of Rwanda 2011, p. 13). Thus, the pol-
icy enumerated a set of implementation strategies, along with constraints for each 
objective, and policy actions to be taken to overcome the constraints (Republic of 
Rwanda 2011, pp. 13–16) and then identified all the institutions implicated in these 
solutions (Republic of Rwanda 2011, pp. 17–23). Beyond this innovative, holistic 
approach, the policy proposed two key innovations that helped lead to successful 
implementation: (1) the creation of ‘focal points in District hospitals’ (Republic of 
Rwanda 2011, p. 14), which resulted in the Isange One Stop Centres for GBV vic-
tims, and (2) a coordination framework that encompassed national-level institutions 
all the way down to village-level institutions and local government administrators 
(Republic of Rwanda 2011, p. 20). The MIGEPROF coordinates activities and holds 
the budget lines, which it then channels through the Ministry of Health and the 
National Police for implementation.
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Accountability, professional technocratic corps, and coordination
The second reason for GBV implementation success is the professional techno-
cratic corps at all levels of the government administration, the accountability 
systems put in place through performance contracts and annual review, and the 
high level of coordination of state institutions that is provided by the executive 
leadership. Several state institutions played key roles in implementation, includ-
ing MIGEPROF and the Prime Minister’s Office, the Gender Monitoring Office, 
the Ministry of Local Governance, the Ministry of Justice, the National Policy, 
and the FWPs.
In terms of implementation, there was strong collaboration among different 
government entities responsible for implementation. For example,
[T]he Ministry of Health worked hand in hand with the National Police 
and the Ministry considered the instructions from the National Police for 
medical assistance. The Ministry of Justice played a big role in the judiciary 
aspect based on the information from Ministry of Health and the National 
Police. There is a visible chain of command and collaboration among all 
concerned parties.16
These efforts were coordinated by the Prime Minister’s Office and the MIGEPROF:
All institutions have the instructions from the Prime Minister regarding which 
activities are to be done, we know the medical activities, judiciary activities, 
psychological, police, etc. We know the channel for the collaboration. Police 
have to investigate, to write the first document, and continue the process to 
present the document and send the victim to the medical services and judi-
ciary services. Police organize the campaign of sensitization in the rural area 
and we were helped by the local government, even the civil society.17
At the level of institutions, the Gender Monitoring Office ensured that every 
government ministry and agency had specific gender-related goals with dedicated 
budget lines and tracked results according to those goals. The budgetary and pro-
grammatic aspects are enforced because the law stipulates that annual budgets 
cannot be approved by the parliament if the gender-related goals are absent or not 
funded. Another reason for successful implementation of the GBV law is the large 
national budget to prevent and fight GBV.18
A key institutional innovation was the creation of the Isange One Stop 
Centres for GBV victims. The first Isange Centre was created in 2009 in the 
Kacyiru Police Hospital; currently, the number stands at 30. By 2013, the national 
police ‘had established nine other one stop centers’ (Hodari 2014, p. 40).19 The 
Isange Centre emerged from two parallel initiatives. First, a coalition between the 
National Police and UN Women led to the creation of gender desks in dis-
trict police departments.20 The creation and existence of gender desks in impor-
tant institutions such as the National Police, the Rwanda Defense Forces, and 
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health centres have helped with implementation of the GBV law.21 Shortly after 
the GBV law was passed, the FWPs led many workshops on GBV where civil 
society, National Police, and the Ministries recommended the creation of ‘focal 
points’ in district hospitals to serve GBV victims.22 Although the Isange One 
Stop Centres have been an important innovation, more work is required for them 
to reach their potential. A 2013 evaluation of the first Isange One Stop Centre 
cited several problems with the model, including the requirement that victims 
report crimes to the police to receive services, inconsistent access to legal ser-
vices, lack of follow-up with victims once they leave the Centre, and the lack of 
integration with community services outside of the hospitals and police (Bernath 
and Gahongayire 2013, pp. 8–10).
The collaboration between the Rwandan National Police and the judiciary has 
been central to addressing issues of impunity related to GBV.23 Following adop-
tion of the GBV law, the National Police investigated alleged GBV crimes with 
greater vigour, kept detailed records to make annual reports, and transmitted 
awareness-raising messages through the media.24 Their capacity was reinforced 
through international cooperation, training, and the creation of investigational 
protocols. Following the investigation, the judiciary then took over cases. The 
judiciary’s capacities were reinforced through staff being allocated for GBV cases 
and the creation of the Maison d’accès à la justice (MAJ) in each district. The 
MAJs have three staff per district, who are responsible for accompanying alleged 
victims during questioning and when they appear in court.25 The MAJ report 
the information to the Gender Monitoring Office so that it can assess how GBV 
cases are resolved.
Another key innovation in terms of implementation is the inclusion of targets 
around gender and GBV within the performance contracts (imihigo) of local offi-
cials.26 As described by Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012, pp. 392, 392fn52),
[A]dministrators are motivated and disciplined by an unusually effective 
form of performance-based contracting linked to the neo-traditional practice 
called imihigo … that gets its force from the unusual level of backing, moni-
toring, and enforcement applied to it from the President’s Office downwards.
Because gender mainstreaming was a foundational pillar of the Vision 2020 
strategic plan and the EDPRS, gender indicators have been included in the 
annual performance contracts of local officials. This technocratic solution meant 
that local officials did not have a choice over whether or not to pay attention to 
gender issues or to implement the GBV law and policy; it was integrated within 
Rwanda’s strong system of accountable governance.
Political will of elites and support of civil society organizations
The third reason for Rwanda’s relatively strong performance in implementing 
anti-domestic violence legislation was the political will of the elites and pow-
erbrokers and the ongoing support of CSOs. The 2010 National Gender Policy 
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cited ‘the existence of genuine political commitment at the highest level of deci-
sion-making provides great opportunities for success’ as one of the key opportuni-
ties for implementing the national gender policy (Republic of Rwanda 2010, p. 16). 
Insiders noted that feminist activists did not stop pushing simply because the law 
had been adopted: ‘The women MPs never cease to talk about the bill and com-
municate these rights to women everywhere in Rwanda’.27 In terms of implemen-
tation and realizing the rights guaranteed by the GBV law, the National Police 
and CSOs have been vital.28 The international NGO, ActionAID, worked with 
the local CSO, Haguruka, to raise awareness among women about their rights 
and about GBV. ActionAID gave technical and financial support to CSOs.29 
Among CSOs, the creation of Rwanda Men’s Resource Centre (RWAMREC) 
and its nationwide awareness-raising programmes have had a significant impact 
in changing the attitudes and beliefs of ordinary male citizens vis-à-vis GBV.
Civil society has played a key role in the implementation of the GBV law by 
raising awareness in communities, providing economic support to victims, advo-
cating for the law, conducting public policy research and evaluations of the One 
Stop Centres during the pilot phase, and advocating for implementation of the 
recommendations coming out of their studies.30 Civil society has been key in 
terms of raising awareness and disseminating information about the GBV policy, 
especially Pro-Femmes Twese Hamwe, RWAMREC, Haguruka, and Transperence 
Rwanda.31 The national grassroots consultative process, which was organized 
by MIGEPROF and implemented through the women’s councils at every level 
of government, was fundamental to building acceptance for the GBV law in 
communities.32
With implementation of the GBV Act, there is also some evidence that 
changes around gender-based violence have occurred on the ground. According 
to local police officers, ‘GBV is punished and people know that it is a success’.33 
‘People know their rights. In the past, no parent accepted to declare the vio-
lence inflicted on their children, they kept it a secret. Now the parents whose 
children are violated declare the violence inflicted to them’.34 The new plat-
form, Umugorobaw’ababeyeyi or Parents Council, organized nationwide by the 
National Women’s Council and local government officials, brings together male 
and female parents to discuss strategies that can be adopted by family members 
to improve their relationships, preventing and resolving conflict that can arise 
in their households, neighbourhoods, and communities. This platform provides 
an important space for listening to and advising parents or children involved in 
cases of domestic violence and a means through which a focus on solving GBV in 
particular can be institutionalized at the village level.35
Despite this progress, some victims of domestic violence are not able to benefit 
from the support of the Isange One Stop Centres because accessing this service 
first requires victims to report their abuse to the police (Bernath and Gahongayire 
2013). In their study of intimate partner violence in Rwanda, Mannell and Jackson 
(2014, pp. 6–9) identified three main structural factors that made victims reluc-
tant to report their abuse: (1) poverty and economic dependence; (2) the culture 
of silence around domestic violence; and (3) social and cultural norms deeming 
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many types of domestic violence as normal. Although there was widespread sup-
port for the bill, dissenting voices on certain provisions within the law remain. 
In particular, the provision defining marital rape as a crime met with some criti-
cism because of cultural understandings about sexual intercourse, marriage, and 
consent. Interviewees, however, were reluctant to speak on the record about these 
dissenting voices.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I set out to explore the extent to which Rwanda’s dominant party 
settlement influenced the pursuit, adoption, implementation, and outcomes of 
gender equity policies in Rwanda. I analysed this through the investigation of the 
adoption and implementation of anti-GBV legislation. I identified the ways key 
actors and formal and informal institutions interacted with each other, the ways 
power was wielded in a dominant type political settlement, and the ways these 
structural formations and power relations affected gender equity outcomes.
Based on the analysis, I found that the successful adoption and implementa-
tion of the anti-GBV law was directly shaped by high-level elite support and the 
impact of technocrats in the government administration. Both of these factors 
flow directly from the nature of Rwanda’s political settlement, which is strongly 
dominant and increasingly institutionalized in character. Even though the GBV 
law was the first law to originate from parliament in the aftermath of the 1994 
genocide, it received strong support from the president’s office, the prime minis-
ter’s office, and the MIGEPROF. The MIGEPROF coordinated the discussions 
with gender institutions (women’s councils, women’s CSOs, women’s caucus, etc.). 
The CSOs and media took the lead in public advocacy and in generating consen-
sus. The president and prime minister approved the law once passed by the parlia-
ment. The formal national grassroots consultative process, along with intensive 
revision of the draft bill, slowed down adoption of the measure, but it met with 
little opposition along the way. The few dissenting voices did not speak publicly 
about their opposition because they perceived it as the political will of the ruling 
coalition. Given the strong support for the GBV law among ruling elites, elections 
and clientelist politics were irrelevant to passing the GBV bill or implementing 
the policy. After adoption, Rwanda’s well-oiled technocratic machine in the exec-
utive branch and gender mainstreaming apparatus ensured vigorous implemen-
tation of the law.
These findings are significant because previous studies identified the top-down 
political will and a vibrant women’s movement as the most important factors 
related to adoption of the policies. However, by examining the case through a 
power domains lens that focuses on both the political settlement and its relation-
ship with the domain of women’s interests, several other important findings have 
emerged from this case.
First, using the political settlement framework to trace the processes of 
gender-inclusive policy initiatives yields benefits in understanding the ways that 
formal and informal political institutions affect outcomes of gender equity policies. 
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This approach helps isolate who the key actors are, how the historical context 
shaped outcomes, what role power played in policy formulation, how the flow of 
ideas influences behaviour, and what role political elites inside and outside the 
government played in adopting gender policies. This study has also highlighted 
the decisive role that the strength of the ruling coalition and the limited opposi-
tion from competing groups played in the successful adoption and swift implemen-
tation of the law.
Second, both the politicization of GBV as an issue and the move to ensure a 
critical mass of female parliamentarians (who would later devise and promote 
legislation against GBV) have their origins in the very formation of Rwanda’s 
post-conflict political settlement. From a power domains perspective, this shows 
how political settlements can, under certain conditions, become gendered with 
the domain of women’s interests, and a specific commitment to gender equity, 
constituted as integral to the legitimacy of the ruling coalition. The women’s 
movement played a critical role here by first helping to politicize the issue of 
gender equity and then moving to fill the positions offered within parliament and 
government by the quota system. This helped ensure strong political commitment 
to not only adopting, but also implementing the law.
Third, this study reveals the ways that transnational actors and discourses can 
influence the pursuit, adoption, and outcomes of gender equity laws and policies 
in dominant party political settlements. Clearly, the MDGs helped to tip the bal-
ance in favour of mainstreaming gender equity in the Vision 2020 strategic plan, 
even though Rwandan women’s CSOs had already effectively advocated for ame-
liorating women’s rights in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. The Millennium 
Challenge Corporation Threshold grant from 2008 to 2011 may also have kept the 
Rwandan government’s laser-like focus on meeting MDG goals wherever possible.
Fourth, the anti-GBV policy case demonstrates the importance of Rwanda’s 
accountability system, and the professionalism and expertise of technocrats 
and femocrats in the government, to Rwanda’s success in implementing gender 
equity laws and policies. As Booth and Golooba-Mutebi found, in terms of the 
understanding Rwanda as a ‘developmental patrimonial state’, the imihigo system 
of ensuring performance and accountability has a robust effect because of ‘the 
unusual level of backing, monitoring, and enforcement applied to it from the 
President’s Office downwards’ (2012, p. 392fn52). District mayors sign their per-
formance contracts under authority of the president to serve the citizens of their 
district.36 The mayors report directly to the president and serve at his behest. 
When they do not meet their performance standards, they will almost always 
be relieved of their duties, either because they resign or because they have their 
contracts terminated by the president.37
While this study appears to support Rwanda’s approach to policy formula-
tion, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation, we must point out two 
weaknesses of the system: (1) success depends on selection of the most accurate 
indicators for measuring achievements; and (2) the system remains vulnerable to 
inaccurate reporting of performance indicators or systemic changes in measure-
ment, such as lowering the bar for success. Some controversy over problems with 
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indicators and reporting progress on Rwanda’s poverty indicators came to light 
in late 2015.38 Beyond small technical problems, the more serious problem is the 
potential for inaccurate reporting of performance indicators by local government 
officials, who face a great deal of pressure to deliver on their performance con-
tracts. Because they are also the ones who report the vast majority of indicators, 
they are incentivized to over- or under-report to meet the goals.
Finally, the case of gender equity policies in Rwanda, and the anti-GBV policy 
case in particular, call into question Htun and Weldon’s (2010) typology of individ-
ual gender policies as being either ameliorative or transformative in and of them-
selves. This typology is not always neatly applicable in practice, not only because 
some policy initiatives can be simultaneously ameliorative and transformative, but 
also because their role in underpinning or challenging the status quo is shaped by 
the legacies of earlier policy interventions within the domain of women’s inter-
ests. The accretion of an expanding set of gender policies and laws in post-conflict 
Rwanda from the mid-1990s onwards had already led to a transformation in nor-
mative ideas about women and gender equity before the emergence of the GBV law 
(Burnet 2011). Indeed, the earlier moves to amend the civil code on matrimonial 
regimes and to establish women’s property rights (including their rights to own and 
inherit real estate), were arguably more transformative than the GBV law, particu-
larly when compared with the cases of Uganda and Bangladesh, where such moves 
have proved too radical for male elites to accept (see Chapters 4 and 7, respectively). 
The transformative progress already achieved within the domain of women’s inter-
ests in Rwanda, and the strong support of a dominant leader, thus helped ensure 
that the passage of the anti-GBV law was relatively uncontroversial, despite the 
inclusion of provisions against marital rape.
Notes
 1. Organic Law No. 08/96 of 30 August 1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions for 
Offences constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity commit-
ted since 1 October 1990.
 2. Law No 22/99 of 12/11/99 to Supplement Book I of the Civil Code and to Institute 
Part Five Regarding Matrimonial Regimes, Liberalities, and Successions.
 3. Law No 27/2001 Relating to the Rights and Protection of the Child Against 
Violence.
 4. Interview with representative, National Women’s Council, September 2014.
 5. Interview with representative, National Women’s Council, September 2014.
 6. Interview with representative, Rwanda Men’s Resource Centre, September 2014; 
interview with senior officer, National Police, February 2015.
 7. Interview with representative, National Women’s Council, September 2014.
 8. Interview with senior officer, National Police, February 2015.
 9. Interview with executive secretary, Women’s CSO, September 2014.
 10. Interview with director, Roman Catholic secondary school, September 2014.
 11. Interview with national GBV advisor, international NGO, Kigali, Rwanda, 
December 2014; interview with programme director, Rwanda Women’s Network, 
December 2014.
 12. Interview with consultant and expert on gender, December 2014.
 13. Interview with representative, Transparency International-Rwanda, September 2014.
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 14. Personal communication, Burnet 2010.
 15. Personal communication, Burnet 2010.
 16. Interview with GBV officer, Ministry of Health, February 2015.
 17. Interview with senior officer, National Police, February, 2015; similar things said in 
interview with programme director, Rwanda Women’s Network, December 2014.
 18. Interview with GBV officer, Ministry of Health, February 2015.
 19. Jimmy Hodari, ‘The Isange One Stop Centre: A Holistic Approach to Sexual and 
Gender-Based Violence’. The Police Chief website, http://www.policechiefmagazine.
org/the-isange-one-stop-centre-a-holistic-approach-to-sexual-and-gender-based- 
violence/[accessed 19 July 2018].
 20. Interview with consultant and expert on gender, December 2014.
 21. Interview with national GBV advisor, international NGO, Kigali, Rwanda, 
December 2014.
 22. Interview with senior officer, National Police, February 2015.
 23. Interview with representative, Transparency International-Rwanda, September 2014.
 24. Interview with national GBV advisor, international NGO, Kigali, Rwanda, 
December 2014.
 25. Interview with national GBV advisor, international NGO, Kigali, Rwanda, 
December 2014.
 26. Interview with national GBV advisor, international NGO, Kigali, Rwanda, 
December 2014.
 27. Interview with representative, Rwanda Men’s Resource Centre, September 2014.
 28. Interview with representative, Rwanda Men’s Resource Centre, September 2014; 
interview with representative, Transparency International-Rwanda, September 2014.
 29. Interview with national GBV advisor, international NGO, Kigali, Rwanda, 
December 2014.
 30. Interview with national GBV advisor, international NGO, Kigali, Rwanda, 
December 2014.
 31. Interview with consultant and expert on gender, December 2014.
 32. Interview with current MP, former CSO leader, Kigali, September 2014.
 33. Interview with senior officer, National Police, February 2015.
 34. Interview with senior officer, National Police, February 2015.
 35. Interview with GBV officer, Ministry of Health, February 2015.
 36. ‘President Kagame Presides over Signing of 2014/2015 Imihigo’, published 12 Sep-
tember 2014, http://www.paulkagame.com/index.php/news/1418-president-kagame-
presides-over-signing-of-2014-2015-imihigo[accessed 31 December 2015].
 37. Musoni (2015). Chambers and Booth (2012, p. 3) report that the imihigo performance 
contract system also ensures accountability in the health care system, because local 
officials’ performance contracts include health indicators.
 38. See, for example, ‘Rwanda Accused of Manipulating Poverty Statistics’ France24 
website, http://m.france24.com/en/20151102-rwanda-accused-manipulating-poverty- 
statistics[accessed 24 December 2015]; and ‘Lies, Damned Lies and Statistics: Pov-
erty Reduction Rwandan-Style and How the Aid Community Loves It’, African 
Arguments website, http://africanarguments.org/2015/11/03/lies-damned-lies-and-
statistics-poverty-reduction-rwandan-style-and-how-the-aid-community-loves-
it/[accessed 24 December 2015].
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1. Staff member, UN Women; member, Réseau des Femmes
2. Former minister, Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion
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4. Executive secretary, women’s civil society organization; member, Réseau des Femmes
5. Lawyer and consultant; former executive secretary, Haguruka
6. Representative, Rwanda Men’s Resource Centre (RWAMREC)
7. Rwandan Civil Society Platform
8. Representative, Gender Monitoring Office
9. Director, Catholic secondary school
10. Representative, National Women’s Council
11. Member of parliament and representative, Forum of Women Parliamentarians (FWP)
12. Representative, Transparency International-Rwanda; civil society leader
13. Consultant and expert on gender
14. Director, Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion
15. Consultant and expert on gender-based violence; member, Réseau des Femmes
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17. Representative, Transparency International-Rwanda
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26. Senior officer, National Police
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Achieving a broad-based coalition
The politics of South Africa’s 
Domestic Violence Act (1998)
Lillian Artz and Valérie Grand’Maison
6
Introduction
Women’s participation in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of 
South Africa’s government has increased significantly since the establishment of 
a new post-apartheid political settlement in the early 1990s, a move that in turn 
helped secure a stronger focus on gender equity within political institutions and 
legislative processes. In a 2015 Women’s Day communiqué, the South African 
government reported that:
… prior to 1994, the South African Parliament had a mere 2.7 per cent rep-
resentation of women, and following the first democratic elections, women’s 
representation in the National Assembly stood at 27.7 per cent. Currently, 
women ministers comprise 41 per cent of the Cabinet, women deputy minis-
ters make up 47 per cent of the total number of deputy ministers and there is 
a 41 per cent representation of women in the National Assembly.1
This level of representation of women in political spaces has been made possible 
by the effective mobilization of a women’s movement distinct from the broader 
national liberation struggle during apartheid and transition to democracy (Hassim 
and Gouws 1998).
Research on the linkages between women’s inclusion in politics and outcomes 
on gender equity has demonstrated that this is mediated by a number of other 
factors, such as the political will of ruling elites and the extent to which women 
members of parliament (MPs) are undeviating in advancing women’s equality, 
autonomy, and empowerment (Childs and Krooke 2009, Htun and Weldon 
2010). In this chapter, we move beyond the inclusion-to-influence debate to 
explore what actors and processes shape the ability to negotiate gender equity 
concerns with regard to policy adoption and implementation, focusing on the 
case of domestic violence policy in South Africa. We specifically look into the 
strategies women and other state or non-state actors used to negotiate within 
South Africa’s dominant party and largely institutionalized political settlement, 
and how these negotiations shape gender equity outcomes. We investigate three 
specific questions:
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1 What factors shaped the relationship between women’s inclusion in politics 
and their influence over the adoption of domestic violence law and its imple-
mentation processes?
2 What role did pro-gender equity policy coalitions within the domain of wom-
en’s interests play in both adoption and implementation processes?
3 What impact did the dominant-institutionalized settlement have on women’s 
strategic interests and their ability to influence gender equity outcomes?
We adopted a political settlement framework to analyse the dynamic nature 
of the political climate, influenced by formal institutions and processes, as well 
as by informal mechanisms. This framework has increasingly been applied to 
conceptualize political stabilization in post-conflict states by taking into consid-
eration the multilayered structures of influence on the political agenda, revealing 
processes outside of the public discourse, and recognizing the reciprocal impact of 
formal and informal negotiations. A political settlement can be conceptualized 
as a dynamic social contract between the state and civil society, fluctuating as a 
result of mechanisms operating at different personal, institutional, and organiza-
tional levels (Di John and Putzel 2009). Such processes include long-term efforts 
in legal reforms, or broader transition developments, or a dominant political ide-
ology suppressing opposing voices; it could also be explicitly negotiated with local, 
national, and international stakeholders, as in the case of a formal peace process.
We used a two-staged method to develop an in-depth understanding of the 
dynamic political context and multilayered structures within which women have 
negotiated their interests. The first step consisted of a thematic analysis (Vaismoradi 
et al. 2013) of (1) historical developments regarding women’s rights advances; 
(2) the transformative nature of the transitional process in South Africa, in terms 
of women’s participation; and (3) the nature of relationships between formal and 
informal institutions that shaped the implementation of domestic violence policy. 
The second stage of study used process tracing to identify the causal mechanisms 
leading to policy adoption. Timeline and actor mapping were used to identify key 
actors and track the negotiations and contestations between these actors. Key 
informant interviews and focus group discussions with those directly involved 
in the policy process were conducted to gain insider insights into how the pol-
icy adoption process and the early years of the implementation of the Domestic 
Violence Act (DVA) played out (see Appendix 3 for a list of participants).
The chapter is structured as follows: the following section discusses South 
Africa’s political and historical context, particularly the critical junctures that 
opened up space for women’s rights, followed by an analysis of South Africa’s cur-
rent political settlement and women’s role within this. The chapter then traces 
the process through which the DVA was negotiated and adopted, focusing on 
the coalition-building and discursive strategies of the key proponents involved. 
The final section tracks the politics of implementation, by identifying processes 
and outcomes, as well as reasons behind the gaps in progress. The conclusion 
examines the links between South Africa’s political settlement and the path of 
adoption and implementation of the DVA.
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Women’s inclusion in politics and policy-making 
in South Africa
Critical junctures and history of women’s engagement 
in politics before the democratic transition
Critical junctures in history—such as liberation, anti-colonial, and national 
struggles—have been shown to expand women’s inclusion in politics and public 
policy in the Global South (Nazneen and Mahmud 2012). Women’s active inclu-
sion and participation at these turning points shape the extent to which women 
can claim political entitlements and establish a focus on gender equity. Important 
critical junctures in South Africa were the liberation movement against apart-
heid, starting in the early 1940s, and the transition to democracy from 1994 
onwards, following the end of apartheid. The recognition of women’s rights in 
South Africa was integral to the mass national liberation movement. In 1943, the 
African National Congress (ANC)—the political party that played a key role in 
the struggle against apartheid and would later dominate South African politics—
adopted Africans’ Claims in South Africa, which declared the need for all Africans 
to unite for freedom (ANC 1943, Preface). This declaration called for equality 
of all races and the end of discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, culture, 
and other marginalized identities. Within this effort, women organized against 
discriminatory and hostile pass laws2 and established the Federation of South 
African Women (FEDSAW) within the Congress Alliance (the anti-apartheid 
political coalition led by the ANC) in 1954 (Albertyn 1994).
The women’s movement in South Africa earned independent recognition from 
the resistance effort in the early 1990s. Inspired by the outcomes of the tran-
sition of other post-conflict countries, women advocated for an autonomous effort 
to secure women’s emancipation in the national liberation process. The South 
African feminist ideology first emerged during the ‘Malibongwe Conference’, 
held in January 1990 (Albertyn 1994). This year also marked the formation of 
the ANC Women’s League (ANCWL), which worked independently from the 
ANC, yet possessed the necessary expertise and skills acquired from the libera-
tion struggle to be heard in the national political arena. ANCWL’s autonomous 
position and its deep links with women’s movement organizations, alongside its 
strong connections with the ANC, were important for negotiating gender equity 
during the transition process in South Africa. The Women’s National Coalition 
(WNC) was established in 1992, with ANCWL as an affiliate, and was a cru-
cial actor in bringing together women’s movement actors from across the polit-
ical divides to work together. WNC stated its mission as follows: ‘to coordinate 
a national campaign for the development and education of women through a 
twofold strategy: bottom-up mobilization through education and political activ-
ism, and a top-down approach to influence policy-making in the constitutional 
process’ (Murphy 2004). The leaders of the WNC effectively used the notions of 
rights to unite women across race, class, and party divides, while taking advan-
tage of the mobilization efforts of the ANCWL and broader national liberation 
struggle to organize, advocate, and educate men and women at the grassroots and 
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parliament levels. The role played by women’s organizations during the liberation 
struggle, the united stance on gender equity taken by these organizations, and the 
personal links these groups had with the ruling party meant that it was difficult 
for the political leaders in the ANC to ignore the demands made by the women’s 
movement. Moreover, the demands for gender equity were framed as intersecting 
with the resistance movement’s own concepts of rights and equality, successfully 
challenging patriarchal attitudes through deeply shaped South African social and 
political discourses (Albertyn 1994, Hassim 2006), thus securing greater traction 
for issues of gender equity within the ANC.
The political settlement post-transition and women’s inclusion
The post-transition political settlement comprised an agreement between the 
dominant white minority and a liberation movement acting on behalf of an 
oppressed majority (Levy et al. 2015). The process of pact-making was long and 
involved both bilateral and multilateral negotiations, some of which were held in 
secret (van Wyk 2009). The nature of the settlement since the time of transition 
can be classified as dominant-institutionalized (see Chapter 2). In terms of the 
configuration of power, since the ANC won the elections in 1994, it has faced no 
credible opposition from opposing political forces for control of the national-level 
government. In institutional terms, the history of state-building over the course 
of the 20th century meant that the elected ANC inherited a relatively strong and 
rules-based set of institutions through which to govern, at the national level at least.
As mentioned earlier, women’s prominent role within the liberation struggle 
and their strong links with the ANC leadership ensured that the WNC was able 
to gain a foothold within the ruling coalition. The negotiation process between 
contending groups offered space for women to participate and to successfully 
include gender issues in the agreed post-apartheid political settlement (Waylen 
2007). As Waylen (2007) argues, gender rights activists lobbied for the inclusion 
of women in the ANC’s negotiating teams, nonsexism in the constitutional prin-
ciples, and an equality clause in the constitution that would override customary 
law. There were tensions with traditional leaders over the equality clause because 
they wanted customary law to be excluded, but the women’s lobby eventually won 
(Waylen 2007, p. 531). Nevertheless, traditional leaders were an important part 
of the deals reached during this negotiation period, including over land, which 
created challenges for pushing gender equity concerns.
In the post-apartheid settlement, the role of women in the ANC was recog-
nized by the establishment of a 30 percent quota system within the political party 
in its nomination as the first democratically elected government in 1994. This led 
to the appointment of more than 100 women to national and provincial govern-
ment positions (Geisler 2000). Women MPs were able to introduce meaningful 
changes within the governmental structures, such as the establishment of the 
National Gender Machinery (NGM) and the introduction of a number of laws 
and policies pertaining to specific needs and vulnerabilities of women (Murray and 
O’Sullivan 2005, Waylen 2007). The constitution adopted in 1996 led to profound 
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changes in the operation of the criminal justice system and the development of 
(gender-related) law and jurisprudence. The constitution further enshrined the 
institutionalization of gender mainstreaming ‘nodes’ within government. These 
included formal channels and accountability mechanisms between civil society 
organizations, government, and international bodies— specifically, the establish-
ment of the Commission of Gender Equality (CGE), the Office on the Status of 
Women (OSW), the Joint Committee on the Improvement of the Quality of Life 
and the Status of Women (JC), and the National Gender Forum (Gouws 2006).
However, the post-transition period also witnessed a schism between women 
parliamentarians and women’s civil society organizations (nongovernmental 
organizations [NGOs], in particular), leading to a crisis of identity in the wom-
en’s movement in South Africa. This was further complicated by post-apartheid 
identifications and settlements between and amongst class and race, as well as 
political, sexual, and gender identities and orientations (Britton 2006, Gouws 
2006). It also became evident during the first democratic government that wom-
en’s representation would not necessarily translate into the promotion of women’s 
interests, due to a lack of political expertise of women MPs and the male-dominated 
nature of the South African parliament at the time (Britton 2006). It was within 
this rapidly changing and complex political context, as located within a deeply 
patriarchal society, that women’s movement organizations had to advocate for 
equal rights whilst recognizing the intersectional identities of women.
The nature of South Africa’s ruling coalition has had an effect on advancing 
gender equity. As traditional figures played a significant role in the post-apartheid set-
tlement process, the ruling party’s position on gender policy leaned more towards 
ameliorative, rather than transformative, gender equity policies. As a result, 
some women MPs were reluctant to push for more transformative changes to stay 
within the party line and played a more influential role in promoting less chal-
lenging policy agendas, such as those relating to gender equality in the workplace. 
This left the promotion of more transformative policies, including on domestic 
violence, to the women’s movement in civil society that remained outside formal 
government.
The institutional dimension of South Africa’s political settlement was also 
influential here, with regards to its relatively strong public institutions (Levy et al. 
2015). This meant that negotiations around domestic violence took place within 
the formal governance arena, and the women’s coalition operated through largely 
formal routes (in contrast to the importance of informal processes in the more per-
sonalized settings of Bangladesh and Uganda; see Chapters 7 and 4 respectively). 
The National Gender Machinery and the South African Law Commission played 
key roles in passing the policy on domestic violence. Although the process of adop-
tion was mainly achieved through formal routes, the role of informal alliances 
between members of the domestic violence coalition and the ruling coalition did 
help to fast-track the process in the context of a dominant political settlement. In 
the next section, we take a closer look at the adoption process of the domestic vio-
lence law and explore the interplay between the formal and informal mechanisms 
and their impact on the symbolic and tangible protection for women.
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The politics of domestic violence policy-making 
in South Africa
South Africa’s transition from apartheid to a democratic state provided the impe-
tus for a concerted focus on advancing women’s rights, as well as the rights of 
victims of crime more broadly (Artz and Smythe 2005). Within this particularly 
enabling political environment, South Africa’s parliament passed the Domestic 
Violence Act 116 in 1998 (DVA). There were also other domestic laws and pol-
icies promoting substantive gender equality and reinforcing women’s rights and 
freedoms during this time, including laws relating to termination of pregnancy,3 
equality,4 labour,5 sexual offences,6 maintenance,7 and customary marriages8 
(Artz 2008). The DVA was promulgated with the aim of ensuring that ‘victims of 
domestic violence received the maximum protection from domestic abuse that the 
law could provide’. The ambit of the Act expanded on what constitutes a ‘domes-
tic relationship’ and what amounts to ‘domestic violence’. In many respects, the 
Act marks a distinctive shift in South African law from denial of the existence 
of domestic violence to a legal definition that encompasses women’s experiences.
The drafting of the DVA took place within a particularly enabling post-conflict, 
transitional environment, where the newly promulgated Constitution and Bill 
of Rights9 promoted a human rights-focused era of criminal justice reform. The 
South African Law Reform Commission was particularly active at the time of 
these emerging laws and was also open to consultation with activists, academics, 
and other civil society organizations that had an interest in the domestic violence 
policy reform process. A number of key actors and institutions were influential in 
the outcome of the domestic violence policy. The strategies they used in terms of 
coalition-building, the discursive use of ideas, and negotiation of power relations, 
as located within an increasingly favourable transnational context, all played 
critical roles.
The story of the law
A comprehensive and largely progressive domestic violence statute, the DVA was 
drafted in part to address the high levels of intimate partner violence in South 
Africa, as well as to ensure a more accessible civil remedy for all South African 
women experiencing violence (Fedler 1995, Artz and Smythe 2005). Implicit 
in the objective of accessibility was the intention to amend pre-1994 legislation 
pertaining to ‘family violence’ that failed to recognize and provide for different 
types of abuse in a wide range of relationships. The DVA’s predecessor was the 
Prevention of Family Violence Act 133 of 1993 (PFVA), which was the first piece 
of legislation specifically enacted to address domestic violence in South Africa. 
Although considered to be an innovative statute in the South African context—
in that it criminalized marital rape—its provisions provided limited protection for 
victims of domestic violence. After the PFVA became operational, it was quickly 
discovered that there were a fair number of inconsistencies, but more impor-
tantly, it became apparent that implementation would be problematic. Among the 
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weaknesses of the PFVA was that it omitted to even define domestic violence, 
and protections were solely restricted to parties who were married, whether by 
civil or customary law, or those living in common law marriages (SALC 1997). A 
result of this failure to define domestic violence was that it afforded magistrates 
the discretionary power to make such a determination (SALC 1997). Another 
major problem was that not only were the police not familiar with the PFVA, 
they also lacked the training on how to implement its provisions because there 
was no instruction on how to use the PFVA or when to use their discretion in 
the protection of victims (Human Rights Watch 1997). Three years after the 
introduction of the PFVA, South Africa’s new Constitution (108 of 1996) came 
into effect. The PFVA provisions were not compliant with the new Bill of Rights 
and the Constitution. A number of organizations, including the Black Sash and 
Human Rights Watch Africa, along with feminist groups and various law schools 
around the country, were highly critical of the PFVA (SALC 1997). In the face 
of mounting criticism and the ineffectiveness of the PFVA, the South African 
Law Commission (SALC) was called upon to launch an investigation. A team of 
experts comprising members from the magistracy, the NGO sector, and academia 
was then tasked with addressing the PFVA’s shortcomings and drafting a new 
Domestic Violence Act (Parenzee et al. 2001).
Following an intensive process of consultation, which included civil society 
organizations, a new law was introduced in 1998. This new Act, the DVA, came 
into operation the following year, on 15 December 1999. The DVA sought to 
resolve all the concerns raised around weaknesses in the PFVA. The main actors 
involved in the negotiation process were individuals from state departments 
and committees, the SALC, legal experts, academic researchers, and women’s 
organizations working in violence against women (Waylen 2007, Artz 2008). It 
is through alliances, public pressure, and discursive framing strategies that these 
stakeholders negotiated the legislation. The process of policy reform was also 
made possible within the context of the discourse of liberal rights and gender 
mainstreaming that was pursued during South Africa’s political transition, as well 
as by the effective engagement of women activists with key politicians and exist-
ing state structures (Vetten 2005, Meintjes 2009).
Coalition-building and negotiations
The domestic violence lobby was comprised of civil society organizations at the 
national and international levels, documenting the high levels of violence against 
women in South Africa to push the government to action (Usdin et al. 2000, 
Mogale et al. 2012). A few years into the democratic transition, the relationship 
between the state and feminist movements slowly deteriorated, as the latter con-
tinued the fight for equality and freedom from violence. An NGO representative 
reflects on the past and the present relationship with the state:
The days are long gone. We [state and civil society] had a nice honeymoon 
period. We were critical of each other, yes, but we all took it in stride and 
BK-TandF-9780815372356_TEXT_BRUNT-181008-Chp06.indd   114 08/02/19   11:27 AM
Achieving a broad-based coalition 115
knew that democracy in action was a tough road. Whatever side of the fence 
we were on after 1994—governmental or NGO—we were all on the same 
side before, in the struggle, and yeah for a few years after we were marching 
to the same tune … Now, over the years, you stop knowing who the enemy is 
any more, because we in the community [sic] kept fighting the good fight—
the liberation of our people from poverty and violence and everything poor 
people suffer from—and the government over the years … they have other 
priorities.10
The increasingly strained relationship between the state and women’s movements 
after democratization (Geisler 2000) meant that women MPs were often unsupport-
ive of women’s efforts for legal reform against domestic violence. Reflecting on the 
role of women’s leadership in securing an emerging body of substantive rights for 
women in South Africa, one activist involved throughout the domestic violence 
policy process points out that it was civil society organizations, rather than women 
MPs or the gender machinery in government, that did much of the groundwork of 
bringing issues of gender-based violence and policy reform to the fore:
Let us not romanticize the role of the leading party at the time… The 
South African Law Commission (SALC) and the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Justice (PPCJ) did do quite a thorough job in presenting a 
discussion paper [on domestic violence] for civil society to comment on and 
engage with. Yet, the impetus for the drafting of this paper came from civil 
society organizations, who worked tirelessly with both the SALC and the 
PPCJ in bringing forward international laws, whatever local research was 
there at the time and of course the harsh realities of domestic violence in 
South Africa at that time. I have no recollection, however, of a substantive 
engagement… at least in the presence of civil society organizations … with 
the government’s so-called ‘gender machinery’ at the time. [Respondent is 
asked to explain who the gender machinery was.] That includes the Office 
for the Status of Women, the Gender Commission, the ANCWL, and oth-
ers, apart from the Ad Hoc Committee [on the Quality of Life and Status of 
Women], who actively engaged with us.11
This difficult relationship with the ruling party necessitated a strong coalition 
between different actors to push for policy reform on domestic violence. In secur-
ing strategic alliances between civil society and state structures, the violence 
against women (VAW) mobilization leadership shifted from grassroots organiza-
tions to legal and political experts championing legislation reform (Meintjes 2003). 
The National Network on Violence Against Women (NNVAW), a coalition of 
organizations throughout South Africa, played an important organizational role 
in putting domestic violence on the policy agenda. Academic and legal organi-
zations initiated discussions in 1993 about the need for a national system joining 
regional chapters of stakeholders in VAW, in order to provide protection, support, 
and information to women and the larger public. The NNVAW was launched 
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in 1995 and possessed a mass-based constituency, including approximately 600 
member organizations, rendering this nationwide structure able to impose much 
pressure on the government to address the internationally recognized pandemic 
levels of VAW in South Africa (Usdin et al. 2000, Vetten 2013). With resources 
from the UNDP and the government, they thus succeeded in opening a conver-
sation about VAW across different departments—such as health, welfare, justice, 
and social development—“and with civil society working in service provision for 
victims of domestic violence (Meintjes 2003). However, the process of politicizing 
the issue reduced the agency of civil society organizations in the legislative pro-
cess. This caused the de-radicalization of the movement on VAW, as advocates 
benefited from homogenizing the image of South African women and their expe-
rience of violence in the face of the law (Meintjes 2003).
Another important institution in the drafting process of the DVA was the South 
African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), a state institution enshrined in 
the constitution with the aim of protecting human rights for all. It submitted a 
report to the Joint Committee on Improvement of Quality of Life and Status of 
Women on the status of domestic violence in South Africa, emphasizing the 
positive responsibilities of the state in fulfilling rights for everyone. Significant 
in its approach is the pressure it put on the government to intervene in domestic 
matters, emphasizing that violence in the home erodes South African society 
because it acts as an example to children and ensures the perpetuation of such 
acts (SALC 1996, Bendall 2010).
The SALC established the project committee on domestic violence in 1996, 
recognizing the positive duties of the state to protect and fulfil the rights of women 
in the form of safeguards and penalties in cases of domestic violence (SALC 1999, 
Bendall 2010). The SALC’s discussion paper on domestic violence (Project 100) 
explained the inception of the present project committee as a response to the 
allegations of attorneys defending men, who decried the departure of the PFVA 
from traditional applications of the law, thus ignoring the role that the domestic 
violence lobby played in engendering the law reform. Most of the submissions in 
the discussion paper, however, described the unique circumstances of domestic 
violence, and the shortcomings of the PFVA due to the narrow definition of vio-
lence and domestic relationships, resulting in limited remedies available to the 
applicant (SALC 1997). This suggests that the power to initiate legislation related 
to gender rights was held by men of the apartheid legislative establishment.
The Joint Committee on the Improvement of the Quality of Life and the 
Status of Women (JC), chaired by MP Pregs Govender at the time, played a cru-
cial role in fast-tracking the Project Bill in legislation through political will and 
expertise (Meintjes 2003). Established as an ad hoc committee in the National 
Gender Machinery, its role was to hold departments accountable for promoting 
the conditions and rights of women, as well as amending policies and legislation 
where gaps in the protection of women are evident. The JC is also responsible for 
ensuring the implementation of CEDAW. Strategic alliances among the JC chair-
person, Govender; the Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar; and the Justice Portfolio 
Committee advocate, Johnny de Lange, allowed for an expedited process of 
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drafting the bill in parliament, ensuring that the SALC would deliver its findings 
and recommendations before the end of the session (Meintjes 2003). This shows 
that informal alliances between members of the domestic violence coalition and 
key figures in the ruling coalition were utilized alongside formal governance pro-
cesses. While the first draft bill was rejected by SALC commissioners, due to 
the lack of gender-neutral language, the project committee members extensively 
engaged in lobbying to expose the need for the legislative reform.
This legislative reform process, however, came with obstacles. First, it deeply 
affected the ways that civil society can engage with government, limiting them 
to structured public hearings, dependent on bureaucratic limitations, and fur-
ther emphasizing the need for political and technical expertise in gender rights 
advocacy (Meintjes 2003). Second, the speed with which particular individuals 
were able to push the project bill also excluded discussion of the financial impli-
cations of the implementation of the DVA for the different departments, which 
proved to be the most significant obstacle to the effective dissemination of the 
Act. Finally, the ratified DVA failed to consider the uneven circumstances of its 
constituencies and of the specific conditions of domestic violence. The politici-
zation of gender-based violence as an issue meant that remedies at different levels 
were dependent on the political will and technical skills of particular individuals.
The role of discourses and ideas in shaping domestic 
violence campaign
The prevailing discourses around gender within South Africa have historically 
been based on a conceptualization of women as mothers, with early brands of 
feminism emphasizing women’s need for protection. These tendencies have 
directly influenced how women’s needs and interests have been framed in South 
Africa. A substantial body of literature decries the omission of gender from his-
torical analyses of oppression in South Africa, noting that it successfully muted 
the agency of women under apartheid and the intersection of discrimination that 
dictated the experiences of women (Meintjes 2009).
An important consideration in the protection of women’s rights before and 
after the transition was the extent to which the state was willing and able to 
intervene in family matters (Gouws 2005). The distinction between the public 
and private spheres was starkly made during the apartheid era by the patriarchal 
system that reinforced the subordinated nature of women in both social and polit-
ical realms (Albertyn 1994). While women’s role in the workforce and the public 
sphere was encouraged by the state, it was reluctant to address inequalities within 
the home. Change came slowly, as South African authority—in the form of com-
munity and religious leaders, as well as regional and national politicians—was 
keen to keep family matters out of the public realm (Geisler 2000, Albertyn 2011).
International discourses and ideas on women’s and human rights, and South 
Africa’s subscription to international human rights declarations, opened a space 
in which domestic violence could be addressed (Gouws 2005). International 
norms were also instrumental in enabling women’s movements to raise awareness 
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of VAW in South Africa (Usdin et al. 2000, Mogale et al. 2012). The South 
African government was then sensitive to international discourse, in an effort 
to improve its standing within the international arena after decades of exclusion. 
It thus heavily committed itself to promoting human rights in line with inter-
national instruments (Hassim and Gouws 1998, O’Sullivan and Murray 2005). 
This was evident in South Africa’s explicit goal of eradicating violence against 
women in response to the ratification of CEDAW and its obligation towards the 
African Protocol on the Rights of Women and to the Beijing Platform (Meintjes 
2003, O’Sullivan and Murray 2005). The 1998 Southern African Development 
Community Declaration of the Prevention and Eradication of Violence against 
Women and Children further propelled the imperative to ensure the implemen-
tation of legislation and practices in line with the regional discussions on human 
rights and VAW (Meintjes 2003). The SALC Project Bill explicitly reiterated 
the South African government’s commitment to CEDAW and highlighted the 
shortcomings of the PFVA in terms of these engagements (Meintjes 2009). Thus, 
global norm diffusion against VAW was critical in spurring momentum for the 
issue of domestic violence in South Africa into the political agenda.
Women’s rights activists also used the shortcomings of the PFVA highlighted by 
victims’ attorneys to frame the need for a new policy (Fedler 1995). They stressed 
the need to reconsider the way domestic violence was conceptualized in politics, 
arguing that the narrow understanding of violence against women did not tackle 
the conditions that perpetuate abuse. This framing shifted public understanding 
on the issue because domestic violence was perceived as a social issue, rather 
than purely a legislative one. The framing of the issue as a social matter, and the 
unique circumstances of battered women, allowed the policy coalition to demand 
that the new policies on domestic violence address women’s medical, psychologi-
cal, and economic needs. However, as we see later, these demands were not fully 
met. The new act only criminalizes the breach of the protection order and not 
domestic violence itself. The limited scope of provisions to protect domestic abuse 
applicants is further restricted by the attitudes and practices of the justice system 
and the South Africa Police Service (SAPS). These continue to constitute obsta-
cles to gender transformative change in South African society.
Tracking the politics of implementation
The passage of the DVA is congruent with the progressive provision of rights 
within South Africa’s post-apartheid political settlement, but its implementation 
is crippled by obstacles at the many levels of implementation. These obstacles are 
rooted in scarce governmental resources towards VAW, blurry definitions of inter-
departmental roles, and pervasive patriarchal attitudes in state structures. Given 
that the standard of proof and the rules of evidence are less onerous than those 
within the criminal law, the civil remedy has at least proven to be more accessible 
and flexible than the criminal one (Connelly and Cavanagh 2007).
The DVA contains expansive provisions to ensure its implementation. It 
requires both the National Commissioner of Police and the National Director of 
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Public Prosecutions to issue national instructions and policy directives requiring 
officials to fulfil specific functions. This is reinforced through the imposition of 
positive legal duties on the police (see Combrick 1998, Artz 1999, Parenzee et al. 
2001). Section 2 of the Domestic Violence Act places a duty on the SAPS to 
assist and inform complainants of their rights, including (1) assisting or making 
arrangements for the complainant to find a suitable shelter and to obtain medical 
treatment; (2) handing a notice containing information to the complainant in 
the official language of the complainants choice; and (3) explaining to the com-
plainant the content of such a notice and the remedies at his or her disposal in 
terms of the Act and the right to lodge a criminal complaint (Artz 2003). The 
protection order granted in terms of the DVA is a civil order. Being a civil remedy 
(with quasi-judicial proceedings), the protection order aims to prevent future acts 
of violence and therefore includes ex parte hearings as part of the process (requir-
ing a lower burden of proof), which allows for more access and more immediate 
intervention in domestic violence cases (Artz 2001). While these are expansive 
provisions, the implementation of the law has been slow, and there are omissions 
within the policy. In fact, the DVA is silent on the role of the health sector and 
was not explicit on the ways in which the judicial system and the police would 
collaborate, resulting in a fragmented response (Vetten 2005).
Artz and Smythe (2005) argue that the promulgation of the DVA was followed 
by decreased commitment to its implementation by the state, which failed to 
ensure interdepartmental collaboration and the necessary budget. It is, more-
over, argued that the accountability mechanisms entrenched in the DVA are 
failing, given that, as of 2010, the SAPS had not imposed any penalties on those 
failing to submit reports on the implementation of the Act. Other obstacles to 
implementation came from the mismanagement of the legislation within and 
between government departments (Moore 2005), pervasive attitudes and tradi-
tional norms within the justice system discriminating against women applicants 
(Matthews et al. 2004, Smythe 2004), and the largely insufficient allocation 
of resources to implement and monitor the DVA (e.g. for training, dedicated 
staff, funding) (Smythe 2004, Vetten 2005). Significantly, there was a lack of 
a comprehensive effort to address sexual violence and women’s rights in differ-
ent domains, including improved information on, and provision of, sexual and 
reproductive health, adequate sex education, increased economic opportunities, 
etc. (Cooper et al. 2004, Mogale et al. 2012). This negatively affected imple-
mentation of the DVA at the different levels, revealing government’s limited 
commitment to eradicating domestic violence in practice.
At the front line of implementation, magistrates and court clerks bear respon-
sibility for granting protection orders to individuals who experience abuse and 
deciding on protective measures for applicants. Many barriers obstruct access to 
the protection orders provided by the DVA, including the language of the form 
(which is only in English, despite there being ten other official languages in South 
Africa), and the complexities of the cases they are confronted with. Most of them 
are poorly trained on the domestic violence legislation reform, still using mis-
leading terminology from the PFVA.12 Yet, scholars and field workers agree that 
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these obstacles lie in the heavy workload of practitioners, rather than a conscious 
neglect of women experiencing domestic violence.
The SAPS, which is supposed to play an instrumental role in granting abused 
individuals access to the law, facilitating medico-legal services to applicants, 
and preventing further abuse, falls short of performing its role effectively 
(SALC 1999, Bendall 2010). Artz and Smythe (2005) found that police officers 
believed that women used the DVA to their advantage in matrimonial disputes, 
on the basis of the high rate of case withdrawal by applicants. Problems of 
implementation within SAPS have been described in SALC’s research paper 
on domestic violence, including hostile and insensitive responses towards vic-
tims of sexual violence, weak commitment to press charges and investigate 
charges against men, and prevalent ignorance of the legislation (SALC 1999). 
The SAPS National Instructions on the DVA aim to provide a conceptual and 
practical guide to police officers in dealing with cases of domestic violence, yet 
civil society has condemned the lack of transparency and consultation in the 
drafting process of the Instructions, resulting in a narrow approach that misses 
the complexity of the cases (Usdin et al. 2000).
With regards to victim protection and recovery, South Africa currently has 54 
Thuthuzela Care centres, which are 24-hour one-stop centres, across the different 
districts of South Africa (UNICEF n.d.). They offer access to integrated services 
to victims of violence, such as doctors, the police, counselling, court preparation, 
and prosecution (Republic of South Africa 2009). However, NGOs still bear the 
majority burden of service provision to survivors of domestic violence—from judi-
cial support to medical and psycho-social care—and providing shelters to women 
and their children. This demonstrates that the Domestic Violence Act created a 
powerful legal tool for women’s rights, yet its power remained in its rhetoric, rather 
than in tangible positive gains for its constituencies. This shows the lack of polit-
ical commitment to transformative change for women’s rights. Although women 
were part of the post-apartheid political settlement, their relationship with the 
ruling party became difficult following transition. These challenges meant that, 
although there was commitment for adoption following action by the women’s 
coalition, commitment to implementation was low.
Conclusion
Does the use of a political settlement lens to unpack how gender equity gains are 
made in South Africa add value to our understanding of this process? We have 
shown in this chapter that, despite the successful adoption of the DVA, implemen-
tation has been slow, due to the lack of government capacity, lack of commitment 
of women MPs, and the lack of collective mobilization by the women’s movement 
to hold the state to account. Within South Africa’s dominant institutionalized set-
tlement, the need for a domestic violence law was demanded by a broad issue-based 
alliance composed of legal and women’s rights organizations with close ties to the 
state bureaucracy and the ruling party. This policy alliance justified their demands 
using the constitution (introduced by the ruling ANC), used their informal links 
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with insiders of the state bureaucracy, and employed an international discourse 
on rights strategically to gain support from the ruling ANC elite. The policy coa-
lition relied on the learnings from their previous struggles. Once the issue was 
taken up by the ANC, the progress on the law unfolded through formal routes, 
given the institutionalized nature of the settlement and lack of opposition to the 
ruling coalition.
However, whilst the adoption of the new policy was swift, the implementa-
tion of the policy has proved to be a challenge. Women’s organizations have a 
limited role in ensuring that the state meets its obligations by implementing the 
policy. The antagonistic relations that now exist between civil society and the 
state around questions of social justice within South Africa mean that the rela-
tionships among the national gender machineries, many female MPs, and the 
women’s movement are no longer close. The dependence on state grants and 
funds means that the majority of the women’s organizations now mostly provide 
services to abused women and have stepped away from their historical role of 
watchdogs—at the same time as female MPs have become drawn into the difficult 
work of government (Geisler 2000).
The present context of South African politics suggests that, rather than evolv-
ing towards social inclusion, clientelism and patronage started to take hold within 
the ANC during the late 2000s, perhaps in part because of the lack of sustained 
challenge to its electoral dominance since the 1994 elections. This means that 
women MPs and the ANCWL, once a strong force within the party, have strug-
gled to maintain a more programmatic agenda on gender equity within the ruling 
coalition. As South African democracy comes of age, much of the population 
hoping to gain from a Black-majority-bargained settlement feel cheated of trans-
formation; pro-poor programmes and affirmative action hardly suffice as a prom-
ise for social mobility and, in the case of abused women, protection of their rights.
Despite the constrained circumstances, South African organizations working 
on addressing gender-based violence never really gave up the expectation that 
progressive policy frameworks could lead to substantive transformation, social 
policy, and improved practices, particularly since post-apartheid constitutional-
ism has done so much to shift social relations. Within a transitional social con-
text, it would be too fatalist to view ‘the law’ as a vacant collection of juridical 
rights that cannot be realized without full political and social ‘restructuring’. It 
is more useful to see the ‘progressive potential of the law’ (Lewis et al. 2001) 
as informing and reinforcing social restructuring processes, where social change 
and the institutionalization of ‘rights’ happen simultaneously, incrementally, and 
relationally, with and without the full support of the state. In South Africa, both 
social and political transformation have occurred through legal transformation—
the recognition of new constitutional rights and the development of human rights 
discourses through law and emerging jurisprudence—because historically it was 
the law and its agencies that kept people unequal and underdeveloped. In relation 
to domestic violence, there was an unambiguous need to challenge the prevailing 
and exclusionary definition of domestic violence and to broaden the scope and 
accessibility of legal interventions as a transformative measure of social justice 
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and equality. However, due to implementation challenges, little has changed, 
with South Africa continuing to have one of the highest rates of gender-based 
violence and domestic homicide in the world.
Notes
 1. Opening remarks by the Deputy Minister of the Department of Telecommuni-
cations and Postal Services, Hlengiwe Mkhize, at event on ‘The Role of Women 
in Politics, Focusing on the Then and Now’, FABZ Garden Hotel, Johannesburg, 
12 September 2015.
 2. Pass laws were first used in South Africa in the early 1800s to control and restrict 
the movement of non-European South Africans, largely within agricultural and 
rural communities. On 9 August 1956, the Federation of South African Women 
(FEDSAW) organized a mass demonstration and marched to Pretoria to protest 
against the pass laws (which were now going to affect the movement of women 
through restricted areas), passing a petition to the government at the time. The pass 
laws were only officially repealed in 1986.
 3. The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996.
 4. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000.
 5. Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (as well as sections of the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act 75 of 1997, and the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995).
 6. Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007.
 7. Maintenance Act 99 of 1998.
 8. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998.
 9. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
 10. Legal researcher (NGO), Cape Town, September 2015.
 11. Advocacy officer, Cape Town, September 2015.
 12. Interview, women’s support organization.
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Building strategic relationships 
with the political elites
The politics of Bangladesh’s 




Bangladesh presents an interesting paradox when it comes to women’s inclusion 
in politics and securing gender-inclusive development outcomes. Since the dem-
ocratic transition in 1991, women have occupied the highest political office, and 
women’s presence in politics in general has increased, due to the existence of 
gender quotas at the national and local levels of government. Women’s movement 
actors have also been active in policy spaces since this turning point. Recently, 
Bangladesh has been lauded for its remarkable pace in reducing maternal mor-
tality and fertility rates, reaching gender parity in primary and secondary school 
enrolment, and for enacting various laws addressing violence against women 
(World Bank 2008). Increased women’s presence in formal politics and policy 
spaces alongside these achievements in securing gender-equitable development 
outcomes would indicate that a positive relationship exists between women’s 
inclusion in politics and their influence over policy outcomes (Escobar-Lemmon 
and Taylor-Robinson 2014).
However, this interpretation overlooks the complex ways in which power and 
politics operate in Bangladesh, including the difficulties of mobilizing women as 
a political force in a patriarchal, informalized, clientelist context (Hassan 2013). 
Women, as a political group, have little to offer to the ruling elites in Bangladesh 
because they do not vote as a bloc, because gender equity concerns have little cur-
rency in mainstream politics, and because women’s organizations are weak actors 
in the formal political arena. Moreover, the progress that Bangladesh has made 
in securing gender-equitable development outcomes, while significant, should 
not be exaggerated. The country has failed to adopt some more transformative 
policy agendas or to implement many policy reforms effectively. In particular, 
Bangladesh has high levels of violence against women—the Bangladesh Bureau 
of Statistics’ (2011) survey of 12,000 women revealed that about 87 percent of 
ever-married women have experienced some form of violence in the last year—
despite the various laws enacted to protect women.
These failures and constraints raise the following questions: What led the state 
to address gender equity concerns in some policy areas successfully? What role did 
women and their allies play to make these changes happen? Why do some of the 
BK-TandF-9780815372356_TEXT_BRUNT-181008-Chp07.indd   129 14/02/19   1:23 PM
130 Sohela Nazneen
failures in implementation persist, even after the successful adoption of policies? 
The answers to these questions require an engagement with how deeper forms 
of politics and power relations shape the adoption and progress of gender equity 
policies, which include, but go beyond, the presence of women in formal political 
institutions. This means unpacking how power relations are organized between 
different groups of actors in overlapping domains of power and how they both 
engage with formal processes, as well as use informal networks and relationships 
to promote or constrain gender-inclusive policy change. In this chapter, I explore 
these questions through a qualitative case-study analysis of a reform aimed at 
promoting gender equity, the Domestic Violence Act of 2010, which was selected 
as a transformative legal reform that challenges patriarchal ideology.
Scholars have identified Bangladesh as reflecting a ‘competitive clientelist’ type 
of political settlement (Khan 2010, Levy 2014), in that (until recently) elites had 
to struggle constantly to assert their power and legitimacy vis-à-vis other organ-
ized elites with a similar level of power in a context within which political power 
was expected to change hands regularly. Such contexts tend to limit the time 
horizons of political elites to short-term considerations of maintaining power, and 
encourage the politicization of public space and bureaucracy and the treatment of 
political subjects as clients. By applying the power domains approach developed in 
Chapter 2 that incorporates the influence of political settlement dynamics on wom-
en’s political inclusion and the promotion of gender equity, I investigate the nature 
of women’s inclusion in Bangladesh and how far this shaped their ability to promote 
these reforms. I examine the nature of women’s inclusion in critical junctures of 
Bangladesh’s history that led to women being able to demand change; the influence 
of ideas and discourses (both national and international) that created ‘windows of 
opportunity’1 (Waylen 1998) for women to make claims; the interests and incen-
tives of the ruling elites, and also other actors that have a considerable stake in 
supporting or opposing these gender-equitable changes; and the institutional norms 
that flow from the competitive clientelist character of the political settlement.
I used the process-tracing method to identify the causal factors behind the 
adoption of the Domestic Violence Act in Bangladesh. This involved construct-
ing a timeline that captured the major events that led to the policy change, map-
ping and interviewing the key actors involved in policy negotiations, analysing 
relevant secondary literature and policy documents, and participant observation 
of two internal policy meetings. In total, 20 interviews were carried out with key 
members of Citizen’s Initiative Against Domestic Violence (CiDV), female MPs, 
the secretary of the Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs (MOWCA), mag-
istrates, and officers (see Appendix 4 for a full list of participants).
In the next section, I provide a brief overview of women’s inclusion and influ-
ence in politics and policy-making in Bangladesh and of the nature of its political 
settlement. I broadly outline the policy adoption story in the third section. In the 
final section, I analyse the key findings in terms of the power domains approach 
and discuss what value the insights from this case study add towards understand-
ing how pro-gender equity policy coalitions promote specific agendas in a com-
petitive clientelist context.
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Women’s inclusion in politics and policy-making in Bangladesh
Critical junctures and history of women’s engagement in politics 
before the democratic transition
Bangladesh was formed upon independence in 1971 as a Muslim majority 
state with a parliamentary system of government. It has experienced alternat-
ing periods of democratic (1971–1975; 1991–2006; 2009–present) and military 
(1975–1990; 2006–20082) rule. The three most powerful actors in Bangladesh’s 
political landscape in the early years were the military, the bureaucracy, and 
the top political party leaders. The result of contests between different political 
groups led to a series of military coups in the mid- and late 1970s. Bangladesh 
was under authoritarian rule for 15 years, during which time the relationship 
between civil society actors and the state was confrontational in nature. The 
state used law enforcement agencies to suppress political activities, making it 
difficult for women’s movement actors to engage with the state in their efforts 
to promote gender equity.
This struggle by women to engage with the state under difficult conditions 
in Bangladesh spans back to the anti-colonial struggles against the British and 
social reform movements during the late 18th and the 19th centuries in Bengal 
(Ahmed 1981, Jayawardena 1986, Jahan 1995). However, women emerged as a 
more significant political and development constituency after independence in 
1971, to a large extent because their suffering at the hands of Pakistani soldiers 
helped politicize their plight and demands. The rehabilitation of survivors of rape 
and war widows was a major challenge for the state, particularly because patri-
archal structures constructed women as economic dependents in ways that lim-
ited their access to material and social resources, mobility in the public sphere, and 
interactions with nonrelated males (Kabeer 1994). The famine in 1974 intensified 
the pressure on the state to address the changed circumstances in which women 
could no longer rely on men to provide and protect them in exchange for forego-
ing property, sexual autonomy, and mobility (Hossain 2017). The first public work 
schemes and programmes targeting women started during this period, including 
the Vulnerable Group Development programme, which was also known as the 
‘destitute mothers’ card’ (Hossain 2007).
Since its inception, the Bangladeshi state has always held a contradictory posi-
tion on matters related to women’s rights. On the one hand, it has enhanced wom-
en’s economic role through various schemes, education, and laws to protect women, 
while, on the other, it has also preserved colonial laws and implemented policies 
that sustain male privilege. The UN Decade for Women (1975–1985) and donor 
willingness to fund Women in Development (WID) programmes created scope 
for targeting women as development agents and also led to the creation of gender 
machinery within government, namely MOWCA. Donor dependency was high 
during the 1970s and 1980s, and the military generals in power from then were 
willing to promote gender and development issues, particularly women’s economic 
empowerment schemes, because it allowed them to use women’s productive power 
and to earn brownie points with donors (White 1992).
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However, the apparently pro-women axis of transnational and military play-
ers was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, international donors offered 
financial and ideological resources for promoting women’s rights and helped to 
empower women in their negotiations with the state, whilst, on the other, it ena-
bled critics to label them as ‘westernized’ actors promoting agendas that violated 
both cultural and religious values and norms (Nazneen and Sultan 2014). And 
whilst promoting women’s economic rights, military dictators would also under-
mine their civil and political rights by rehabilitating banned religious political 
parties and incorporating religion in state policies, in order to legitimize their 
regime (Jahan 1995). After the transition to multipartyism, both main parties 
entered tacit or overt alliances with the Islamist parties to win elections and form 
a government, further strengthening the position of the religious political parties 
and groups (Nazneen and Sultan 2014). The emphasis on religion in public life 
has created difficulties for women’s rights organizations to demand change in mat-
ters that are dictated by religious personal laws.
Bangladesh’s political settlement following democratic transition 
and women’s inclusion in politics
The anti-authoritarian movement in 1990 was spearheaded by two centrist 
parties—the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)—
that dominated the political scene after Bangladesh’s democratic transition in 
1991 through a de facto two-party system. The change to a nominally demo-
cratic order involved a shift in balance of power within the national elite, with 
the political class emerging as the most powerful vis-à-vis the military and civil 
bureaucracy. However, the operation of this multiparty system is closely condi-
tioned by the fact that the state is built on a social structure that is hierarchical by 
gender and class, within which patron–client relationships remain the dominant 
form of social organization (Jahan 1995, Kabeer 1989). These factors have com-
bined to produce a form of competitive clientelism within which public spaces 
and institutions become heavily politicized in the struggle for power between the 
two political parties.
The public bureaucracy is heavily politicized, as reflected by the recruitment, 
transfer, and promotion processes of the police, civil bureaucracy, and lower judi-
ciary to allow the ruling parties to exert partisan control over these agencies 
(BRAC Institute of Governance and Development, 2014). Partisan recruitment 
ensures loyalty to the ruling party at the local level and creates a stable network of 
insiders within the law enforcement agencies, civil bureaucracy, and the judiciary, 
although elements of the higher judiciary have been able to preserve their auton-
omy. Ruling regimes use the police and other security forces as private enforcers of 
violence for harassing opposition political leaders and constraining dissent from 
civil society (ICG 2015). The politicization of the law enforcement agencies has 
led to political parties essentially privatizing violence, with the youth, labour, 
and student wings and local cadres of successive ruling parties able to intimi-
date and discipline opposition activists (ICG 2015). Civil society has also been 
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heavily politicized in Bangladesh, with professional associations divided along 
party lines, in ways that constrain their capacity to promote their interests and 
demand accountability. The ruling party’s power is challenged or constrained to 
some extent by the scrutiny of the privately owned print and electronic media and 
national-level rights-based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (Hassan 2013). 
To some extent, the Islamist groups also act as challengers, exercising veto powers 
over particular policy issues, including on women’s rights.
In general, the systemic levels of bureaucratic and political corruption and 
political instability generated by this form of competitive clientelism have tended 
to undermine the capacity and commitment of the state to promote inclusive 
development; although within this context, political elites have been willing and 
able to protect certain sectors that are deemed critical to regime survival, par-
ticularly within key parts of the economy and social provisioning (Hassan 2013). 
This protection, and perhaps also the dynamic nature of competitive clientelism 
(Levy 2014), has enabled Bangladesh to make significant development progress on 
certain fronts in the past two decades.
This context has closely shaped the possibilities for women’s political empow-
erment in Bangladesh. The influence of privatized forms of violence within 
local- and national-level politics restricts women’s participation in these tradi-
tional arenas of political apprenticeship and prevents them from developing the 
networks that are crucial for functioning effectively within informal-centralized 
party structures (Akter and Nazneen 2014). It seems likely that the social and 
financial capital required to navigate the informal nature of ruling coalition pol-
itics also reduces the extent to which women can operate politically, with infor-
mality also limiting the extent to which rules-based legislation around women’s 
rights can actually be enforced by the heavily politicized public bureaucracy and 
judiciary. As discussed later, these factors closely shape how women’s movement 
actors have engaged with the dominant elite groups in promoting the women’s 
rights agenda.
A shift in women’s political and civil engagement took place after the demo-
cratic transition. Women’s organizations and women in student unions were active 
in the pro-democracy movement of the 1980s and won a seat at the table dur-
ing the first caretaker government (CTG) regime formed after the fall of General 
Ershad in 1991. They were consulted on how women in politics and policy-making 
should be addressed by the democratic regimes. The preparations for the Fourth 
World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 also created scope for women’s 
groups to access policy spaces, because the government needed the expertise of 
civil society groups and Bangladeshi feminists working in international develop-
ment agencies to draft national reports for the event.
Quotas for women in parliament and local government were considered inap-
propriate by political elites after independence, because of both a perceived lack of 
eligible women and the perception that this would be discriminatory towards men 
(Jalal 1975). A reservation of 15 seats for women in the parliament was introduced 
in 1972 and was later increased to 30 seats in 1978 (Chowdhury 1994b). These 
reserved seats were added to the existing 300 general seats. In 1988, one-third 
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of seats were reserved at the local level for women. The reserved seats at the 
national and local levels were seen as quick fixes by the military government to 
increase women’s numerical representation during the UN Decade for Women. 
The provision of 30 reserved seats for women in parliament lapsed in 2001 and 
was extended, and later increased, to 50 seats (Akter 2014). Direct elections for 
women in local government to reserved seats that constituted one-third of local 
assemblies were introduced in 1997 (Chowdhury 1994b). The continuation of gen-
der quotas in parliament in 2001 was deemed by the political elites to be a solution 
that required minimum changes to ensure women’s presence in parliament. Female 
politicians and women’s organizations were themselves ambivalent about the gen-
der quotas, seeing them as an interim measure that created scope for women to 
enter a male-dominated space, whilst also being aware that in the long run, this 
system may limit women’s political effectiveness (Jalal 1975, Chowdhury 1994b) and 
create proxy representatives (Chowdhury 1994a, Panday 2008).
Reserved seats in parliament have been used by the two main parties to 
negotiate with coalition partners and distribute patronage (Akter and Nazneen 
2014). No political party, whether in power or not, has proved willing to change 
the system of nomination by party executives and introduce direct elections to 
these reserved seats. This is despite strong demands from women’s rights organ-
izations and women’s wings of these parties (Akter and Nazneen 2014) and 
stipulations made in the Representation of People’s Ordinance (RPO) of 2008.3 
This suggests that gender quotas were largely introduced to create party loy-
alists, to gain the support of donors, and to project Bangladesh and its leaders 
as ‘progressive’ on the global stage (Nazneen and Sultan 2014). Little has been 
done by the political parties to address the various structural and attitudinal 
barriers that limit women’s effective participation in formal politics, including 
an androcentric political culture, a lack of women in leadership positions, polit-
ical violence, and the limited capacity of most women to function as political 
agents in terms of their knowledge of government functioning and financial 
means (Chowdhury 1994a, Akter and Nazneen 2014).
Women largely come into politics in Bangladesh through the financial support 
and kinship networks of dynastic political families, including the female politicians 
who have led the two major parties. With the presence of these leaders—along with 
four female cabinet ministers, a female Speaker of the House, and a large number 
of women representatives in reserved seats in the national parliament—Bangladesh 
performs well compared with other countries when it comes to women’s inclusion 
in informal politics (Inter Parliamentary Union 2014). What is less clear is the effec-
tiveness of these women in delivering gender-equitable development policies and 
outcomes. The picture is also different at the national and the local levels. At the 
national level, women MPs are nominated, and therefore more accountable to the 
parties, than to their constituents. Given the weak position of the legislature as 
an institution, and the control exerted by the party leaders in a fiercely com-
petitive electoral context, female MPs have rarely contested party positions on 
gender equity concerns or managed to create cross-party alliance and effectively 
lobby for gender-equitable legal reforms. In most cases, female MPs have toed 
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the party line when parliament acted as a rubber stamp for executive decisions 
(Akter and Nazneen 2014).
In terms of gender-responsive policy reforms at the national level, femocrats (i.e. 
feminist bureaucrats), the women’s movement, and their (often male) allies within 
the bureaucracy have played key roles in promoting gender equity concerns in 
Bangladesh. Given the partisan and polarized nature of civil society (Hassan 2013), 
women’s movement organizations have judiciously steered clear of engaging with 
political parties for fear of being labelled as appendages and losing their credibil-
ity. The women’s organizations are not key players in formal politics, and political 
parties are unwilling to challenge the ‘veto power’ that Islamist parties and groups 
(ulema) have on certain agendas, such as education policy, religious personal laws, 
and reproductive rights (Nazneen and Sultan 2014). Led by the middle class and 
professional women, women’s movement organizations have been active in promot-
ing various agendas, including property rights, reproductive rights, political empow-
erment, family law reforms (Kabeer 1989, Halim-Chowdhury 2009), and, as we will 
see, legal reforms addressing violence against women.
The politics of domestic violence policy-making in Bangladesh
This section analyses the politics of negotiating gender equity within Bangaldesh’s 
competitive clientelist settlement through the story of how the Domestic 
Violence Act of 2010 was adopted. The analysis reveals a range of factors that 
influenced the extent of adoption and implementation of domestic violence legis-
lation: the holding power of the pro-gender equity coalition (both organizational 
and ideational) and their ability to navigate informal politics; the changes in 
organizational power of the groups opposing these reforms; the shifts in political 
settlement dynamics that create policy reform opportunities; and the interests 
and incentives that the ruling coalition, particularly the top political leader in 
power, have in promoting certain agendas that either build their reputation or 
contribute to patronage distribution. I also explore the role played by transna-
tional actors and ideas in influencing the inter-elite bargaining processes and in 
framing the policy agenda.
The story of the law
The enactment of the Domestic Violence (DV) Act in Bangladesh in 2010 is touted 
as a success story for gender equity by government and women’s movement actors, 
both because of the unprecedented level of collaboration between these two par-
ties and because the legal provisions have immense potential to change gender 
power relations. The Act introduces a broad definition of domestic violence that 
includes physical, sexual, psychological, and economic abuse ‘against a woman or 
a child of a family with whom the victim is, or has been, in a family relationship’ 
(DV Act 20104). The formulation of the Act involved the following key actors and 
institutions: (1) the coalition of women’s rights and human rights organizations 
(CiDV) that carried out the advocacy for the bill and drafted the laws; (2) the 
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gender machinery of the state, especially MOWCA—particularly the secretary 
and the women’s minister, who championed the bill; (3) the prime minister, who 
used her influence inside the cabinet; (4) the ruling party and the parliament; and 
(5) the Ministry of Law, which resisted some proposed provisions. Interestingly, 
there was no resistance from organized religious groups after 2009, perhaps because 
such groups were under legal scrutiny at the time, although their potential threat 
continued to influence government behaviour. International donors provided 
funds for legal research, internal meetings, and other costs incurred by CiDV, but 
were not a part of the political negotiations.
The Act itself is the result of many years of struggle by the women’s movement 
in Bangladesh to make the personal political. The process that led directly to 
the DV Act of 2010 started after 2002, when it came to the attention of women’s 
legal aid organizations, and also government, that the existing laws on violence 
against women were unable to address the needs of women suffering from vio-
lence inside the family home. Existing legislation either addressed dowry-related 
violence or categorized cases to be tried under the criminal code where victims 
had suffered extreme forms of violence (e.g. acid attack, bride burning, etc.). This 
concern converged with the increased emphasis placed on addressing domestic 
violence in international discourse and agencies since the late 1990s. Women’s 
rights groups started researching the provisions and laws of other countries on 
domestic violence, with funding from international donors. These groups also 
sought help from female lawyers, male judges, and international feminist lawyers 
from neighbouring countries, mainly India and Malaysia.5 The evidence gathered 
provided a focal point for feminists to come together to assimilate these drafts in 
2006, at which point the decision was made to lobby government to enact a law 
on domestic violence. Importantly, an electoral turnover at this point brought 
in a caretaker government (CTG) within which an erstwhile feminist activist 
in civil society held a prominent position, with authority over MOWCA. This 
political opening, created by the absence of partisan politicking at the centre 
of government, encouraged feminist groups to forma policy coalition—Citizen’s 
Initiative Against Domestic Violence (CiDV)—consisting of 25 groups, which 
engaged regularly with government to push the issue.
The policy coalition’s work suffered a setback in 2008, when the controversy 
over the proposed clause on women’s control over acquired assets in the National 
Women’s Development Policy (NWDP) led to wide-scale mobilization and crit-
icism by the Islamist groups and forced the CTG to stall its work on any issues 
related to women’s rights. In 2009, after the AL government came into power, 
MOWCA was headed by an insider from the feminist movement, injecting new 
momentum into CiDV, which moved to partner with MOWCA in promoting 
the bill. The drafting of the bill was incorporated as a part of the donor-funded 
Multi-Sectoral Project on Violence Against Women (MSVAW) at the suggestion 
of the new minister of women’s affairs. This led to the institutionalization of the 
work around drafting facilitated by the then secretary of MOWCA. The draft law 
was actually prepared by the CiDV, which included lawyers’ organizations, and 
presented to the Ministry of Law for vetting. The placement of a well-researched 
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draft reduced the time needed by the law ministry to forward a draft law to the 
cabinet in 2010. The close relationship6 between the minister of women’s affairs 
and the prime minister expedited the process. The prime minister was eager to 
enact the DV Act because the AL government had compromised on the new ver-
sion of the National Women’s Development Policy in 2010, and the government 
also wanted to project itself as a women-friendly government for the Committee 
on Status of Women (CSW), because the country was scheduled for a CEDAW 
review in February 2011 in New York that would assess whether the commitments 
made by the state to CEDAW provisions were being met.7 Moreover, in July 2010, 
the key leaders of the Jamaat E Islami, the opposition coalition partner, went on 
trial on charges of collaborating with the Pakistani military, which reduced the 
veto power of the Islamist groups and created the need for the AL government to 
seek support from secular elements of civil society.8
The positive stance of the prime minister was influential over both the cab-
inet and the parliament. In an unprecedented move, the minister of women’s 
affairs passed queries on the draft law raised by the cabinet on to CiDV, so that 
they could help the minister convince the prime minister of the necessity of the 
clauses in question.9 Meanwhile, CiDV members actively lobbied male MPs who 
could potentially oppose the law and mounted an intensive media campaign 
when the bill was being discussed in parliament. These moves were informed by 
CiDV’s own political analysis, undertaken at the outset of the campaign, which 
had mapped out the key players who may resist the Domestic Violence Act. This 
meant that the bill was subjected to relatively little debate and scrutiny in par-
liament once it went through the cabinet and was passed in October 2010. The 
Act includes the following provisions for women: protection orders; the right to 
reside in the marital home; temporary custody of children; and recovery of per-
sonal assets and assets acquired during marriage. However, compromises were 
made with the law ministry in terms of defining which relationships were covered 
under the law and also through the exclusion of marital rape from the legislation. 
In addition, various loopholes in the law have made its application difficult in 
matters related to economic rights and claiming compensation.
Each stage of the negotiation process was characterized by the high degree 
of informality and dynamism that characterizes politics under competitive cli-
entelism in Bangladesh, involving backdoor negotiations, personal relationships, 
and shifting coalitional politics. However, it was also closely informed by broader 
factors, including the influence of transnational discourses and actors and the leg-
acies of previous processes of engagement between feminists and the state within 
the domain of women’s interests in Bangladesh.
Coalition-building and informal negotiations
The policy coalition, CiDV, was formed by organizations that either belonged 
to the women’s movement or were human rights NGOs. The leaders came 
from national-level organizations with significant credentials in championing 
women’s rights, working on violence against women, and providing legal aid. 
BK-TandF-9780815372356_TEXT_BRUNT-181008-Chp07.indd   137 14/02/19   1:23 PM
138 Sohela Nazneen
The inclusion of female and human rights lawyers and scholars in the pol-
icy coalition allowed it to access different constituencies (lawyers and judges) 
and to claim legitimacy on the subject of dealing with domestic violence. The 
experience of legal aid provision at the grassroots level helped the coalition to 
counter the claim that there was no demand at that level and that its members 
were elite women disconnected from reality.10 The coalition also expanded its 
membership to signal that the demand for a DV Act was, wider, with deliber-
ate efforts to include organizations of transgender and gay groups, people with 
disabilities, and children’s rights organizations.
CiDV’s lead organizations included members who had been classmates of the 
prime minister at university or were close friends of the women’s minister, who her-
self was a member of CiDV lead organizations, Bangladesh Mohila Parishad (BMP) 
and Bangladesh National Women Lawyer’s Association (BNWLA). These previ-
ous relationships and informal connections opened many doors, allowed access to 
insider knowledge, and enabled the policy coalition to tackle bureaucratic resist-
ance. According to one of our sources working within CiDV at the time:
When Shirin Sharmeen Chowdhury became the Minister of Women’s 
Affairs, we were very happy as she was one of us… and a lawyer to boot… 
Previously those serving in the CTG were also our people, but the political 
reality was different, so the issue had stalled… The minister herself took a 
personal interest and was willing to put the ministry’s resources at our dis-
posal… She lobbied to get MOWCA in charge of the process and not the 
Ministry of Law… she tipped us off about the kind of queries that may be 
placed. She knew X, Y, and Z and those who drafted the Act, so for us to 
access her was not an issue… When the Act was placed in the cabinet for 
debate, she asked for a special briefing and specifically asked us to respond to 
the queries that were privately asked by the PM before the bill was placed, 
which is not the norm….11
MOWCA secretary was like a mother hen guarding the whole process of 
drafting the law, getting it vetted, and placing it into the hands of the minister. 
We were lucky that he was not transferred … for six years he organized con-
sultations, called us up whenever the draft hit a wall, tipped us off about how 
to draft our demands, who we should target, and how we could negotiate the 
bureaucratic maze, resisting pressure from the law ministry… his core team 
members at MOWCA also took this to heart… he is the one who integrated 
it into the MSVAW project. He used to say, ‘I will write the notes in such 
way that other ministries cannot ignore this—that even if I am not here the 
work will go on…’.12
The coalition members interviewed described their role and the role of the sec-
retary of MOWCA and Minister of Women’s Affairs as ‘committed opportunists’ 
and ‘realists who started with the ideal asking for the stars… and made pragmatic 
choices and compromises to get the law through’.13 Their opportunism resulted 
from the alignment of the campaign with the interests of the ruling regime to 
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enact this particular piece of law, which flowed both from the shifting dynamics 
of the ruling coalition at the time and its need for wider (international) legiti-
macy (discussed later).
MOWCA played the lead role, along with the Bangladesh Law Commission and 
the Ministry of Law, in facilitating the process. The women’s minister and the secretary 
of MOWCA ensured that the DV Act was institutionalized as a deliverable for the 
donor-funded MSVAW project that was being implemented by the ministry. This for-
malized CiDV’s interactions with the government and gave its work weight and entry 
into policy space. Conventionally, the Ministry of Law takes the lead in drafting bills, 
but this was unconventionally left to MOWCA, which allowed CiDV the opportunity 
to rework and place its initial drafts of the Act. This move reflected not only the min-
ister’s own personal interest in enacting this law, because of her personal links with 
the women’s movement and the close fit between the DV Act and the ministry’s other 
policy priorities at the time, but also pressure from external funders to move forward 
on this issue and the fact that the law ministry lacked the expertise to draft laws on 
domestic violence—expertise that CiDV lawyers could offer.
Nonetheless, the women’s minister had to personally deal with the resistance 
from the Ministry of Law, which saw MOWCA as encroaching on its territory. 
A Supreme Court barrister and also a member of CiDV pointed out that the ‘law 
ministry had kicked up a fuss over our definition of family in the draft, but Shirin 
(the minister) was very tough… and insisted that the law ministry should not 
tinker with MOWCA’s draft…’.14 Although MOWCA is the weaker ministry, in 
terms of resources, personnel, and position within the government, the position 
of the women’s minister within the inner circle of power opened up avenues. The 
support of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), and especially the prime minister, 
was critical once the law was placed in the cabinet: a CiDV insider based at the 
PMO noted that the prime minister briefed the cabinet that she wanted the Act 
passed during her tenure as a part of the election pledge and that the draft should 
be placed in parliament as soon as possible. This helped to limit discussion in the 
cabinet, excepting protests from the Ministry of Law, and also parliament. CiDV 
members interpret this support as AL’s need to:
[W]oo the women’s rights and human rights groups with the beginning of 
the war crimes trial, when the government needed support of all secular 
and liberal groups against the Islamist parties—especially since the govern-
ment had compromised on appeasing the ulema (religious scholars) on the 
National Women’s Development Policy and had disappointed us… so this 
was a peace offering, given the CEDAW review at CSW (Committee on 
Status of Women) was coming up in February 2011 and we were preparing 
the alternative report and Bangladesh needed to appear doing well….15
The fact that merely passing the Act did not require immediate resourcing also 
reduced any potential resistance from other stronger ministries.
Donors were not a part of the CiDV, nor did they formally engage in the nego-
tiations with government. Nonetheless, funding from the German Corporation 
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for International Cooperation (GIZ), Academy for Educational Development 
(USAID funding), and the Nordic countries in particular helped facilitate the 
process. Donor funding was particularly useful during the research and training 
stages, where legal aid scholars and feminist lawyers who had worked on the Indian 
Domestic Violence Act were brought in to discuss difficulties in the Criminal 
Procedure Code enacted by the British colonial authority and the various cultural 
matters that one needs to take into cognizance when drafting such a law.16
The role of discourses and ideas about domestic violence
The influence of international discourses on women’s rights on the Bangladeshi 
women’s movement is palpable. The longstanding focus on violence against 
women by women’s rights organizations in the country gained prominence in 
and around preparations for the UN Beijing Conference in 1995, the follow-up 
to which saw the government formulating the National Women’s Development 
Policy and the National Action Plan for women, which included domestic vio-
lence (Afsharipour 1999, Chowdhury 2001). This process created opportunities 
for women’s rights organizations to engage with the state by entering policy 
spaces, enabling each side to gain insights into the other, and helped create the 
basis for the working relationships that would later develop around the push for 
the DV Act. The growing rights-based agenda also created a context where the 
domestic violence issue was packaged as a human rights violation issue—and not 
a private matter between family members. The ideas used to frame the Indian 
and the Malaysian domestic violence law were particularly influential on women’s 
rights groups in Bangladesh.17
The key achievement of the DV Act was to define domestic violence beyond 
the physical, to include economic, sexual, and psychological forms of violence 
(in line with the general recommendation made by the CEDAW committee in 
1992)—because the latter three dimensions were not clearly recognized in the 
existing penal code. This definition had far-reaching consequences in matters 
related to consciousness raising and the framing of provisions for women. The 
idea of how a family was defined was another issue that challenged the prevalent 
notions about marital relations, sexual order, and women’s needs. CiDV promoted 
a wider definition that included cohabitation, adopted children, and transgen-
der and gay partnerships. This definition was internally contested, because some 
members felt that the DV Act should only focus on women and leave out other 
groups to be covered by special codes.18 In the end, a narrower and sanitized defi-
nition of the family was used by the Ministry of Law to avoid controversy and 
minimize contention (only blood, marital relationships, and adopted children 
were recognized). A debate also occurred around whether it should be a gen-
der-neutral bill (covering men also) or specifically target women.19
While framing the issue, the policy coalition and the ministry emphasized 
the interconnectivity of ideas and interests on domestic violence with other 
prominent discourses at the time in Bangladesh, including the Millennium 
Development Goals, maternal mortality, and the economic and social costs of 
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domestic violence.20 This more instrumentalist discursive strategy was adopted to 
help the coalition reach a wider audience. The policy coalition and the ministry 
were well aware that domestic violence is embedded in patriarchal power rela-
tions and that an explicit challenge to male privilege would provoke resistance. 
The Act also contained provisions on the rights of married women to live in the 
marital home and to claim compensation for property that was acquired during 
marriage, which, if implemented, would greatly limit male power. However, these 
provisions were framed around the ‘need’ Bangladeshi women have for male pro-
tection and economic provision by the husband. While this framing reflected 
the reality of women’s condition, it also limited the possibilities for contention by 
playing into a construction of gender roles more acceptable to men and society 
in general.
The provisions on these aspects in the final version of the Act were much less 
challenging to male privilege than they might have been. The right to live in the 
marital home does not establish ownership claims of the woman, but provides 
temporary shelter until the husband cools down.21 Because the law is premised on 
protecting victims while they remain married, it does not apply once the couple 
is divorced and so enables a man to unilaterally divorce his wife by sending her 
three written notices. The economic rights for women within the family that 
were enshrined in the domestic violence law (e.g. right to residence, maintenance 
claims) are limited by the fact that the DV Act is a civil law that does not disrupt 
the discriminatory religious personal law regimes in place in Bangladesh. Men’s 
stake with regards to the loss of privilege was not as high with the DV Act as com-
pared with the National Women’s Development Policy, where a move to increase 
women’s control over acquired assets opened up possibilities for disrupting exist-
ing systems of property and inheritance rights. While the DV Act included sex-
ual violence in its definition of domestic violence, it did not include provisions 
on marital rape, but focused more on sexual offences that take place within the 
home against children or minors. In fact, by the time this law reached the cab-
inet, it was seen as a ‘lightweight’ issue that was needed to protect women from 
widespread violence within the home.
On resistance to the law and diffusing resistance
The main resistance to the Act came from the Ministry of Law and some male 
MPs. Ministry of Law officials disputed the draft bill’s broad definition of the 
family, which included a couple cohabiting or persons living in the same house-
hold, in favour of focusing only on married couples. The recognition of cohabi-
tation was seen as a threat to the existing sexual order and family stability, in a 
society where the only acceptable form of sexual relations takes place within 
(heterosexual) marriage. Law ministry officials were also worried that families 
would break down if marital rape was recognized and that women would abuse 
the various provisions in the law that allowed them the right to reside in the 
marital home and property in order to harass the husband and in-laws. Initially, 
resistance to these provisions was dealt with by the women’s minister, who was 
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adamant that no changes would be made. However, the Ministry of Law had the 
right to send the draft for independent scrutiny, which is where the definition of 
the family was changed, cohabiting couples were removed from protection, and 
marital rape was excluded.22
Some resistance also came from male MPs, including leading members of the 
executive and opposition party, who criticized the bill ‘for singling out women for 
protection under the Act, since men also needed protection, and they feared that 
women would abuse the provisions of the law’.23 CiDV counter-lobbied by high-
lighting the widespread nature of domestic violence, noting the fact that other 
countries had legislated against it, and also toning down the more radical aspects 
of the proposed Act. Most female MPs, other than those who had links with 
the women’s movement, played no part in persuading their male counterparts.24 
The policy coalition briefed all the female MPs regarding the bill, partly to avoid 
hostile questions from the opposition female MPs. This fear was not unfounded, 
given the confrontational nature of parliamentary political practices and culture 
in highly competitive settings such as Bangladesh, where female MPs have usu-
ally failed to unite over gender equity concerns, due to pressures to toe the party 
line.25 This is further exacerbated by the fact that the majority of female MPs are 
in reserved seats and thus owe their loyalty to the party leadership.26
Parliamentary resistance to the Act could therefore have had a significant 
impact, had it not been for these efforts by women’s movement actors, along with 
the strong support from the PMO, and the fact that parliament is a weak insti-
tution that has rarely proved capable of resisting pressure from the executive. 
The attention of opposition MPs was also usefully diverted by other ongoing pro-
cesses, including the war crimes trial. Although the ulema (religious scholars) 
and Islamist political parties did not directly oppose the bill, the toning down of 
the radical aspects of the DV Act—particularly concerning the definition of the 
family and the non inclusion of marital rape—was a direct result of the group’s 
veto powers and the perceived threat this group posed with regards to questioning 
AL’s credentials to rule a Muslim majority country. Again, this process of norm 
contestation and negotiation at the domestic level demonstrates the interactive, 
rather than top-down, nature of norm diffusion on domestic violence and the 
important role played by domestic political dynamics and actors in this process, 
as suggested in Chapter 3.
The politics of implementation
The pace at which Bangladesh moved to adopt the DV Act of 2010 may not have 
been rapid when compared to other developing countries (see Chapter 10), but it 
certainly exceeds the pedestrian pace at which it has been implemented to date. 
The state still lacks a coherent and well-resourced operational structure through 
which to implement the law. The process of implementation was initially stalled 
because of the delay around the rules of procedure, which took three years to 
develop and gazette. The rules were developed and submitted to MOWCA by 
the CiDV in 2012. However, the ministry only took them up in 2013, and it 
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took another year to develop the prescribed forms required to file cases; even 
now, MOWCA still lacks the resources to copy these forms and distribute them 
to different state agencies. MOWCA also requires cooperation from the home, 
social welfare, law and justice, and finance ministries, which has so far been 
absent.27 It was envisioned that the MOWCA officer at the district and the upzila 
level would be the key implementing officer and would liaise with the police, 
courts, hospitals, and local-level women’s organizations. A list of service-providing 
organizations (women’s organizations, legal aid organizations) would be devel-
oped, and catchment areas of these service-providing organizations would be 
clearly defined. So far, training modules for MOWCA officers and the listings of 
these service-providing organizations have been completed by CiDV, although a 
recent evaluation conducted by BNWLA found that about half of the MOWCA 
officers interviewed at the district level had not received training on the DV 
Act (Bangladesh National Women Lawyers’ Association [BNWLA] 2013). Most 
stated that they did not know how to file applications under the DV Act and 
could only do so with the assistance of the legal aid and women’s organizations.
Progress in the training of judges and police officials has been slow because of 
a lack of resources as well as commitment. The BNWLA evaluation also reported 
that of the police officers interviewed in five districts, only 10 percent of the 
officers knew about the DV Act (BNWLA 2013). There are eight one-stop crisis 
centres and nine government shelters, covering 64 districts (some of these existed 
before the law was passed), which means that the vast majority of Bangladeshi 
women are unable to access the support required to take advantage of the new 
law. Although the law has specific provisions for compensation, the courts strug-
gle to issue such orders because establishing what assets women have acquired 
during marriage is difficult. Adequate monitoring mechanisms are yet to be devel-
oped to track implementation of the Act by the state. Table 7.1 shows the steps 
undertaken by the state and the gaps in implementation.
Why do these gaps in progress exist? The immediate reasons that surface are 
the following. The implementation of the DV Act requires changes in operational 
procedures and budgets to ensure that state officials are able to enact the law. At 
present, MOWCA and social welfare officers operate as the point of contact at 
the district level when cases are filed. However, this provision places the officer 
in the role of enforcer, which is largely incompatible with their primary role as 
welfare officer. This is in addition to the increased workload; the lack of training 
on the new law; and lack of budget for transport, conducting investigations, and 
accessing various services that the victims need. One MOWCA officer based in 
Dhaka highlighted the following problems:
There weren’t enough forms to file complaints, which were later supplied 
by BLAST… I worked with BLAST to file a protection order, as I had no 
training …I work on other cases also (and because of this)…there was a lag 
in securing the protection order… When the order was ineffective to protect 
the girl, I had to go and rescue her at 10pm. I contacted the local police 
station, but they were not co-operative initially. I needed a vehicle to go 
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to that part of the city at night, which I did not have, and the office will 
not reimburse me…My husband took me. The officer in charge was respon-
sive later and helped in rescuing the girl, but we could not bring her things, 
as we had no storage space for keeping them…I received so many threats 
from the husband’s family… and this is just one case… If anything gets done 
[under the DV Act], it gets done because some people in the government 
and the women’s organization workers are committed to making it work, but 
there are limits to what only commitment can deliver!
In addition, CiDV’s role in training state officials and developing the forms 
required for cases to be developed has created internal conflict, because some are 
opposed to CiDV becoming a ‘training unit’. However, where cases have been 
filed under this law, experience shows that involvement of women’s rights groups 
in handling the case on behalf of the plaintiff, and the presence of responsive 
state officials, are crucial for successful implementation.28
If one digs deeper, it is apparent that the following structural issues act as bar-
riers. First, the law requires MOWCA to be able to coordinate the activities of 
Table 7.1 Steps undertaken to implement the Domestic Violence Act in Bangladesh
Action Year Time and other types of lags
Developing Rules of 
Procedure




Completed in 2013 Modules developed three years 
later
Training of MOWCA 
officers
299 officers trained to 
cover 64 districts; still 
continuing
Resource gaps
Preparing list of service 




Catchment areas identified 
by CiDV by 2013; list of 
service delivery 
organizations submitted 
by CiDV in 2014
MOWCA yet to published list
Training of police officers CiDV continuing from 2013 Resource gaps
Training of magistrates CiDV continuing from 
2013
Resource gaps
Cases filed Cases were filed mostly in 
Dhaka and five other 
districts, largely in project 
pilot areas:
Most court officials and police 
officers unaware of the 
DV Act
146 by BNWLA; 32 by 
BLAST; 9 by ASK. Cases 
are mostly filed by women 
against their husbands.
Monitoring of cases CiDV member pilots in 
2013–14
Some pilots by CiDV 
members; no concentrated 
efforts by the state
Note: information as of December 2014; collated from CiDV members and MOWCA officials and website.
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several implementing agencies, which it is unable to do effectively, given its low 
levels of bureaucratic capacity and also political capacity, particularly in relation 
to the more powerful ministries of law and home affairs. The lack of coherence 
between the vision of the DV Act and its provisions makes this task of coordina-
tion harder still.
Second, the preceding discussion reveals that the implementing state agencies 
face a lack of resources and capacity to implement the law, in part because a clear 
financial policy and plan was not developed when the law was adopted.29
Third, the implementing agencies—including the police, lower judiciary, and 
medical service providers—remain male-dominated professions and arenas and 
act as ‘blockers’ in the implementation process (Waylen 2014). Most of these actors 
encourage women who bring domestic violence cases to pursue mediation and 
reconciliation, partly as a paternalist means of protecting them from the loss of 
economic security that this could entail, given that many women in Bangladesh 
are economically dependent on their husbands. Moreover, the predominant view 
within the police and judiciary is that the filing of domestic violence cases leads 
to ‘destruction of family, the core unit upon which the society is built’.30
Fourth, the key players in the adoption process—namely the civil society coa-
lition and also donors—are not officially involved in implementing the law, and 
whilst the key implementing agencies were consulted during the adoption pro-
cess, they were not amongst those pushing for this legal change. Thus, there is 
a disconnect between the ‘rule-makers’ and ‘rule-enforcers’ (Waylen 2014), a gap 
that has to be mediated by the relatively weak MOWCA. This disconnect helps 
explain the limited priority that implementing actors have placed on enforcing 
the law. Moreover, the fact that these institutions have been heavily politicized 
within Bangladesh’s competitive clientelist setting for over two decades, has fur-
ther reduced their capacity and incentives to deliver rules-based policies in gen-
eral, let alone those that threaten dominant interests and ideas, and carry little 
political weight behind them. For example, a police officer made the following 
points to a CiDV member:
[A] husband slapping a wife around is not a priority when we have to make 
sure that the opposition party cadres are not out of line, when there are polit-
ical clashes, when we get phone calls to provide different types of services by 
the ‘high ups’ [sic]… solving a domestic violence case will not help in keeping 
my job….31
Conclusion: a hollow victory?
In Bangladesh, national-level ruling elites are capable of reaching a consensus 
over policies that would earn them extra mileage with the international commu-
nity or create opportunities for distributing patronage. Thus, many reforms and 
good policies are formulated when it comes to addressing gender needs and the 
rights agenda insofar as they meet either or both of these conditions. However, 
most of these policies and reforms are not implemented effectively, partly because 
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of the particular difficulties of implementing reforms in the domain of women’s 
rights, partly because of low levels of state capacity, and partly because the failure 
to deliver is not electorally costly, as it does not threaten the stability of the regime. 
The interest of the ruling coalition in enacting a domestic violence law was driven 
by the top leadership’s interest in projecting its image as a gender-friendly regime 
at the national and international levels. The enactment of a law, which had been 
compromised during the negotiation process through which it was established, did 
not create major challenges to the sexual, social, and gender order.
Moreover, CiDV members are unwilling to publicly shame the government 
concerning its limited enforcement of the DV Act, because this would under-
mine the good relationship that they have established with government—access 
that enables them to retain some degree of influence at a time when the ruling 
elite’s need to woo the women’s rights groups and the space for opposing the state 
is being squeezed out. In 2014, new gagging laws pertaining to the media and 
NGO funding were introduced to limit criticism of government actions, which 
has limited space for calling the state to account. Also, the holding power of the 
policy coalition had decreased with the rise of Hefazat E Islam, a loose coalition of 
Islamic forces in 2013, which the government needed to pacify, given upcoming 
elections in 2014.
This analysis reveals how the political settlement has shaped the negotiation 
of gender equity in Bangladesh and points to the value of moving beyond the 
usual focus on the impact of gender quotas and the effectiveness of state gender 
machinery to the deeper forms of politics and power relations that shape progress 
on this front. The difficulties in getting the DV Act adopted and implemented 
reflect the significance of securing an alignment between the policy reform and 
the dominant interests and ideas of the ruling coalition and, thus, the capacity 
and commitment accorded to the policy agenda. As a nominally ‘transformative’ 
policy reform, the DV Act of 2010 faced great resistance and had to be diluted in 
ways that have helped to maintain male privilege. The difficulties in implement-
ing the law can be explained in part by its complex character, which requires 
coordination between multiple actors and agencies, but also because it does not fit 
the incentive structure of the ruling coalition. It does not confer electoral legiti-
macy nor offer scope for dispensing patronage—the key currencies within political 
contexts that are primarily clientelist rather than programmatic in nature. This 
insight carries important lessons for movement actors and policy entrepreneurs 
in advancing transformative policy reforms in competitive clientlelist contexts.
By using a power domains framework that brings together feminist and polit-
ical settlements literatures (see Chapter 2), I was able to draw attention to the 
role of key actors in relation to their power within the ruling coalition, the sig-
nificance of historical context in terms of establishing women’s entitlements at 
key moments of state formation, the role of informal networks and personalized 
relations in the negotiation process of policy formulation, and the role of strong 
policy coalitions. Whereas a standard political settlements analysis would focus 
only on interests, the power domains framework also enabled me to explore the 
influence of ideas in shaping political behaviour (Lavers, 2018). In many ways, 
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these analytical insights converge with the recent emphasis placed by feminist 
scholars on the significance of informal institutions (Waylen 2014, 2017), and 
state–society relations (Htun and Weldon 2010) and coalitions in securing gen-
der equity, but the analysis of the Bangladesh case brings these insights together 
under a coherent framework. This indicates that the framework used allowed 
me to capture a more nuanced picture of the policy story than current feminist 
analysis.
The value of the power domains framework for the analysis of the domestic 
violence policy case story in Bangladesh lies in being able to clearly capture the 
role of the informal networks, interpersonal capital, and informal norms and 
practices in adopting and implementing a legal change. It revealed that infor-
mal networks may not always adversely affect the promotion of gender equity, as 
generally assumed in the good governance literature (Nazneen 2017). Personal 
relationships between the leadership of the domestic violence policy coalition, 
the top leadership of the ruling regime, and key officials in the gender machinery 
greatly influenced the pace of the policy adoption process and the content of the 
law. The significance of the informal network that existed between the lead-
ers of the women’s movement and a powerful female minister created strong ties 
between civil society and the elites.
The other value added from using a power domains framework for analysing 
negotiations around the DV Act is to show how, even in a competitive clientelist 
context within which it is difficult to promote programmatic agendas, windows 
of opportunity for feminist activists may emerge when political dynamics shift 
and when opponents (in this case, religious political parties) are rendered tem-
porarily toothless. An analysis of the political settlement is useful for unpacking 
these dynamics and the ebb and flow of holding power amongst different groups 
therein, with a view to overcoming resistance. Unpacking the role of informal 
networks, norms, and practices and understanding the incentives of the key 
actors for promoting or resisting gender equity concerns is crucial for developing 
a clear analysis of what kind of change is possible for advancing women’s rights or 
gender equity concerns.
The evidence from the Bangladesh story suggests that for the public bureau-
cracy to play a progressive role requires that the normal rules of the game within 
a competitive clientelist political settlement are somehow disrupted. This hap-
pened here when the usual dynamics of competitive clientelism and its politi-
cizing effects on political debate and the public bureaucracy were temporarily 
suspended by the installation of a caretaker government, in ways that opened 
political space for activists and femocrats to ally and drive forward the enactment 
of the law.
Lastly, the Bangladesh story reveals (as do other country cases in this book) 
that transnational actors, events, and discourses on women’s rights are able to tip 
the balance in favour of women’s rights, even if this comes at the price of women’s 
groups having their legitimacy called into question. Importantly, South–South 
exchanges can play a vital role in the promotion of gender equity, as demon-
strated by the role played by Indian and Malaysian feminist movement actors in 
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supporting their Bangladeshi counterparts to frame the DV Act in Bangladesh. 
These findings challenge the methodological nationalism of much political anal-
ysis on gender equity and also point towards the need for a deeper appreciation 
of how transnational actors and discourses may be constitutive of, and help 
shape, the political settlement itself, as well as specific policy domains within 
the Global South.
Notes
 1. Changes in national and international contexts, power of the allies and opposition.
 2. The 2006 military intervention created a caretaker government, which was in 
power for two years to implement the necessary electoral reforms.
 3. In 2008, under the caretaker regime, the Election Commission proposed that the 
RPO should stipulate direct elections in reserved seats, a 33 percent reservation for 
women in parliament, and all committee positions within the political parties. All 
political parties resisted these changes.
 4. See https://mowca.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/mowca.portal.gov.bd/page/203db-
6dc_7c82_4aa0_98a6_8672334b235c/Domestic%20Violence%20Act%20English.pdf 
[accessed 23 July 2018].
 5. Interview, Naripokhkho and CiDV member; 25 May 2014; HRLS, BRAC employee 
(former Ain o Salish Kendra employee) and CiDV member, 27 August 2014.
 6. The father of the minister of women’s affairs was a high-ranking AL leader, who 
had a close relationship with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the prime minister’s father. 
The women’s affairs minister also steadfastly supported Sheikh Hasina, the AL 
prime minister, when Hasina was facing difficulties during the 2007–2008 CTG regime 
backed by the army and also was being challenged by many of the AL leaders.
 7. Interview, GIZ employee and CiDV member, 22 June 2014; interview, Bangladesh 
senior staff member and CiDV member, 19 June 2014.
 8. Interview, senior staff member and CiDV member, 19 June 2014; interview, former 
Bangladesh National Women Lawyers’ Association (BNWLA) employee and CiDV 
member, 24 June 2014.
 9. Interview, former BNWLA employee and CiDV member, 24 June 2014; interview, 
MOWCA secretary, 22 July 2014.
 10. Interview, HRLS BRAC employee (former Ain o Salish Kendra employee) and 
CiDV member, 22 August 2014; interview, senior staff member and CiDV member, 
19 June 2014.
 11. Interview, former BNWLA organizer and member of CiDV, 24 June 2014.
 12. Interview, Naripokhkho member of CiDV, 25 May 2014.
 13. Interview, HRLS BRAC employee (former Ain o Shalish Kendra [ASK] employee) 
and member of CiDV, 27 August 2015; interview, senior staff member and member of 
CiDV, 19 June 2014.
 14. Interview, senior staff member and CiDV member, 19 June 2014.
 15. Interview, senior staff member and CiDV member, 19 June 2014.
 16. Interview, former Care Bangladesh employee and CiDV member, 20 April 2014.
 17. Interview, Naripokhkho and CiDV member, 25 May 2014.
 18. Interview, HRLS BRAC employee (former ASK employee) and member of CiDV, 
27 August 2014.
 19. Interview, senior staff member and CiDV member, 19 June 2014.
 20. Interview, former Care Bangladesh employee and CiDV member, 20 April 2014.
 21. Interview, former BNWLA employee and CiDV member, 24 June 2014.
 22. Interview, senior staff member and CiDV member, 19 June 2014; interview, former 
GIZ employee and CiDV member, 22 June 2014.
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 23. Interview, BLAST lawyer, 24 June 2014.
 24. Interview, female MP 1, 1 March 2014; interview, BNWLA employee and CiDV 
member, 24 June 2014.
 25. Rules against ‘floor crossing’ were introduced after 1973 to control dissent; a mem-
ber of parliament loses his/her seat.
 26. Interview, BNWLA employee, 4 June 2014.
 27. Interviews, BLAST lawyer and CiDV member, August, 2014; MOWCA officers at 
MOWCA–CiDV dialogue, August 2014.
 28. Observations made at the MOWCA–CiDV meeting, August 2014.
 29. According to an article in ProthomAlo, 26 April 2015, more than 450 posts were 
vacant for the position of district and assistant judges at the time of writing.
 30. Interview, magistrate 1, 26 August 2014.
 31. Interview, ASK lawyer and CiDV member, 24 July 2014.
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Appendix 4 List of participants in the Bangladesh study
1. Senior staff member and CIDV member
2. Human Rights Legal Services, BRAC employee (former Ain O Shalish and CIDV 
member)
3. Former BNWLA organizer and member of CiDV
4. GIZ employee and CiDV member
5. Naripokhkho member and CiDV member
6. Lawyer 1, BLAST
7. Former CARE employee and CiDV member
8. GIZ employee 2, CiDV member
9. Secretary, MOWCA
10. Former director, MSVAW; MOWCA
11. Female MP 1
12. Female MP 2
13. Magistrate 1 (Dhaka)
14. Magistrate 2 (Dhaka)
15. MOWCA officer 1 (Dhaka)
16. MOWCA officer 2 (Tangail)
17. BNWLA lawyer
18. ASK lawyer and CiDV member
19. BMP member
20. Senior staff member (involved as Naripokkho member)
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Between democratization 
and patronage
The politics of Ghana’s Domestic 
Violence Act (2007)
Beatrix Allah-Mensah and Rhoda Osei-Afful
8
Introduction
Despite Ghana’s apparent success in building a multi-party democracy and achiev-
ing middle-income status, concerns remain over the extent to which women have 
benefited from these wider processes in both political and developmental terms. 
In 2014, Ghana ranked 124 in the world in its Gender Inequality Index, with 
a score of 0.554 (UN Development Programme 2015). Furthermore, although 
Ghana was one of the first countries to introduce a quota to elect women to 
parliament in 1960, this was discontinued amid subsequent political upheavals, 
with the result that women currently represent only 11 percent of parliamentari-
ans (Quota Project 2015). From an inclusion-to-influence perspective, this would 
seem to corroborate the expectation that progress on gender equity requires the 
increased presence of women in politics (Phillips 1995, Escobar-Lemmon and 
Taylor-Robinson 2014). Although this may well form an important part of the 
picture, drawing such broad-brush correlations is not helpful when it comes to 
identifying the specific conditions under which a country such as Ghana adopts 
gender-equitable policies. Drawing on recent advances in the political analysis of 
both gender and development in the Global South (see Chapter 2), this chapter 
highlights the role of elite interaction, informal politics, and power relations in 
shaping political commitment to inclusive development (Hickey et al. 2015) and 
gender equity (Nazneen and Mahmud 2012). Our analysis of the adoption and 
(partial) implementation of legislation against domestic violence in Ghana draws 
attention to the configuration of power within the national political settlement 
and the domain of women’s interests and how this shapes how formal democratic 
institutions actually function within a competitive clientelist setting.
In methodological terms, we used a multi-staged approach to data collection, 
starting with a desk-based review to identify women’s political inclusion in relation 
to the unfolding of Ghana’s political settlement over time. We then sought to trace 
the process through which the domestic violence policy was adopted in 2007 and 
the subsequent process of implementation. Primary data were collected using key 
informant interviews with the stakeholders involved in the campaign for domestic 
violence legislation and the implementation process (see Appendix 5 for a list of 
interviewees). Primary data collection was supplemented by secondary document 
BK-TandF-9780815372356_TEXT_BRUNT-181008-Chp08.indd   152 14/02/19   1:26 PM
Between democratization and patronage 153
analysis of academic and policy literature on domestic violence policy-making and 
implementation in Ghana. The focus throughout was on the dynamic interaction 
of actors, institutions, and ideas within key domains of power and how that shaped 
this particular effort to negotiate gender equity in Ghana.
This chapter is structured as follows: the next section discusses the history 
of women’s inclusion in politics and policy-making in Ghana, before subsequent 
sections focus on the politics behind domestic violence policy-making. The con-
cluding section offers a summary of the broader politics of securing gender equity 
within Ghana’s competitive clientelist settlement.
Women’s inclusion in politics and policy-making in Ghana
Ghana’s status as one of Africa’s political and economic success stories has recently 
been challenged by scholarship suggesting that its impressive achievements—in 
terms of growth, poverty reduction, and multiparty elections—have become 
increasingly compromised by the nature of its competitive clientelist political set-
tlement. The combination of intensely competitive electoral politics and the per-
sistent presence of informalized patron–client relationships as the means through 
which status and resources are accumulated and distributed, is said to create 
few incentives for political elites to establish institutions capable of meeting the 
higher-level tasks of challenging structural inequalities and achieving economic 
transformation (Whitfield 2011, Oduro et al. 2014, Abdulai and Hickey 2016). 
Competitive clientelism—particularly where there are strong factions competing 
for power and regular turnovers—as pertains to Ghana, tends to encourage polit-
ical elites to adopt short-term time horizons rather than programmatic agendas 
and to use public institutions as a means of securing political loyalty through the 
distribution of rents rather than the impersonal allocation of rights (Levy 2014). 
As outlined in Oduro et al. (2014), this form of governance has characterized 
Ghana since the mid-1990s, with intra-elite negotiations required from 1992 
to 1995 to ensure actual buy-in to the multiparty system reestablished in 1992. 
Prior to this transition, Ghana had experienced a largely ‘dominant’ political 
settlement under the rule of Jerry Rawlings from the early 1980s. This came 
after a series of coups and political instability that followed the deposing of the 
largely dominant period of President Nkrumah, the country’s leader at inde-
pendence in 1957.
Critical junctures and women’s engagement in politics (1950s–80s)
Ghana’s political history from the independence period through to the early 
1980s, we argue, created specific types of opportunities for women to participate 
in politics and largely constrained their ability to promote gender equity concerns 
after the transition to democracy in the early 1990s.
Women played a significant role in Ghana’s struggle for independence. Tsikata 
(1989) records that the Convention People’s Party (CPP) developed its women 
and youth wings to marshal massive popular support and also to form women’s 
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groups—including the Ghana Women’s League (GWL). In recognition of this 
contribution, the CPP introduced a number of measures to enhance women’s 
political participation when it came to power at independence, including the 
establishment of the national women’s association, the National Council of 
Ghana Women, in 1960. As Adomako-Ampofo (2008) argues, although the asso-
ciation was not independent from the government, it offered women a space for 
organization, training, and development. According to Tsikata (2009a), Ghana 
became one of the first African countries to introduce and implement a quota 
system for women through the enactment of the Representation of the People 
(Women Members) Amendment Act of 1960. The Act ruled that in addition to 
the seats provided by law, there would be 10 additional seats for women. Women 
members of the national assembly were to be elected for each region by the mem-
bers of the assembly representing that region (Burnett Harvey 1966, p. 37). The 
Act led to women’s representation reaching 18.2 percent (19 women) of the 104 
parliamentary members by 1965 (Tsikata 2009a, pp. 33–34). However, these gains 
for women were to be short-lived.
The fall of the CPP government through the first military coup in 1966 intro-
duced an unstable period of rule marked by frequent shifts between the military 
and civilian governments, with largely negative implications for the inclusion of 
women in both politics and policy-making. The closed nature of governance under 
male-dominated military regimes left women out of decision-making roles. Moreover, 
the National Council of Ghana Women was disbanded following the fall of the CPP 
government, leading to a 15-year period during which women lacked a formal struc-
ture through which to engage with government (Tsikata 2009b). The dictatorships 
also introduced a chaotic socioeconomic order that made it dangerous for women 
to gain a public profile, including, for example, prominent businesswomen, some of 
whom were victimized by the state. The political misfortunes that women experi-
enced intensified following the 1979 uprising under the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC) led by Flt Lt Jerry John Rawlings. This era saw women running 
market stalls portrayed as the causes of the economic woes of the country, leading to 
their public humiliation and torture (Adomako-Ampofo 2008).
However, under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) that held 
power from 1981 through to 1992, also led by Jerry Rawlings, there was a strong 
commitment to women’s political inclusion, particularly under the auspices of 
the 31st December Women’s Movement (DWM), as led by the wife of President 
Rawlings. The movement revived women’s organizing at a national scale and per-
meated every region and district of Ghana with a large following. In line with the 
wide mobilizing strategies of the PNDC, which emphasized building its support 
base amongst popular rather than more elite social groups, the women’s move-
ment and party structures were populated mainly by market women, workers in 
the informal economy, and artisans (Allah-Mensah 2005).
The role of the women’s movement was instrumental in developing and pass-
ing key bills, including the interstate succession law, which came into effect 
on 24 June 1985 and offered legal protection for widowhood rights concerning 
inheritance and abuse (Gedzi 2014). The movement was also instrumental in 
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strengthening the National Council for Women and Development (NCWD), the 
women’s machinery, which later became the institutional base for the creation of 
Ghana’s Women and Children’s Ministry (now the Ministry of Gender, Children, 
and Social Protection).
The dominant party settlement was effectively used by women during this 
period to negotiate their interests, frequently in informal ways through accessing 
the leader’s wife, Mrs Rawlings. This included gaining representation for women 
within the Constituent Assembly that negotiated the transition from military 
dictatorship to constitutional rule. The DWM gained considerable political 
support to undertake economic empowerment activities for women, and it was 
DWM members who formed the majority of female candidates at the district 
assembly level’s first elections in 1998 and subsequently the 1992 general elections 
(Allah-Mensah 2005). Women’s political inclusion was thus conducted through 
the personalized politics of patronage, rather than through a more institutional-
ized and rights-based system, as reflected in the failure to reestablish an effective 
quota system for women. In addition, the PNDC’s dominance closed the political 
space for wider mobilization, leaving women with little opportunity to form more 
autonomous organizations beyond the DWM (Tsikata 2009b).
The current political settlement and women’s inclusion 
in politics (1992–2012)
The democratic transition of the early 1990s enabled space for a broader range of 
actors to engage in politics, including women and women’s organizations. The 
1992 constitution-making process involved a nationwide effort to collate the 
views of Ghanaians on the future of democracy in Ghana and created scope for 
women to raise matters concerning their rights (Allah-Mensah 2005, pp. 18–19). 
The government decided to install a Committee of Experts to draw up proposals 
for a draft constitution, and although only two women were appointed to the 
nine-member committee, it did make some proposals around women’s political 
inclusion. These included recommending a Council of Ministers to be appointed 
on the basis of special expertise, experience, and equitable regional and gender 
representation and on women’s rights issues such as addressing debilitating cus-
tomary practices, female circumcision, property rights, equal conditions of work, 
and equal representation and participation of women and men on boards and 
in appointments to public positions (Committee of Experts 1991). Nonetheless, 
these proposals were ironically whittled down in the 1992 constitution that was 
formulated by a consultative assembly, despite the assembly having higher lev-
els of female representation than the Committee of Experts (Republic of Ghana 
1992, Svaniker 1997). The consultative assembly (CA) did not ensure that any of 
the afore-mentioned gender issues were categorically included in the constitution, 
including a quota for women’s political participation. Some critics explain this 
gap between women’s sizeable inclusion in the CA and their limited influence 
in terms of the characteristics of the women who gained inclusion. The PNDC 
government used urban informal-sector agents to sponsor, form, and register 
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more than 30 informal organizations (e.g. of hairdressers, fishmongers, drinking 
and chop bar owners), some of which became representatives in the consulta-
tive assembly (Allah-Mensah 2005). The NCWD, which was an advisory body 
to government largely controlled at that stage by the 31st December Women’s 
Movement (DWM), had 10 representatives (Bluwey 1998). Women’s inclusion 
thus arguably reflected the PNDC’s clientelist strategy of securing support from a 
particular constituency, rather than a broader commitment to women’s empow-
erment. In line with the PNDC’s broader strategy of supporting popular rather 
than elite actors, many highly educated and articulate women were excluded 
from the process in ways that arguably reduced the quality of women’s representa-
tion that might have been achieved through a more cross-class-based coalition. 
Some observers (e.g. Bluwey 1998) note that the largely politically acquiescent 
and less educated representatives failed to raise strategic issues, including affirm-
ative action and making women’s rights legally binding, in ways that would have 
significantly changed the role of women in politics and public life.
Women’s political representation within the fourth republic has therefore been 
limited at both the national assembly and local government levels (see Table 8.1). 
In a parliament of 275 members, only 29 are currently women, a proportion that 
has been largely unchanged since 1992. The situation at local government level 
(see Table 8.2) is similar: in the local level elections in 2010, only 7 percent of the 
elected and 3 percent of appointed members were women (Ministry of Women 
and Children’s Affairs 2012).
A review commission established in 2011 to undertake a consultative review of 
the 1992 constitution argued strongly for affirmative action to increase women’s 
Table 8.1 Women in Ghana’s national parliament 
Year Number of parliamentary seats Women Percentage
1992 200 16 8.0
1996 200 18 9.0
2000 200 19 9.5
2004 230 25 11.0
2008 230 20 8.3
2012 275 29 10.5
Source: Allah-Mensah (2005), Bawa and Sanyare (2013).
Table 8.2 Women in Ghana’s district assemblies





Source: NDPC (2001), Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs (2012).
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effective participation in politics. This recommendation was championed espe-
cially by the women’s movement, civil society organizations, think tanks, and 
research and academic institutions and was backed by the Ministry of Women 
and Children’s Affairs. The resulting government white paper supported the prin-
ciple of affirmative action but rejected the recommendation for political parties 
to amend their constitutions to undertake measures that would boost women’s 
chances of parliamentary representation (Republic of Ghana, Constitutional 
Review Committee 2011). This reflects the powerful grip that political parties 
have over public institutions in Ghana’s competitive clientelist context and the 
powerful incentives for them to focus first and foremost on ensuring their political 
interests and survival. This stance also reflects the broader patriarchal norms that 
closely conscribe women’s political agency in Ghana.
Looking beyond political society to civil society, the democratic transition 
of the early 1990s in Ghana encouraged the emergence of a broader range 
of women’s organizations. Two notable examples of women’s movements in 
this period were NETRIGHT and the Women’s Manifesto Coalition, which 
lobbied on issues of economic justice and women’s increased representation in 
formal politics, respectively. As Adomako-Ampofo (2008, p. 401) argues, these 
two organizations would later provide the basis for the Domestic Violence 
(DV) Coalition. Research-based women’s groups championed by women aca-
demics also flourished at this time and would later help produce research on 
women’s rights and violence against women, and use international protocols 
to leverage the framing of issues around the importance of women’s politi-
cal inclusion and the promotion of gender equity (Institute of Development 
Studies et al. 2016).
The politics of domestic violence policy-making in Ghana
This section explores how the gendered dynamics of Ghana’s political set-
tlement identified earlier shaped the process through which the Domestic 
Violence Act was promoted and adopted and the extent to which it has been 
implemented. The quest to address domestic violence is not a recent phenom-
enon in Ghana, or Africa more broadly, and cannot be seen as a Western idea 
or imposition (Burrill et al. 2010, p. 1). The roots of domestic violence itself 
lie within the colonial period, and specifically the British hut tax system that 
mandated men to pay for any extra wives they had as a way of discouraging 
polygyny (Burrill et al. 2010). Efforts by some men to increase their control 
over their wives’ labour led to conflicts over wealth and income controlled by 
the women. This meant that this colonial project of domestication, through 
which African households became connected to the political economy of colo-
nialism, ‘contributed to the consolidation of a moral authority and reordering 
of household relationships within the state and among members of the house-
hold’ (Burrill et al. 2010, p. 9). Some analysts interpreted this as the very foun-
dation of, or at least a catalyst to, forms of violence in the household, which 
subsequently became entrenched.
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Background and story of the law
The issue of domestic violence gained prominence in Ghana in the 1990s, due 
to a convergence of international, regional, and national pressure and events 
that unfolded around the same time. In March 1995, the Women in Law and 
Development in Africa (WiLDAF) network met in Togo and proposed the cre-
ation of an African Charter on Human and People’s rights to address women’s 
rights. Although the charter was not signed until 2003, the issue of women’s 
rights, including protection against violence, was already on the table in regional 
meetings. This, combined with the Beijing Platform for Action, which included 
clear steps that governments should take to end violence against women (VAW), 
offered a stepping-stone for women’s groups in Ghana to push for policy change on 
domestic violence (Fallon and Aunio 2006). In 1998, in partial fulfilment of its 
international obligations under the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the government established the 
Women and Juvenile Unit (WAJU) of the police service as a specialized unit to 
handle cases of abuse against women and children.
As shown in Table 8.3, the trigger for national-level discussions on domes-
tic violence came in 1998, from a study conducted by the Gender and Human 
Rights Documentation Centre. Their report made shocking revelations about the 
prevalence and forms of domestic violence in Ghana, including the finding that 
one in every three Ghanaian women suffers from physical violence at the hands 
of a current or past partner and that 27 percent of women had experienced psy-
chological abuse through having been forced to have sex by their male partner 
(Coker-Appiah and Cusack 1999).1 Public discussion on domestic violence was 
further catalyzed by newspaper reports of married women being killed by their 
husbands on grounds of infidelity (Adomako-Ampofo 2008, p. 405), and the serial 
killings of women in the years preceding the 2000 elections that led to women’s 
demonstrations against VAW. The main opposition party politicized the issue of 
domestic violence during the 2000 election campaigns2 and would go on to estab-
lish the Ministry of Women’s and Children’s Affairs (MOWCA) on taking office.
Women’s groups, feminist academics, and internationally recognized civil society 
groups intensified their mobilization around domestic violence after the election 
and resolved to form a coalition in 2002 to ensure the government’s commit-
ment to global and regional protocols on VAW. Evidence-based awareness-raising 
became a key strategy. Research by University of Ghana law students and human 
rights experts for the International Women’s Human Rights Clinic at Georgetown 
University in 2003 found that women in Ghana were inadequately protected from 
high rates of domestic violence (Cantalupo et al. 2006). These findings coincided 
with parliament’s consideration of the Domestic Violence Bill proposed by the Law 
Reform Commission. However, efforts of the women’s movement to build alliances 
within government and parliament were heavily undermined by the stance taken 
by the then Minister for Women and Children’s Affairs, Gladys Asmah. Asmah 
opposed the bill in both cabinet and parliament, where she was a leading member 
of the women’s caucus. According to Boas (2006), the minister’s opposition—and 
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that of some male MPs, traditional authorities, and religious leaders—focused in 
particular on a clause in the bill that would outlaw marital rape. Realizing the 
extent to which this issue was acting as an obstacle to the bill as a whole, the women’s 
coalition decided in 2005 to downplay this aspect and also to shift the discursive 
framing of their advocacy from a focus on women’s rights to an emphasis on the 
‘pro-family’ aspects of the bill.
Table 8.3 Chronology of events and critical moments for the Domestic Violence Law 
in Ghana
Date Event
1998–99 Discussions on domestic violence legislation start by Leadership and 
Advocacy for Women in Africa (LAWA); Gender Centre’s research 
findings; WAJU established.
1999 The above discussions picked up by International Federation of Women 
Lawyers (FIDA)–Ghana and efforts to push it as a private members’ bill in 
parliament made. Consultation with the women’s caucus showed that this 
would not work.
2000 Serial murders of women lead to intensity in calls for action by government. 
MOWCA formed.
2001 A draft bill submitted to the attorney general’s (AG’s) department for 
consideration.
2002 Law Reform Commission submits its research and proposals to the AG. AG 
then considers all submissions as basis for drafting a first draft for public 
comment. The bill then becomes a government bill.
The Ark Foundation holds maiden ‘activists night out’—an annual dinner 
for anti-violence advocates and activists to relax and reflect together. The 
commitment to establish the National Domestic Violence Coalition was 
made during this first meeting.
2003 Women’s Initiative for Self-Empowerment (WISE) organizes a National 
Strategic Planning Workshop on Domestic Violence Bill, held to actualize 
suggestions from the night out.
As part of the outcome from the strategic meeting, the National Domestic 
Violence Coalition was established. The key members of the coalition 
were mainly women’s groups who formed NETRIGHT, but later others, 
including MPs, joined.
The AG’s department prepares second draft, and there was a national 
consultation on the bill.
Challenges with the consultations and the then Minister for Women and 
Children’s Affairs, who opposes the bill.
2004 Over 100 individuals and organizations sign up as members of the coalition.
There is a change in the ministerial appointment for Women and 
Children’s Affairs.
2005 Women’s ministry continues with consultation on draft bill to cover whole 
country with widespread support for the passage of the bill.
2006 In May 2006, the bill is introduced in parliament by AG.
2007 In February 2007, parliament passes the bill into law after six years of civil 
society advocacy, political agitation, and parliamentary quandary.
Source: Adapted from Adomako-Ampofo (2008), pp. 408–11.
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The year 2005 also marked an important turning point in other respects, 
particularly through the appointment of a new minister at MOWCA, Alima 
Mahama, who had previously worked within women’s organizations. In addition, 
the Country Report from the Beijing +10 conference, which highlighted that 
high levels of gender-based violence persisted in Ghana, called on the govern-
ment to undertake legislative and administrative reforms in this area (UNDP 
2010). Women’s movements utilized these global calls to end VAW and pushed 
the government to act, claiming that it had the obligation under CEDAW to 
introduce laws against domestic violence (Hodžić 2009). According to a gender 
activist interviewed,
[T]here was a lot of talk about it, but domestically, when you talked about 
it, people felt that it was not a common phenomenon and the concept was 
foreign. The Gender Centre decided to research into the problem to see the 
extent of the problem in the Ghanaian society.3
This impetus helped lead to the bill being tabled in 2006 and subsequently passing 
into law as the Domestic Violence Law (Act 732) in 2007. The Domestic Violence 
Act 2007 incorporates a broad definition of domestic violence that includes phys-
ical, sexual, psychological, and economic abuse or any other act that may harm 
an individual. It also involves a fairly broad definition of the family that involves 
couples, children, and other relatives (Republic of Ghana 2007).
The protracted process of claims-making, negotiation, and compromise regard-
ing the passing of the DV Act in Ghana was closely shaped by the relative power 
of the different actors and ideas involved and how these interacted with both 
formal and informal institutional arrangements. The next section analyses some 
of these aspects in more depth, starting with the role played by the women’s coa-
lition and moving onto analysing how their strategies and the outcomes (in terms 
of policy articulation and adoption) were shaped by the broader character and 
dynamics of Ghana’s political settlement and the dominant players therein.
Coalition-building and informal negotiations
Ghana’s journey towards the domestic violence law enactment was significantly 
influenced by women’s collective action, specifically by the nature and strategies 
of the coalition that was formed to campaign for the bill (Adomako-Ampofo 2008, 
p. 396). Our respondents stressed the ‘instrumental’ role played by the National 
Coalition on Domestic Violence Legislation (DV Coalition) in securing ‘the 
passage of the Domestic Violence Act’.4 Founded in 2003, the DV Coalition 
was one of three coalitions to have emerged over the past decade, along with 
the Network for Women’s Rights in Ghana and the Coalition on the Women’s 
Manifesto for Ghana (Tsikata 2009b, p. 186). Bringing together varying elements of 
the women’s movement in Ghana, which included a range of different types of civil 
society organizations, academics, journalists, lawyers, and grassroots advocacy 
groups, coalitions helped overcome potential weaknesses naturally inherent in 
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collective action within the women’s movement. A strong secretariat, a capable 
coordinator, and a highly committed core of leaders ensured that the membership 
rose from about 15 people to over 100 groups, organizations, and individuals and 
that a clear campaigning and mobilization strategy was adhered to (Adomako-
Ampofo 2008, Tsikata 2009b). Realizing that the passage of a domestic violence 
bill was going to be a tough and long drawn-out struggle, the coalition also 
started to reach out to other potential allies, including the female caucus in 
parliament, some male MPs, and students.5
Awareness-raising was a key strategy. According to a former minister at MOWCA:
Most people who opposed the bill did it out of ignorance. Opposition 
stemmed from lack of clarity and understanding about the concept. They 
thought the bill was confrontational to men, but when they were educated 
and sensitized about it, they got to understand the issues.6
This broad approach was joined by more direct lobbying of key figures—including 
potential opponents such as queen mothers, chiefs, and religious leaders—and 
an effort to use church platforms, mosques, and various local languages during 
numerous consultation and community sensitization meetings on the bill at the 
district levels to reach citizens directly. Bodza, one of the key male gender activ-
ists, notes that
First we went to the men’s/women’s fellowships of the churches and then they 
invited us; we also went to pastors several times and then they allowed us to 
get to the congregations. We also used other organizing strategies, like using 
the president’s wife, and MP’s wives.7
There was initially little effort to mobilize rural women as actors; rather, local-level 
consultations seem to have been undertaken and intensified as a damage-limitation 
strategy once the government (and the women’s minister in particular) had rejected 
their demands. This arguably reflects the urban-elite nature of the coalition, a point 
we return to.
The role of ideas: framing domestic violence by opposers 
and activists
The policy coalition sought to use all available formal channels of engagement to 
advocate for the bill, including the media and direct lobbying of parliamentari-
ans. The Ghanaian media’s representation of the issue had mixed effects, on the 
one hand emphasizing the views of opponents to the bill and framing it as being 
spearheaded by elite women groups for their own interests (Hodžić 2009, p. 334), 
whilst on the other hand helping to popularize the issue by their reportage on 
abuses perpetrated against women, including through the role played by Women 
in Broadcasting (WIB). The group’s initial call was contextualized within the con-
stitutional rights and legal framework. However, this framing catalyzed opposition 
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around the key sticking point of marital rape from a considerable number of male 
parliamentarians, religious and traditional leaders, and even from some women, 
who saw the concept of marital rape as foreign and almost unthinkable within 
Ghanaian culture. Under Ghanaian law, all sexual relations during marriage are 
considered to be consensual. The Criminal Offences (CO) Act 1960 section 42g 
on consent mentioned that when consent is given, the use of violence is not 
prohibited. It explicitly mentioned that in marriage, the two parties give consent 
to sexual relations, and this can only be revoked if the parties divorce. The DV 
Coalition vigorously protested for this section to be repealed from the CO Act.
During government’s stakeholder consultations on the draft bill, the bill was 
opposed on the basis that it would cause of marital breakdown.8 Within par-
liament, the bill received both support and opposition from both sides of the 
political divide.9 For example, the then Attorney General, Nana Akufo-Addo, 
was supportive whilst the then Minister of Women and Children’s Affairs was 
opposed, launching a country-wide campaign for arbitration via customary law as 
an alternative to the domestic violence bill (Hodžić 2009).
In order to counter the focus on marital breakdown from those opposing the 
bill, the coalition reframed domestic violence as threatening to family life and the 
bill as helping to protect family values. This was specifically focused on securing 
the buy-in of religious leaders. One respondent noted that, ‘some religious leaders 
opposed the law, but were not vociferous…they thought that it was going to break 
up marriages’.10 The coalition also started to emphasize the developmental payoffs 
of the bill; a leading thinktank, the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD), 
supported this argument by stating that:
the bill would assist the nation in quelling violence against women, which 
would in turn enable the country to increase its productivity. The more 
women are able to participate as equal partners in the country, unimpeded 
by violence in their homes, the more likely that they will contribute to the 
country’s economic development. (CDD 2005, p. 5)
However, this reframing did not in itself reduce opposition around marital rape, 
which the coalition eventually decided to start downplaying in order to achieve 
the other goals within the proposed bill. One of the interviewees and a member 
of the coalition indicated that there was modification of language regarding the 
marital rape issue to state that consent should be sought within marriage on sex.11 
This modification facilitated the passage of the bill,12 although intense opposition 
from government eventually led to marital rape being removed from the bill, 
which was redrafted and sent to parliament. There was also no mention of repeal-
ing section 42g of the Criminal Offences Act, despite intense mobilization by 
women’s groups to do so. The Act was successfully passed in 2007. Although the 
DV Act mentions that violence cannot be justified on the basis of consent, which 
is an important breakthrough, marital rape is not explicitly prohibited. Despite 
this major loss, section 42g on consent was eventually repealed after the DV Act 
was passed (Fallon 2008).
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These findings demonstrate the power of gender norms and ideas in shaping 
domestic violence policy-making, eventually leading to a diluted domestic vio-
lence law that does not challenge structural gender inequalities and patriarchal 
notions of the family. The early deployment of a rights-based discourse by the 
DV Coalition was perhaps politically naïve in a context in which women’s rights 
were highly contested and stands in contrast with the strategic shift to a focus on 
‘family unity’ and ‘development’. Whilst this arguably helped secure the passage 
of the bill, as was the case in Uganda (Chapter 4), this came at a price in terms of 
limiting the transformative ambitions of the bill for gender equity.
The politics of implementation
The National Domestic Violence Policy and National Plan of Action identi-
fies a number of actions required for the DV Act to become effective, including 
the development of the legislative instrument; the establishment of a manage-
ment board, with a secretariat and governing board; the provision of shelters and 
healthcare; and the training of staff in the key implementing agencies, particularly 
police and health officers. Government officials within the Ministry of Women, 
Children, and Social Protection, which is responsible for delivering the DV Act, 
note that progress has been very slow, at least until 2013, from which point a new 
minister seems to have brought some impetus to the proceedings. For example, the 
development of a legislative instrument (LI) has taken longer than the passage of 
the bill itself and has still not been finalized. Under the new minister, the LI has 
been drafted and presented to the attorney general’s office in July 2013. A com-
mittee met to finalize it in June 2014, although by the end of 2016 it had yet to be 
completed. This failure places constraints on what can be achieved; for example, 
a fund has been established to provide financial assistance to victims of domestic 
violence, but this cannot be operationalized until the LI has been established.
The ministry coordinates and engages with various stakeholders involved in 
implementation, including the DV Coalition, the Gender Centre, FIDA-Ghana, the 
attorney general’s department, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Health, and 
the Domestic Violence and Victims Support Unit. The National Policy and Plan of 
Action was developed and adopted in 2008, and a set of guidelines for policy action 
has also been developed. Among the key actions so far taken towards actualizing the 
Act are the following: (1) setting up a management board—and the establishment 
of the Domestic Violence Secretariat by the board to coordinate implementation 
of the Act; (2) disseminating of copies of the Act, abridged and in six local lan-
guages, to schoolchildren, traditional leaders, and regional directors of the ministry; 
(3) developing guidelines for the construction of shelters for victims (two shelters 
have been established, one in Accra, through collaboration with the Christian 
Council, and one in Wa, which belonged to the social welfare department); and 
(4) establishing two courts for trying domestic violence cases in Accra and Kumasi.
The legal, social, and physical infrastructure required to enforce the Act have 
been only partially institutionalized. As Adu-Gyamfi puts it, ‘it is an established 
fact that in spite of the legal provisions to combat the canker of domestic violence 
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in Ghana, still there are issues hindering domestic victims’ access to justice to bring 
perpetrators to face the laws of the land’ (Adu-Gyampfi 2014). There is no clear 
budgetary allocation for operationalizing the Act. Table 8.4 indicates that part 
of the problem here has been the very small budget allocated to the Ministry of 
Gender, Children, and Social Protection, up until at least 2012, for all its activities, 
including support for the implementation of the DV Act and for the secretariat.
Table 8.4 shows that the ministry remains heavily dependent on external sup-
port, with donors providing an increasingly large share of the ministry’s budget. 
This has left implementation subject to the uncertainties of donor funding: 
according to one civil society advocate,
there are no resources committed by government; it’s now donors who are 
doing ‘pick and choose’ on different aspects of the policy. Currently, donors 
who supported the cause initially have shifted their focus to ‘early marriages’ 
and this is also affecting the full implementation of the bill.13
Donors such as DANIDA, UNICEF, ActionAID, and UNFPA have helped 
develop a regulatory framework that sets out how both state and non-state insti-
tutions can work in the area of domestic violence (Quaicoe-Duho 2014), although 
the uptake of such opportunities has been slow. NGOs such as the Ark Foundation 
have established some victim support centres in addition to the centres in Wa 
and Accra, although these are woefully inadequate to support the cases received. 
More positively, in 2014 the Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Protection 
(MOGCSP) developed a communication strategy on domestic violence to facili-
tate educational campaigns and training for the prevention of gender-based vio-
lence and the protection of survivors. A domestic violence victim support fund was 
launched and a training manual developed for domestic violence service providers, 
as well as for the sensitization of stakeholders on domestic violence, and the provi-
sion of professional psychosocial support for domestic violence victims (MOGCSP 
2014). However, there are currently no state-run one-stop crisis centres (although 
in January 2018, the Ministry of Health announced that it would open one).
In terms of explaining the general lack of progress on implementing the DVA, 
those involved in the process point to a number of problems, many of them polit-
ical in nature. This includes the electoral turnover of the party that adopted the 
Table 8.4 Budgetary allocation to the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection 
(in Ghanaian cedis)






Overall total of funds 
(national budget and donor)
2009 2,752,774 0.1 6,768,571 9,521,345
2010 4,147,266 0.13 4,371,404 8,518,670
2011 3,285,625 0.17 10,037,071 13,322,696
2012 3,833,158 0.14 11,840,332 15,673,490
Source: Ministry of Women and Children Affairs (2012, p. 45)
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legislation within one year of the Act being adopted, frequent changes in min-
isterial appointees, and a general lack of political commitment to providing the 
required funding. The Act lacked strong support from the kinds of powerful play-
ers required to ensure the effective implementation of public policies, particularly 
those in cabinet and parliament. Given this somewhat familiar lack of support for 
gender issues within the political elite, we tend to agree with Sardenberg (2011) 
that women’s organizing is vital, not only to get laws onto the statute books, but 
also to play a role in monitoring the implementation of these policies and hold-
ing government accountable in making legislation more effective. However, the 
efforts of the DV Coalition have substantially waned since the bill was adopted as 
an Act, in part because of financial limitations, but also because its strategic focus 
was mainly on securing the passage of the legislation, rather than its implemen-
tation (Tsikata 2009b, Manuh and Dwamena-Aboagye 2013).
Another challenge to the successful implementation of the law in Ghana is the 
prevalence of customary law, which advises women to obey their husbands and to 
submit to their demands for sexual relations (Archampong 2010). With the passage 
of the domestic violence law, responsibility shifts from the village elders to the jus-
tice system, and any customary practices that are harmful to people are prohibited. 
Although this is a significant development, many people still adhere in practice to 
customary law. This can constrain women from raising their case and asking for 
help and can reduce the transformative effect of the law in practice.
The political settlements literature suggests that policy implementation is 
particularly problematic in competitive clientelist settlements, where the pub-
lic bureaucracy is heavily personalized and politicized and used primarily as a 
means of distributing rents, rather than delivering public goods and protecting 
the rights of citizens in an impersonal way (Levy 2014). As argued by Whitfield 
and Therkildsen (2011), ruling elites choose policies and implementation arrange-
ments as part of their strategies for maintaining ruling coalitions and/or winning 
elections (Whitfield 2011, p. 8). It seems likely that the New Patriotic Party (NPP) 
government saw the passage of the domestic violence law not as being critical to 
its continuity in power, but rather as something that, on the one hand, needed to 
be done to assuage certain elements of its ruling coalition (notably the educated 
and often lawyerly element of the women’s movement that formed part of it social 
constituency) and, on the other, would enable it to avoid international censure. 
It seems reasonable to conclude that the lack of either an instrumental political 
rationale for pursuing the legislation or a genuine ideological commitment to 
gender equity could help to explain the slow progress in terms of both adoption 
and implementation, before and after the election.
Conclusion: the political settlement and domestic violence 
legislation in Ghana
The passing of the Domestic Violence Act was an important step in a long journey 
to eliminate domestic violence in Ghana. The process of demanding the domestic 
violence law took at least six years to bear fruit, and legislation was only adopted in 
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2007 once the most controversial part of it (concerning marital rape) was modi-
fied. The legislative instrument is yet to be finalized, and there is little evidence 
as yet that norms around domestic violence have started to shift in Ghana. One 
of our interviewees noted that Ghana’s government tends to enforce general laws 
adequately enough, ‘but when it comes to laws for something specific like the 
domestic violence, it takes forever…’.14 The protracted process through which 
the legislation on domestic violence was eventually secured in Ghana needs 
to be understood in relation to the hybrid elements of political openness and 
patron–client politics that characterize its competitive clientelist settlement. The 
openness of political space secured by the transition away from dominant party 
rule not only meant that women’s groups had more room for manoeuvre, but 
also that they could start to escape from the overbearing patronage of the erst-
while First Lady. Tsikata (2009b) argues that the women’s coalitions represent an 
enlargement and consolidation of the space for women’s organizing in Ghana, 
although as Lust (2009, p. 122) points out, these openings are also available to 
many other interest groups, such as the youth and the disabled, some of which 
will have competing and opposing interests. Importantly, where electoral com-
petition is as fiercely fought, as it is in Ghana, this space becomes heavily politi-
cized in a partisan sense as the key political organizations pursuing power deploy 
their mobilizing and discursive strategies to secure electoral advantage. Unable 
to align directly with either political party, for fear of undermining their broader 
appeal, women’s organizations can too easily become marginal to the main politi-
cal dynamics at play, which often revolve around organized social groups, such as 
unions, business associations, and ethno-regional groups bargaining with ruling 
elites for the distribution of goods on a club or private (rather than public) basis 
in exchange for political support (Levy 2014).
Such contexts reduce the possibilities for political parties to adopt program-
matic agendas, including around women’s rights, unless they can directly help 
patronage politics and/or secure election victories, and it is notable that neither 
political party in Ghana, including the allegedly ‘social democratic’ National 
Democratic Congress, has championed women’s rights or gender equity more 
broadly. Also successive presidents—who are also party leaders and who retain 
considerable agenda-setting and legislative powers in Ghana (Oduro et al. 2014)—
failed to support the DV Act. The case of Ghana therefore draws attention to 
the problems of promoting inclusive development in contexts of competitive cli-
entelism, where the incentives are geared towards spreading resources thinly in 
accordance with the logic of pork-barrel politics and making deals, rather than 
following (constitutional) rules and promoting equity (Abdulai and Hickey 2016). 
Transformative policies for gender equity seldom generate sufficient rents or legit-
imacy for politicians for it to be worth their expending political capital on them, 
especially in the face of opposition from powerful groups.
Within this generally unfavourable context, women’s groups have sometimes 
found the government of Ghana to be responsive when issues are raised at elec-
tions (Adomako-Ampofo 2008, p. 400), particularly where closely fought elec-
tions raise the prospect of the ruling coalition being deposed, as was the case in 
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both 2000 and 2008. However, what seems to have been more critical here was 
the removal of the focus on the marital rape clause and a new minister for women 
and children’s affairs, plus transnational pressure before and after the Beijing 
Women’s Conference, rather than elections per se.
Lacking the support of dominant players, the women’s movement also lacked 
representation in the multiple venues required for women’s representation to 
be effective in terms of securing policy change (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-
Robinson 2014). This was denied to women not just by the lack of a quota to help 
secure a critical mass of women in parliament, but also by the initial opposition 
from within the women’s ministry itself. Although the Ministry of Women and 
Children’s Affairs is not renowned for its agenda-setting powers, its minister none-
theless holds a cabinet position and is expected to champion women’s rights and 
issues. The fact that the then minister for women and children’s affairs directly 
opposed the bill during the first two years of the campaign was cited by most of 
our interviewees as the most significant obstacle to progress. The concerns she 
raised over the marital rape element of the bill resonated well with those ini-
tially opposed to the bill, such as religious groups, male parliamentarians, and a 
cross-section of the Ghanaian public, who perceived the introduction of the bill 
as a foreign imposition and a potential threat to marriage and the social and cul-
tural norms of Ghana. According to some women activists interviewed, the new 
minister had a far greater affinity with the coalition and its cause, in part because 
she was from the CSO family and therefore could better relate to them, the issues, 
and their modus operandi and in part because of her previous role in the wom-
en’s movement.15 This was confirmed in our interview with her: ‘I had exposure 
with CSO work and knew how to handle them. I had been one of them actually 
and I think this experience helped me to manage my dealings with them’.16 This 
allowed the Coalition to use these ties, both formally and informally, to help 
ensure her support. This appears to be the exception that proves the rule, in that 
women generally lack access to the informal venues and processes that continue 
to characterize policy-making in Ghana and clientelist political settlements more 
broadly (Parks and Cole 2010, p. 9). In general, gaining access to and navigating 
the informal rules, unwritten conventions, patron–client relations, and midnight 
meetings where critical political decisions and agreements are negotiated require 
levels of social and financial capital that are more amenable to male than female 
politicians (Waylen 2014).
Finally, the Ghana case reveals that the discursive framing strategies required 
to secure alignment between gender equity policies and paradigmatic ideas on 
gender within a given political settlement can lead to potentially transformative 
policies being rendered ameliorative. The shift from a rights-based discourse to a 
focus on family unity and development made strategic sense and helped ensure 
that at least some legal basis for protecting women from domestic violence is now 
in place. However, the exclusion of a clause on marital rape, and the limited rate 
of progress in implementing the Act, raise concerns that Ghana remains a long 
way from establishing a decisive normative shift towards greater gender equity in 
this regard at least.
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Notes
 1. Records from the Domestic Violence and Victim Support Unit (DOVVSU) indi-
cated that between 1999 and 2000, there were 109,784 cases of domestic violence, 
with women being the biggest victims (Participatory Development Associates, 2014).
 2. Interviews with gender activists, held between 26 February and 25 April 2014.
 3. Interview with civil society and gender activist/advocate, 28 March 2014.
 4. Interview with former coordinator of the Domestic Violence Coalition A, 17 March 
2014.
 5. Interview with Domestic Violence Coalition coordinator, 18 March 2014.
 6. Interview with former Minister of Women and Children’s Affairs, 21 March 2014.
 7. Interview with gender activist, 26 February 2014.
 8. Interview with former coordinator of the Domestic Violence Coalition B, 18 March 
2014.
 9. Interview with civil society and gender activist/advocate, 28 March 2014; interview 
with former coordinator of the Domestic Violence Coalition A, 17 March 2014.
 10. Interview with gender activist/advocate, 8 April 2014.
 11. Interview with former coordinator of the Domestic Violence Coalition B, 18 March 
2014.
 12. Interview with gender activist/advocate, 8 April 2014.
 13. Interview with civil society and gender activist/advocate, 28 March 2014.
 14. Interview with gender activist, February 2014.
 15. Interview with gender activist/advocate, 28 March 2014; interview with former min-
ister for women and children’s affairs, 21 March 2014.
 16. Interview, former minister of the Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs, 
21 March 2014.
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Appendix 5 List of participants in the Ghana study
1. Interview with gender activist, 26 February 2014, Accra
2. Interview with a former coordinator of the Domestic Violence Coalition A, 17 March 
2014, Accra
3. Interview with a former coordinator of the Domestic Violence Coalition B, 18 March 
2014, Accra
4. Interview with former minister for women and children’s affairs, 21 March 2014, Accra
5. Interview with civil society and gender activist/advocate, 28 March 2014, Accra
6. Interview with gender activist/advocate, 8 April 2014, Accra
7. Interview (via phone) with civil society activist, 23 April 2014, Accra
8. Interview with legal practitioner and consultant to the Ministry of Gender, Children, 
and Social Protection, 25 April 2014, Accra
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Although the Constitution of India guarantees equal rights for women, there is 
much to be done for women to achieve parity of status with men. Taking their 
cue from article 15 (3) of the Constitution,1 successive Indian governments have 
promulgated a number of laws and policies to promote gender equity. The enact-
ment of many such laws, particularly on issues of violence against women, has 
required longstanding campaigns by India’s highly influential and active women’s 
movement. The role of the Indian women’s movement in this regard has been 
remarkable, given the limited presence of women in the mainstream political 
arena. Women do not vote as a bloc and, as a political group, are considered 
less important than religious, caste, and regional groupings. This leads to the 
question: what led the state to address gender equality concerns through legisla-
tion and policy? And what role did women and their allies play in making these 
changes happen?
Answers to these questions require an understanding of how power relations 
between different actors and groups in formal and informal spaces have been 
organized and how these relations underpin the way institutions function. In this 
chapter, I investigate the issue of how India’s political settlement has shaped the 
inclusion of women in politics and policy-making to promote gender equality. 
This is done through an exploration of the process that led to the enactment of 
the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (PWDVA) in 2005. I used 
a three-pronged approach for this study, starting with a mapping of how India’s 
political settlement has evolved over time and of the nature of women’s political 
inclusion in relation to this. Second, I used the process-tracing method to explore 
the drivers behind the PWDVA, with a particular focus on the key actors, ideas, 
and institutions involved in the process. I conducted 24 key informant interviews 
with members of women’s groups and a range of stakeholders involved in the 
adoption and implementation of the law, including protection officers, lawyers, 
and service providers (see Appendix 6 for list). Secondary document analysis—
particularly a review of parliamentary debates, available data on violence against 
women, and reports of NGOs on the implementation of the PWDVA—helped 
create a fuller picture of the process. Third, I analysed secondary and primary 
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data from three states—Maharashtra, Karnataka, and National Capital Territory 
(NCT) of Delhi—to help further investigate the implementation process. The 
three states were chosen because in NCT Delhi and Maharashtra, the women’s 
movement was the most organized in campaigning for the law, while Karnataka 
was the only state to introduce a domestic violence law, even before a law was 
enacted by parliament.
It should be noted that I worked for the Lawyers Collective and was present in 
parliament when the law was being debated.2 Therefore, to mitigate personal bias, 
and as part of the rigorous research effort identified above, I took additional steps 
to interview those who were critical of the process of campaigning and imple-
mentation, taking care to ensure that their points were included in my analysis. 
This account has also been subject to peer review.
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section sets out the con-
text by providing a brief introduction to the Indian political context and the 
actors and institutions involved in forging India’s broader political settlement. 
It also discusses the nature of women’s political inclusion in formal represent-
ative bodies, particularly the parliament, and provides a short account of the 
history of the women’s movement in India. In the second section, I trace the 
different phases of the movement around the PWDVA, focusing on key actors, 
the negotiations between these actors, the discourses used to influence the 
outcome, and milestones achieved in the campaign for the PWDVA. The final 
section traces the politics of implementation, identifying the reasons behind 
the level of progress achieved, before discussing the links between India’s polit-
ical settlement and the path of adoption and implementation of the PWDVA 
more generally.
Women’s inclusion and influence in politics and policy-making 
in India
Critical junctures and history of women’s engagement in politics 
before independence
India has a vibrant women’s movement, and women have played an active role 
in various political struggles throughout its history. The women’s movement in 
India gained momentum in the 1920s by building on the gains made by the social 
reform movement of the 19th century. This laid the foundation for at least some 
progress towards gender equality, through reforms in education and abolition 
of practices such as sati (widow immolation), child marriage, and infanticide, 
although these reforms were largely carried out by men, with women in the role of 
passive recipients (Burte 2013). In pre-independence days, women’s organizations 
were linked to political parties. While the national movement allowed for wom-
en’s participation, issues relating to women’s emancipation were relegated to the 
cultural and spiritual realm, particularly in negotiations with the colonial state. 
Women participated in large numbers in India’s freedom struggle, thus helping to 
legitimize their claims for equality after independence.
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India’s post-independence political settlement and women’s 
inclusion in politics
India gained its independence in 1947, after a long struggle against the British. 
Since then it has functioned as a federal parliamentary democracy with a bicam-
eral parliament.3 Power-sharing among several institutions, including the bureau-
cracy, courts, and parliament, provides checks and balances and prevents a 
monopolization of power, while simultaneously posing challenges to defining the 
boundaries of power between different institutions (Jayal and Mehta 2010).
According to the typology outlined in Chapter 2 and by Levy (2014), India 
represents a competitive-institutionalized form of political settlement. Politics 
in the first 20 years after Indian independence was dominated by the Congress 
system, with the Congress party running governments at both federal and state 
level (Jayal and Mehta 2010). Congress hegemony continued until the mid-1980s, 
after which India’s politics has been rigorously competitive, with regional parties 
gaining prominence at the national level. Since the 1980s, India has witnessed 
violent agitation for secession in Kashmir, Assam, and Punjab, which led to a 
deterioration of the communal situation all over the country. Fuelled by the vio-
lent history of Partition in 1947, the deterioration of inter-communal relations 
opened up space for the spectacular rise of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) as a major national party.
State-level politics (except for a few states) is highly competitive. Mehta and 
Walton (2014) point out that no single social or political group has been able to 
dominate the polity over the past three decades. A crucial dimension of parlia-
mentary politics in India in the 1990s was the replacement of single-party rule 
by coalition governments. Coalitions, led by the major political parties—the BJP 
and the Congress—have alternated in forming governments through coalitions 
since 1991. From 1990 onwards, the regional parties came to play a crucial role in 
forming coalition governments, which changed the power relations between the 
centre and states.
The second dimension of India’s political settlement is the extent to which 
institutions function based on informal personalized relations, as opposed to for-
mal rules. Mehta and Walton (2014) argue that India’s political settlement can 
also be categorized as a hybrid type in terms of the level of institutionalization. 
Although the politics of patronage and corruption remains prevalent, India’s 
longer and more intense period of state-building under colonial rule means that it 
has established higher and more impersonalized levels of institutional complexity 
than competitive clientelist countries, such as Ghana or Bangladesh. Institutions 
such as the electoral commission, the judiciary (particularly the Supreme Court), 
and the auditor general’s office, largely function in accordance with formal rules. 
The Supreme Court has been able to maintain its independence from excessive 
political intervention by ensuring that appointment of judges, particularly in the 
upper judiciary, remains firmly within its remit.4 However, the Indian bureaucracy 
does not function strictly in the ‘Weberian’ sense, and ‘[o]ften embod[ies] both 
legalistic processes and varieties of informal mechanisms, from informal payments 
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for preferred positions, to petty bribes that are a pervasive feature of everyday rela-
tions with citizens’ (Mehta and Walton 2014, p. 10). This informality also perme-
ates the way in which state security agencies, particularly the police, operate.
In terms of actors, it is important to explore the role played by civil society 
and social movement actors in India’s political settlement, particularly their rela-
tionship with the state.5 The relationship between the civil society and the Indian 
state has evolved over the years, from collaboration with the state to confronting 
the state over its excesses and building grassroots movements. Advocacy con-
ducted by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), particularly their critique of 
state actions in violation of human rights, has led to an onslaught against civil 
society by the state since 2010 (under the second term of the United Progressive 
Alliance; Sakhrani and Panchal 2015).
The possibilities for women’s inclusion in politics, and for how women’s groups 
can mobilize in support of gender equity, are strongly informed by this political 
context. The absence of a dominant ruling coalition at the centre, and the rise 
of identity-based regional parties, has influenced women’s inclusion in politics at 
the national level, how agendas around women’s rights are framed by the govern-
ment, and how women’s movement actors engage with political elites in specific 
ways. Coalition politics has meant that elite support for policies aimed at promot-
ing gender equity has waxed and waned, depending on whether such issues were 
deemed central by different coalition partners. Moreover, the rise of Hindutava 
and nationalist parties gaining power in the 1990s has influenced the nature and 
space for women’s rights groups engaging with political elites, and the kinds of 
discourses that have emerged around women’s rights.
Identity issues—such as caste, religion, and class—remain central to winning 
elections and political survival for the political parties, and this mediates the extent 
to which gender equity concerns are taken up by political elites. Indeed, the influ-
ence of identity politics on how the Indian state approaches questions of gender 
equity has been apparent since before independence. During the colonial era, iden-
tity was constructed along religious lines by applying separate religious family laws 
for different communities—Hindu, Muslim, Christian, and Parsi—in the realm 
of the personal (relating to aspects of marriage, guardianship, inheritance, etc.). 
Following independence, and while there have been some attempts to reform reli-
gious personal laws, there is also a tendency to avoid such legislation, ‘thus avoiding 
a direct confrontation with communities and communal politics’ (Menon 2014). 
The PWDVA is an example of such a law because it mandates civil reliefs to pro-
tect women from domestic violence and recognizes women’s right to reside in the 
shared household. However, to avoid confrontations with the personal law regime, 
the PWDVA does not displace existing religious family laws, which have remained 
intact. This reflects the ways in which the compromises made in the realm of the 
personal compromise the transformative potential of the law.
While women’s presence in civil society is well entrenched in India, women’s 
representation in formal politics, particularly the parliament and state legisla-
tures, has been historically and consistently low. The current parliament has 
61 women MPs out of 543 (a proportion of 11 percent), and the national average 
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of women members of (state) legislative assemblies (MLAs) stands even lower, 
at 9 percent. Though women head some of the major political parties, studies 
have shown that women face deep-seated gender bias when it comes to contesting 
elections and are discriminated against within the rank-and-file of major political 
parties. Women voters carry little weight compared with groups based on caste 
or religious identities, and parties have made little effort to increase their share 
of women’s votes.
In India, reservations in political institutions for various groups, including 
women, have been shaped by the ideas of building an inclusive nation and by iden-
tity politics along religious, caste, and ethnic lines (Mazumdar 1999, Menon 2000). 
After the 73rd and 74th Amendments that introduced reservation for women in 
local government, women’s organizations made a joint demand for a women’s res-
ervation in parliament. This led to the formulation of the 81st Constitutional 
Amendment Bill (Women’s Reservation Bill, or WRB), which proposes a reser-
vation of 33 percent of seats in parliament and state legislatures for women and, 
additionally, the reservation of one-third of the total number of seats for Scheduled 
Castes and Tribes for women in these groups. Although the Rajya Sabha passed 
the WRB in 2010, the Lok Sabha has still not passed it. The consistent lack of 
consensus over the WRB indicates that women are considered a less significant 
political category in comparison with religious, caste, class, and tribe groupings. 
In turn, the power of these groups has made it more difficult to promote gender 
equity in India.
The politics of negotiating gender equity: the case 
of the PWDVA
The story of the law
The campaign for the enactment of the PWDVA, a civil law on domestic violence, 
began in the early 1990s and would span a decade. The need for a comprehen-
sive law on domestic violence was identified from the practice of using criminal 
laws to address cruelty within marriages. The campaign for the PWDVA was 
foregrounded in the women’s movement’s engagement with issues of violence 
against women, which began in the 1970s around incidents of dowry deaths. The 
women’s movement campaigned for amendments to the existing 1961 law, which 
outlawed the practice of dowry and demanded that cruelty within marriage and 
dowry death be recognized as separate offences (Sakhrani and Panchal 2015). 
The reformed law and the issue of cruelty within marriage would later feature in 
discussions around the PWDVA. As a result of the campaigns led by the wom-
en’s movement, sections 498A6 and 304B7 were introduced in the Indian Penal 
Code to criminalize cruelty within marriages and dowry deaths, respectively, 
as well as amendments in the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.8 Further, women’s 
police stations and family courts also started functioning in the late 1980s to 
enable more gender-sensitive handling of cases of marital violence (Sakhrani 
and Panchal 2015).
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The campaign for the enactment can be divided into three phases, the first 
starting in the 1990s to the early 2000, which involved the initial phase of draft-
ing and consultations. The second phase involved the start of the legislative 
process, with the introduction of the bill in parliament by the BJP-led National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA) in 2001. In the third phase, the legislative process 
was continued under the United Progressive Alliance (I), which was voted into 
power in 2004, and the enactment of the bill in 2005. The different phases of 
the campaign reveal the importance of the following factors in adoption of the 
law: (1) the informal relationship that women’s movement actors have with the 
members of government commissions and ministry officials, and in later stages 
with women members of parliament (MPs); (2) changes in political settlement 
dynamics, particularly elections in 2004 that led to a change in government and 
brought Left parties into the coalition government; (3) the significant role played 
by ideas in shaping how political elites promoted or resisted changes in the var-
ious provisions of the law; and (4) the importance of international events and 
discourse in creating opportunities for pushing the agenda on domestic violence.
Coalition-building and informal negotiations
Phase 1—1990–2000
The initiative for drafting a law on domestic violence came from the National 
Commission of Women (NCW). In 1993, the NCW asked the Lawyers Collective9 
to prepare the first draft of a civil law on domestic violence. Mohini Giri, a noted 
social worker and founder of the Guild of Services for women, was a member of 
the NCW and knew Indira Jaising of the Lawyers Collective.10 Jayanti Patnaik, 
the chairperson of the NCW, Mohini Giri, and Indira Jaising were known to each 
other due to their close association with the women’s movement. The Lawyers 
Collective submitted a first draft of the bill to the NCW in 1994.11 After sub-
mission of the draft there was a lull, but a more focused campaign for the law 
began in 1998. The Lawyer’s Collective and other women’s organizations used 
a two-pronged strategy: (1) to build consensus within the legal community and 
the women’s movement on the content of the law; and (2) to strengthen the 
legitimacy of the draft bill by incorporating feedback and lessons from women’s 
organizations working at the grassroots level.
To build a consensus on the content among the legal community, the Lawyer’s 
Collective organized a colloquium, ‘Empowerment through Law’, in 1998, which 
brought together lawyers, academics, women’s rights activists, and appellate 
judges from across the country. Arun Jaitley, the then law minister with the NDA 
government, also attended the colloquium. The colloquium helped to introduce 
the concept of ‘domestic violence’ as ‘legal tender’ in India.12 Some of the judges 
attending the meeting had to be introduced to the concept of ‘domestic violence’, 
which was broader in scope than ‘cruelty within marriages’, as per section 498A 
with which the legal community was more familiar. The Lawyers Collective bill 
was revised, based on the discussions at the colloquium (Jaising 2009). To build 
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consensus among women’s movement actors on the content, several revisions, 
based on wide consultations with a range of women’s organizations, took place 
between 1998 and 2001. The National Alliance of Women’s Organizations, a 
network of grassroots women’s organizations, played a key role in organizing 
these consultations. The consultation informed the drafting of the law with les-
sons from practice. The draft bill was also widely circulated among lawyers for 
feedback, with a view to ensuring a workable and effective passage of the bill. 
Consequently, the bill was resubmitted to the National Commission for Women, 
as well as to the Department of Women and Child Development (DWCD) under 
the Ministry of Human Resource Development (HRD) and other government 
agencies, for adoption.
International events also created opportunities for pushing this agenda. 
One of the concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) to India’s report on 24 January 2000 
was that the government should ‘strengthen law enforcement and introduce 
reforms proposed by the NCW and women activists with regard to the law on rape, 
sexual assault, and domestic violence’ (CEDAW 2000). The Indian women’s move-
ment contributed significantly in highlighting this agenda through the CEDAW 
shadow reporting process. The CEDAW review, coupled with commitments made 
at the 1995 Beijing Platform of Action, gave the Indian government a significant 
push to enact a law on domestic violence, as the government needed to be seen to 
be doing something for Indian women on the international stage.13 Consequently, 
the minister of HRD, Murli Manohar Joshi, tabled the bill in the Lok Sabha in 
February 2002. Unfortunately, the government chose to table its version of the bill 
(GOI bill 2002), instead of accepting the Lawyers Collective draft.
This phase of the process therefore centred on efforts to establish a consensus 
among women’s movement actors and other key stakeholders, such as legal pro-
fessionals and statutory commissions, on the PWDVA. It reveals the importance 
of personal relations, particularly those between the women in state agencies and 
women’s movement actors, and shows how the need for international legitimacy 
influences political elite behaviour on the PWDVA.
Phase 2—the legislative process under the National Democratic Alliance
The NDA, which came to power in 1998, was led by the Hindu nationalist party, 
BJP, which extolled the role of the family and motherhood and has maintained 
a minimalist position on the rights of women within marriage. The narrow pro-
visions made in GOI (Government of India) Bill 2002 demonstrate how ideas 
held by political and policy elites shape the space for promotion of gender equity 
within legal reforms. While the introduction of the government version of the 
bill marked a willingness on the part of the government to legislate on the issue 
of domestic violence, the government had not taken on board the expansive pro-
visions that were incorporated in the Lawyers Collective draft.
The GOI bill 2002 was geared more towards the preservation of the family, 
rather than preventing domestic violence. The definition of domestic violence was 
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based on definitions contained in the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 
1939, which are narrow and vague. Thus domestic violence was defined to include 
only habitual assaults (thereby excluding one-time acts of violence) and acts that 
‘made the life of an aggrieved person miserable by cruelty’. It contained no declara-
tion of rights or prescription of clear remedies or mechanisms to facilitate women’s 
access to justice. The most insidious provision of the bill was section 4(2), which 
seemed to suggest that a plea of ‘self-defence’ was available to the man when faced 
with a complaint of domestic violence because it recognized the right of men to 
use violence in order to defend themselves and their property. This allowed a man 
to argue that the violence between himself and his wife was not intentional, but 
that the injury had occurred during self-defence (Lawyers Collective 2004).
A month after this bill was tabled, a press conference was organized by the 
members of the women’s movement to condemn it. Subsequently, women’s groups 
in New Delhi and other cities organized a number of meetings to discuss GOI bill 
2002 (Saheli 2002). The campaign for the enactment of a civil law on domestic 
violence thus transformed into a campaign resisting the passage of the GOI bill. 
At this point, the Minister of State for Women and Child Development, Sumitra 
Mahajan, intervened and, at a meeting with women’s movement representatives, 
provided an assurance that the government bill would be referred to a parliamen-
tary standing committee for review (Saheli 2002). A parliamentary standing com-
mittee under the HRD department was thus constituted, with representation from 
all elected political parties and chaired by Arjun Singh of Congress (I), which 
was the main opposition party. The parliamentary standing committee invited 
submissions on GOI bill 2002 from the public during the period May–December 
2002. In response, it received 27 memoranda from individuals, institutions, and 
women’s organizations from across the country. The committee agreed with most 
of the recommendations made by the women’s groups, including expanding the 
coverage of the law to include non-marital relationships, as well as the deletion of 
provisions relating to self-defence and mandatory counselling.
The report of the committee was tabled in the Rajya Sabha on 12 December 
2002, but the campaign was not able to achieve anything substantial in the two 
years following the recommendations of the standing committee. A key reason 
behind this is that the NDA regime was reaching the end of its tenure and there-
fore prioritized other government work that would ensure electoral success, and 
the PWDVA was not perceived to be one to ensure electoral votes. The dissolu-
tion of parliament in February 2004 resulted in the lapse of the bill.
Phase 3—legislative process under United Progressive Alliance I
In 2004, political settlement dynamics in India shifted through elections, as the 
United Progressive Alliance (UPA) (I), led by Congress, came to power. The 
analysis here shows how this shift and the role of coalition politics created oppor-
tunities for adopting the PWDVA. It also reveals the importance of ideas on 
gender equity held by key elite actors and the significance of informal networks 
that women’s movement actors have within state agencies and with women MPs.
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The coalition government, formed with external support from Left parties, 
adopted the National Common Minimum Programme, which listed the enact-
ment of a law on domestic violence, as a matter of high priority. Women’s groups 
were invited to provide inputs into the formulation of the Common Minimum 
Programme.14 Further, the move to prioritize the enactment of a civil law on 
domestic violence received strong support from Left parties, as well as from key 
political elites actors, including the Congress (I) party leader, Sonia Gandhi, and 
the law minster, H.D. Bharadwaj.15 Women MPs from the Communist Party of 
India (Marxist) also played a key role in promoting the agenda.
In July 2004, the Lawyers Collective held a meeting with representatives of 
key women’s organizations16 from across the country. A delegation was formed to 
hand over a revised draft of the Lawyers Collective bill to Arjun Singh, who was 
appointed as the minister of HRD. Other women’s groups also voiced demands 
for the law. To illustrate, Action India, a grassroots women’s organization based 
in Delhi, collected thousands of signatures from across the country demanding 
an early passage of the law. The Left-affiliated All Indian Democratic Women’s 
Association created a delegation with women MPs from the Left parties—including 
Vrinda Karat, Sarla Maheshwari, Chandrakala Pande, and other representatives 
from the women’s movement—in Delhi to meet the minister and urge him to intro-
duce the bill in the winter session of parliament.
Consequently, the minister forwarded the draft bill to the DWCD for further 
action; it moved back and forth between the DWCD and the Department of Law 
in the following months. As a result, certain things got left out from the final 
bill that was presented for cabinet approval (Jaising 2009). During this time, the 
National Advisory Council (NAC) and the National Commission for Women 
(NCW) also submitted positive recommendations on the content of the law. The 
agreement of these bodies on the content of the bill was due to the presence of 
allies of the women’s movement17 in these bodies and their informal interactions 
with the Lawyers Collective and other women’s organizations.
In May 2005, the bill was presented for cabinet approval. The bill was then 
tabled in parliament and, following discussions, was finally passed in the Lok 
Sabha on 22 August 2005. In spite of contestations by male MPs (see next sec-
tion), the law was passed unanimously by the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha on 
29 August 2005 and received presidential assent on 13 September 2005. The Act 
was brought into force on 26 October 2006.
The role of discourses and ideas in shaping the PWDVA campaign
The influence of international discourses on the Indian women’s movement in 
shaping the draft of the PWDVA is clear. The draft bill prepared by the Lawyers 
Collective relied on the UN Model Code framework on domestic violence. The 
Lawyers Collective also conducted extensive research on laws on domestic vio-
lence in other countries, including Malaysia, USA, UK, Canada, Australia, and 
South Africa. The availability of international funding supported the research 
and consultative processes adopted in the drafting of the law.
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While the principles of the law were derived from these sources, the effort was 
to ensure that these principles were contextualized within the Indian legal frame-
work to ensure relevance. The law was envisaged to apply in addition to existing 
laws to ensure applicability to all women, irrespective of religion, which meant 
that provisions needed to be framed in way that avoided direct confrontations 
with the state on issues relating to personal laws. Significantly, the law recognized 
the right of all women, irrespective of religion, to reside in the shared household 
and prevent illegal dispossessions. This is a civil law in form, but criminal proce-
dure was applied for obtaining reliefs and remedies to ensure efficiency.
The key achievement was to expand the definition of domestic violence beyond 
physical violence to include verbal, emotional, sexual, and economic forms of 
violence. This definition was in marked contrast to the one proposed in GOI 
bill 2002. The definition encompassed unnamed forms of everyday violence that 
women faced within the home and helped to counter moves to trivialize the dis-
course and downplay the severity and seriousness of domestic violence during the 
campaign (Jaising 2009).18 Interestingly, there was no opposition during the con-
sultation or the parliamentary debates to the broad definition of ‘sexual abuse’19 
adopted in the PWDVA that could be used to seek relief in cases of marital rape, 
which continues to be exempted from the ambit of rape laws under the Indian 
Penal Code. The law covers all forms of domestic relationship: those based on 
consanguinity, marriage, adoption, and even relationships in the nature of mar-
riage. This marked a departure from the earlier laws used to address domestic 
violence, which limited protection to women in marital relationships alone.
The law was conceived of as a form of ‘emergency’ legislation to provide imme-
diate relief to women survivors, to stop violence, and to equalize relationships 
within the home. It contained the following provisions for relief: protection orders 
(or ‘stop violence’ orders), residence orders (orders to prevent dispossession or 
allow for restoration in cases where the woman has already been dispossessed but 
does not provide ownership rights), orders for monetary relief (to meet expendi-
ture incurred as a result of violence, as well as maintenance), compensation orders 
(providing damages for the mental agony suffered), and temporary custody orders 
(to guard against any form of harassment over the custody of children). These 
orders could be granted at an interim stage and on an ex parte basis at the dis-
cretion of the magistrate. The court orders under the law were thus visualized as 
being temporary in nature and aimed at creating a violence-free space for women 
to consider their longer-term options, including divorce, maintenance, reconcil-
iation, or criminal proceedings (Jaising 2009), as provided for under other laws 
governing the family.
Over the course of consultation and during parliamentary debates, contesta-
tions took place over the following issues: the scope of the law, whether the law 
should provide only for women, and the role of protection officers. Interestingly, 
in the parliamentary debates, no one contested the need for the law, either under 
the NDA or the UPA governments. Speakers from both parties supported the 
bill. Indira Jaising, who headed Lawyer’s Collective, made the following observa-
tion about support for the bill: ‘One did not know if it was a reflection of a gradual 
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social recognition of domestic violence as an issue of immediate concern or was 
it plain apathy towards a law which was being enacted to simply fulfil an election 
promise?’ (Jaising 2009).
During consultations within the women’s movement, a much-debated issue was 
whether the law should be gender neutral and extend its protective ambit to men 
facing violence within the home. The wide consensus from the groups was that 
the law should be gender specific and regarded as a substantive equality meas-
ure to counter historical disadvantages faced by women. Moreover, there was an 
apprehension among the women’s groups that extending protection to men might 
result in men using the law as a tool to harass women. While the issue of gender 
neutrality was hotly debated within the women’s movement, interestingly, this 
was not picked up in parliament as an issue.
The inclusion of the term relationships in the nature of marriage was needed 
to cover women in relationships that did not meet the requirements of a legally 
valid marriage. This term, as mentioned earlier, was contested by the some MPs as 
they urged the government not to compromise the rights of legally wedded wives. 
However, counter-arguments were presented by pointing out that since India has 
no mandatory law on registration of marriage, many women would be excluded 
from the protection of the law.20 The main opposition from male MPs was around 
the fact that the law would disrupt cordial familial relationships. They felt that 
it was developed with Western values in mind. A number of MPs raised con-
cerns about the potential misuse of the law and indicated that this law created 
an avenue for women to pursue frivolous litigation due to the broad definition of 
domestic violence. These were opposed by some women MPs, using statistics on 
domestic violence to illustrate the need for the law. The response of the minister 
of state HRD, Kanti Singh, to the issues raised by male MPs is particularly reveal-
ing of the contradictory views on using law to address domestic violence:
Despite unanimity on this bill, one question is arising in the minds of many 
people. Many of them are apprehensive that the bill may…create a chasm 
in the relationship and obstruct the smooth function (sic) of the family…
However, I would like to submit that any woman who has patience, courage, 
and strength, would never prefer to approach courts for scuffle with her hus-
band and other trivial discords in the family. This is the reason that there is 
so much increase in domestic violence.21
Tracking the politics of implementation
The PWDVA completes a decade of implementation in October 2016. How has 
India fared in implementing the law? While the PWDVA is a central legislation, 
the Act places the onus of implementation on state governments. Although the 
rules framed under the PWDVA provide some guidance on how the law is 
to be enforced, there is no central policy on the implementation of the law nor 
have any special mechanisms been put in place for the regular monitoring of 
implementation at the central level. The extent to which the various aspects 
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of the implementation mechanism are in place depends on the requirements 
identified and implemented by each state government. This has led to variation 
in implementation practices adopted at the state level and in the performance of 
each state. The following discussion provides a brief snapshot of the key aspects 
related to implementation, including setting up an operational architecture, allo-
cating budget and resources, and establishing coordination mechanisms.
Setting up the operational architecture requires the appointment, training, 
and support of protection officers; registration of service providers (NGOs, wom-
en’s organizations) to support the victims during the litigation process; and the 
establishment of shelters, medical facilities, and counselling services, as well as 
an effective coordinating body to manage multi-agency responses. By 2015, pro-
tection officers had been appointed in all states. However, in most cases, existing 
government officers22 were vested with additional responsibilities as protection 
officers, which meant that this increased their workload. Data collected by the 
Lawyers Collective reveals that while protection officers could make use of exist-
ing facilities, no new infrastructure was provided to them in most states. Further, 
provision of training on the new legislation has been uneven across states, with 
most protection officers gaining clarity on their roles through hands-on experi-
ence. Registration of service providers has been slow to take off. By 2015, only 
23 of 35 states and union territories have registered service providers, and the 
number of service providers in each state varies widely; no additional funds have 
been provided to service providers.
As a civil code, the PWDVA prescribes a limited role for the police. However, 
given the low levels of public awareness of the PWDVA, the police continue to 
be women’s first port of call. Studies have found that patriarchal mindsets persist 
among police, wherein they believe that domestic violence is a family problem that 
can be resolved through counselling and reconciliation (Sakhrani and Panchal 
2015). Although there are some referrals to protection officers from the police, in 
many cases, police either conduct counselling themselves or refer claimants to 
counselling cells.23 Except in Andhra Pradesh, there were no initiatives taken by 
the police or by the Legal Services Authority to outline roles and responsibilities 
of these agencies vis-à-vis PWDVA implementation. Moreover, the failure to allo-
cate adequate funds has been cited as a major impediment to the implementation 
of the PWDVA. Only just over a third of all states with the relevant information 
had separate budgets allocated for the implementation of the law.24
The Lawyers Collective (2012) noted a substantial increase in the number of 
orders collected from courts on domestic violence, from nearly 8,000 in the first 
year that the PWDVA was enacted to approximately 20,000 in 2012. However, 
according to lawyers interviewed in the study, court delays frequently under-
mined the rapid achievement of justice envisaged within the emergency character 
of the PWDVA. Overall, although the experience of using the law has not been 
satisfactory for women, the rising number of cases filed indicates the clear need for 
the law itself. However, lack of time-bound proceedings, high expenses associated 
with litigation processes, and the unpredictability of litigation outcomes has led 
many women to continue to use informal systems of redress, such as mediation 
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centres based in courts, NGOs, women’s organizations, local governance bodies, 
and government-run family counselling centres (Sankrani and Panchal 2015).
The preceding discussion provides a snapshot of the measures taken to imple-
ment the PWDVA in terms of the implementation mechanisms established, the 
gaps in implementation, and how the law operates on the ground. The mecha-
nisms established to give effect to the law are far from adequate. Key stakeholders 
are not sufficiently incentivized and supported to deliver protection for women 
in an effective way. Furthermore, patriarchal attitudes among key implementing 
authorities, particularly the police and courts, impede effective functioning. The 
inadequacy of resources within the criminal justice system is also a major imped-
iment. These issues have persisted across changes in political dispensation within 
national government.
The limited commitment and capacity deployed to enforce the formal rules 
and regulations enshrined in India’s PWDVA is mediated by the informal and 
less visible norms, rules, and practices on the ground. Geogina Waylen’s (2014) 
analysis of institutional change points out that informal institutions play an 
important role in both subverting and facilitating institutional change. Based 
on this reading, the cases of the PWDVA would be classified as using a ‘layering’ 
strategy for institutional change, because the PWDVA led to the introduction 
of new rules and procedures alongside existing formal rules and procedures to 
address violence against women. Waylen points out that rule-makers are often not 
the rule-takers, which creates a gap between policy adoption and implementation. 
She also argues that actors who are implementing the rules may not be in favour 
of the institutional change process and may block progress. Actors who played 
a key role in rule-making, such as women’s organizations, do not play a central 
role in implementation of the law. The representatives of women’s organizations 
interviewed for this study all agree that there has been a de-politicization of the 
issue since the enactment of PWDVA. Although women’s organizations continue 
to work on the issue,25 the heightened engagements with the state, particularly 
with the central government, witnessed during the campaign have been vastly 
reduced. The bureaucracy mostly drives policy-making. There also appears to be 
a reluctance to deal with the current dispensation on the part of some organiza-
tions that are ideologically opposed to the government. Furthermore, changes 
in the relationship between civil society actors and the state in the past decade 
have limited the opportunities for women’s organizations and civil society actors 
in terms of interactions with government functionaries and policymakers. How 
rule-takers interpret the law, particularly the judgements provided by the appel-
late judiciary, have also narrowed the expansive scope of the law in practice, par-
ticularly key issues linked to patriarchal gender norms. These include judgements 
on the right to residence, maintenance, and relationships covered by the law.
Politically, the implementation of PWDVA is not a key area of concern for MPs 
because it offers few opportunities for increased legitimacy, more votes, or distrib-
uting patronage. Issues of PWDVA implementation have been raised only spo-
radically in parliament: between 2006 and 2016, approximately 75 questions have 
been raised on the implementation of the PWDVA. These included questions 
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on aspects of budgetary allocation, the number of cases registered and trends, 
achievement of objectives, need for review and amendments, and steps taken for 
the timely disposal of cases. The most significant questions were raised in relation 
to protection officers and budgetary allocations. It is interesting to note that MPs 
representing states with high reportage of domestic violence were not necessarily 
the ones raising questions in parliament (Sen 2014). There has been little fol-
low-up in terms of improving infrastructure and service delivery under the law. 
In fact, budgetary allocations in the area of women and child development have 
been going down. This indicates that the promotion of gender equity is not a 
priority issue for the state.26
Conclusion
What do the findings from the India case reveal about the politics of negotiating 
gender equity in India? What does a political settlement analysis add to our 
understanding? The findings and analysis presented here show that it is essential 
to move beyond a focus on gender quotas or the effectiveness of state gender 
machinery to understand the progress made in negotiating and implementing 
gender equity agendas. The India case demonstrates why it is important to exam-
ine links between different political settlements (and compromises made therein) 
to understand the deeper forms of politics and power relations that shape progress 
on gender equity. The findings reveal the relative ease with which the Indian 
government brought in legislation with limited to no commitments to ensuring 
effective legal implementation, and how the expansive provisions of the law were 
interpreted in relation to the compromises made with the personal law regime.
In terms of the politics of adoption, the case reveals that the following factors 
play a key role shaping the nature of the gains made around gender equity in India. 
First, women, as a political constituency, have very little weight in mainstream 
politics as compared with other identity-based groups. The competitive nature of 
India’s polity, and the role played by coalition politics and regional political parties 
that mobilize around issues of religion, caste, and class issues mean that gender 
equity concerns are often sidelined or that compromises are made by the political 
elites on various progressive agendas involving women, should they clash with 
other identity-based interests. However, shifts in political settlement dynamics 
(including through the electoral process) can bring new coalitions into being that 
include actors in favour of gender equity, as with the role played by the Left in the 
UPA coalition in promoting the PWDVA. Second, the informal relations that 
existed between women’s movement actors and members of the NCW—and, later, 
the links that women MPs had with the women’s movement—played a key role in 
placing the adoption of the law on the political agenda and then placing demands 
and influencing debates within parliament. The analysis shows how even within 
competitive-institutionalized contexts, women’s groups may have little to offer to 
political elites in terms of the incentives they face to remain in power.
Third, our analysis moves beyond the traditional political settlement analy-
sis that focuses on the interests of the key actors in promotion of a particular 
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agenda, to demonstrate the key role played by ideas in shaping elite behaviour. 
Contestations over the various legislative provisions that were proposed and 
changed during NDA and UPA regimes and the framing of the law by the wom-
en’s movement actors reveal the important role of discourse and ideas.
Fourth, our analysis highlights the important role played by international events 
and discourses. The state was persuaded to take up the agenda on domestic violence 
to increase its international legitimacy, after India’s performance was reviewed by 
CEDAW at the Commission on the Status of Women. The women’s movement 
had been influenced by the UN model framework, and also by research on various 
laws in other countries—research that was aided by international funding.
Fifth, our analysis of implementation of the law reveals capacity and resource 
gaps that impede implementation. It also reveals how informal norms, practices, 
and rules can subvert the spirit of the law (i.e. interpretation by the state agencies 
and the courts). Because the PWDVA does not generate any scope for patronage 
distribution, nor is key to electoral success, elected officials make very little effort 
to hold the state to account for delivering on this law.
In fact, Indira Jaising has this observation to make: ‘courts are basically imple-
menting personal laws with marked determination under the PWDVA, forget-
ting that this is a secular law applicable to all communities regardless of religion’ 
(Jaising 2014).
Given all this, what is the future of the PWDVA? Will there be a backlash, or 
will the law lead to transformative change? Arguments highlighting the misuse 
of the law have already surfaced from courts and others in cases where a woman 
claiming the right to reside is seen as a disgruntled wife demanding property 
(Jaising 2014). The resistance of male groups has been comparatively less in rela-
tion to the PWDVA, perhaps due to the careful drafting of the law and owing to 
its being civil in nature. As courts start becoming inured to granting orders on the 
right to reside, it is likely that more such claims will be made in future. Legally, the 
only counter to this is to recognize women’s equal rights within the home, however 
politically difficult this would be. While reform of discriminatory personal laws 
cannot be avoided if women are to be viewed as equal citizens, in the deeply frag-
mented politics of India today, this is likely to be a difficult goal to attain.
Notes
 1. Articles 15 (1) and (2) prohibit the state from discriminating against any citizen on 
grounds of any religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, or any of them. Sub-clause (3) 
of this article provides that nothing in this article shall prevent the state from making 
any special provision for women and children.
 2. 23 August 2005: discussion on the motion for consideration of the Protection of 
Women from Domestic Violence Bill, 2005, moved by Smt. Kanti Singh (then min-
ister of state in the Ministry of Human Resource Development).
 3. The bicameral parliament at the centre has a lower house called the Lok Sabha 
(people’s assembly) with 543 members, and an upper house called Rajya Sabha (state 
assembly) with 243 members. Fifteen percent and 7.5 percent of all seats in the 
lower house are reserved for candidates drawn from marginalized castes and tribes, 
respectively.
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 4. In October 2015, the Supreme Court struck down the National Judicial Appoint-
ments Commission (NJAC) Bill, 2014 and the Constitution (One Hundred and 
Twenty First Amendment) Bill, 2014, which enhanced the powers of the legislature 
in the appointment of judges. For details, see Jaising (2015).
 5. NGOs involve any nonprofit group that is organized on local, national, or interna-
tional levels. Social movements are defined as a group of often informally organized 
people or organizations with a common goal relating to social change.
 6. Inserted in the Indian Penal Code by Act 46 of 1983.
 7. Inserted in the Indian Penal Code by Act 43 of 1986.
 8. Amendment Acts of 1984 and 1986.
 9. An NGO providing legal services and engaging in advocacy for legal reform. See 
http://www.lawyerscollective.org.
 10. For example, Mary Roy v State of Kerala, 1986 AIR 1011, where she successfully 
secured rights of equal inheritance for Christian women covered under the 
Travancore Succession Act, RupanDeol Bajaj v KPS Gill, 1995, (6) SCC 194-India’s 
first case of sexual harassment, etc.
 11. The colloquium was held on 8 and 9 May 1999 in New Delhi (Lawyers Collective 2000).
 12. Interview with lawyer and founder, Lawyers Collective, 6 December 2015.
 13. Interview with lawyer and founder, Majlis, 7 October 2015.
 14. The author attended the meeting organized by UPA I representatives along with 
other women’s groups.
 15. This was clear from the Lawyers Collectives’ interactions with government officials.
 16. Including Ruth Manorama (National Alliance of Women’s Organizations), Sheeba 
George (National Alliance of Women’s Organizations, Gujarat), Albertina Almeida 
(BailanchoSaad, Goa), Ammu Abraham (Women’s Centre, Mumbai), Philomena 
(State Commission for Women, Karnataka), and Anuradha Kapoor (Swayam, Kolkata).
 17. As mentioned, members of the NAC were drawn from social movements and civil soci-
ety organizations. Hence there was already an organic link between these members 
and the members of the women’s movement. NAC members who played a lead role in 
advocating for the adoption of the Lawyers Collective draft included Aruna Roy of the 
right to information movement; A.K. Shiv Kumar, an economist engaged with child 
rights issues; Mirai Chatterjee of Self Employed Women’s Association, etc. On the other 
hand, the Lawyers Collective received strong support from NCW chairperson, Dr Girija 
Vyas, who was known to Indira Jaising. NCW member Dr Malini Bhattacharya of the 
CPI (M) and a longstanding member of the women’s movement required no introduc-
tion to the ongoing debates and strongly supported the Lawyers Collective bill.
 18. As Indira Jaising further explains: ‘the experience of using Section 498A in cases of 
domestic violence showed that it was extremely difficult to convince judges of the 
existence of violence in a relationship. Although the term “cruelty” in Section 498A 
encompassed both physical and mental cruelty, it was difficult to bring the subtleties 
of everyday violence in intimate relationships within the ambit of laws. Even when 
the judges were convinced of the existence of “cruelty”, they tended to play down the 
possible impact of it and asked the woman to “forgive and forget”’ Jaising (2009).
 19. Section 3 (1) (ii) of the PWDVA provides that ‘“Sexual abuse” includes any conduct 
of a sexual nature that abuses, humiliates, degrades, or otherwise violates the dig-
nity of a woman.’
 20. Debates also focused on whether the law should cover domestic workers, because 
many experience violence and sexual abuse within their place of work. However, 
this proposal was not taken up, because it was felt that the protection of domestic 
workers was a better fit under laws relating to sexual harassment at the workplace.
 21. Parliamentary debates accessed from the parliament library on the debates on the 
Domestic Violence Bill, 2005.
 22. Mostly working under the Integrated Child and Development Scheme under the 
MWCD.
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 23. E.g., Parivar Paramarsh Kendras (family counselling cells) in Madhya Pradesh. The 
author recalls training sessions conducted with the Delhi police immediately fol-
lowing the enforcement of the law, where the police personnel clearly stated that 
they were not responsible for the implementation of the PWDVA.
 24. As per the National Family and Health Survey, 2005–06, International Institute for 
Population Sciences and Macro International, Mumbai, 2007.
 25. By undertaking activities such as raising awareness on the law at the community 
level, case work, trainings, etc.
 26. Here it was noted that MWCD proposals are not often heeded by the finance min-
istry because they are not always gender sensitive and give less priority to women’s 
development.
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Academic TATA Institute of Social Sciences Mumbai
Programme analyst UN Women New Delhi
Member Vimochana Bangalore
Academic Institute of Development Studies New Delhi
Member Vimochana Bangalore
Lawyer and founder Majlis Mumbai
Activist Action India New Delhi
Lawyer and founder Lawyers Collective New Delhi
Academic Centre for Women’s Studies New Delhi
Advocate New Delhi
Lawyer and researcher Centre for Law and Policy Research Bangalore
Protection officer New Delhi
Lawyer TISS Mumbai
Researcher Centre for Enquiry into Health and Allied 
Themes and Dilaasa
Mumbai
Academic Centre for Policy Research New Delhi
Activist NAWO Bangalore
Researcher CEHAT and Dilaasa Mumbai
Lawyer StreeMuktiSanghatana Mumbai
Academic TISS Mumbai
Member Saheli New Delhi
Advocate Mumbai
Academic Centre for Legislative Research and Advocacy New Delhi
Protection officer Mumbai
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How does politics shape the 
negotiation of gender equity 
in the Global South?
A comparative analysis
Sohela Nazneen and Sam Hickey
10
Introduction
Our final chapter reflects on how politics shapes the adoption of gender equity 
policies in the Global South through a comparative lens. So far, the country chap-
ters have demonstrated that the negotiation of gender equity is a profoundly polit-
ical process that can operate along multiple pathways, depending on the type 
of political context involved. We argued in Chapter 2 that our ‘power domains’ 
framework would enable us to capture these multiple and contested routes towards 
social justice, through offering an integrated approach to analysing political and 
institutional realities in the Global South. Our framework was set up to explore 
the interplay between the underlying power configurations that shape how poli-
tics functions at the level of polity, on the one hand, and in the specific domain of 
‘women’s interests’, on the other. An overriding aim was to try and go beyond the 
limitations of the contemporary research agenda on the politics of gender equity, 
which has tended to narrow itself to the question of whether women’s political 
inclusion leads to greater influence over policy agendas aimed at promoting gen-
der equity.
Building on the analyses presented in the previous chapters, we focus on the 
following issues. First, what does a comparative analysis of the country case studies 
tell us about how different types of political settlement shape the possibilities for 
advancing gender-transformative policies in the Global South? Second, does our 
power domains framework—which combines recent theoretical advancements on 
the politics of development with those in the field of gender and politics—add 
value to current thinking on the politics of promoting gender equity in the Global 
South? Finally, what clues do our comparative insights offer for policy actors striv-
ing to promote gender equity in different types of political contexts?
We start by presenting the findings from the comparative analysis, exploring 
how efforts to promote gender equity reforms exist within, and are shaped by, the 
broader political settlement within a given country. We find that the level of wom-
en’s political inclusion does matter to some extent, but that deeper-level political 
settlements analysis is required to reveal both how this inclusion becomes estab-
lished in the first place and the kinds of effects it can have on the promotion of 
gender equity policies. Our comparative findings highlight important similarities 
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in the ways that anti-domestic violence policy processes have unfolded in our 
three competitive clientelist cases of Ghana, Bangladesh, and India, on the one 
hand, as compared with the more dominant cases of Uganda, Rwanda, and South 
Africa, on the other. In showing that reform processes have generally moved 
faster and further in more dominant settings, we join others in raising awkward 
questions regarding the assumed links between ‘democratization’ and progress on 
gender equity, and reemphasize the need to look beyond formal institutions to the 
forms of power relations and politics that underpin them. We demonstrate that the 
strategies that women’s movements chose to deploy—including coalition-building, 
informal networking, and discursive framing—were influenced by the dominant 
interests and ideas that prevailed within specific political settlements and that 
their success was shaped by the shifting nature of political settlement dynamics 
therein. These dynamics included shifts in the balance of power between contend-
ing groups, including those with veto power over progressive legislation, and also 
electoral processes, the influence of which was closely mediated by the nature of 
intra-elite competition and the strength of institutions in particular contexts. In 
strategic terms, our comparative case-study analysis shows both the opportunities 
and risks facing feminist activists in terms of whether or not to seek alignment 
with the interests and ideas of dominant actors in order to achieve progress. It 
also shows how different political settlements present different opportunities for 
building progressive alliances and coalitions, a finding that has important strate-
gic implications for gender equity proponents moving forward. We conclude the 
chapter by identifying the political and policy implications of the research for civil 
society organizations, governments, and transnational actors such as donors, and 
by posing critical questions for future research in this field. The critical commen-
tary chapters (Chapters 11 and 12) from Georgina Waylen and Anne Marie Goetz, 
respectively, go further still in this regard.
Negotiating gender equity in different types of political 
settlement: a comparative analysis
The adoption of legislation against domestic violence in so many countries within 
the Global South over the last two decades, including our case study countries, can-
not be separated from the broader transnational movement to assert women’s right to 
be protected from domestic violence as a new global norm (see Chapter 3). From the 
1993 UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women onwards, the 
effort to promote such an international norm has been critical for action to address 
violence against women because, as Htun and Weldon (2012, p. 556) explain, ‘norms 
create standards in global civil society, create shared expectations in regional com-
munities of nations, and mobilise domestic civil society’.
Our power domains framework incorporates the process through which 
transnational ideas, norms, events, and actors influence both the political 
settlement and the domain of women’s interests (see Chapter 2). In general 
terms, we found evidence from our interviews with feminist activists that the 
anti-domestic violence policy coalitions in all of our case-study countries were 
BK-TandF-9780815372356_TEXT_BRUNT-181008-Chp10.indd   192 14/02/19   1:29 PM
Politics and gender equity in Global South 193
informed by transnational ideas around women’s rights and the anti-domestic vio-
lence agenda and, to some extent, were enabled by external resources received 
from donors. All the country chapters show that domestic violence legislation 
rose to prominence in national policy arenas in close proximity to the agenda 
gaining importance in global policy and in international women’s rights dis-
course. International conventions and declarations, including the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Vienna 
Declaration, and Beijing Platform for Action (PFA), directly shaped discourses 
on domestic violence within these countries.
However, our process-tracing efforts in each country struggled to identify 
moments at which transnational actors had a direct influence on the campaigns 
waged by women’s movement actors in our case-study countries. This was in part 
because conscious efforts were made by activists to emphasize the struggle as being 
national rather than transnational in character, for fear of being labelled as pursu-
ing a ‘Western’ agenda. Activists were also wary of using a (‘Western’) discourse of 
‘rights’, for fear of provoking a backlash from elites in contexts where paradigmatic 
ideas around women’s rights were far from aligned with international conventions. 
We did find some evidence that international events either influenced the pace of 
adoption or helped establish domestic violence on the ruling coalition’s political 
agenda. In particular, ruling elites in India and Bangladesh were directly influ-
enced by the CEDAW review processes undertaken by the Committee on the 
Status of Women (CSW) on progress made in addressing domestic violence, and 
in the case of Bangladesh a direct move was made to push forward legislation 
ahead of a forthcoming CEDAW review meeting at the CSW in New York in 2011.
The case-study chapters also draw our attention to the importance of the 
international and regional women’s movement actors and South–South links. 
These emerged as important elements in framing the law and discursive strat-
egies. South–South exchanges between feminist groups played a major role in 
the diffusion of ideas. For Bangladesh, Indian and Malaysian feminists played 
a key role, with the Malaysian experience having already informed activists in 
India; the feminist debates and policy developments undertaken in South Africa 
during the late 1990s would provide important sources of inspiration for wom-
en’s movements in Uganda, Rwanda, and Ghana. Interestingly, in all case-study 
countries (except Rwanda), donors had a moderate influence when it came to the 
adoption of the law, apart from providing some funding to the policy coalitions 
for research in Bangladesh, Uganda, Ghana, and South Africa. Donors also seem 
to have made relatively little effort to ensure that the legislation is implemented 
effectively, again, with the exception of Rwanda, where donors played a key role 
in designing delivery mechanisms.
So, while international norms and actors played a key role in creating an ena-
bling environment for the adoption of legislation against domestic violence, our 
comparative analysis demonstrates that the extent to which these norms gain 
traction within particular countries, the precise timing of policy uptake in this 
area, and the extent of implementation is shaped much more strongly by national 
political factors.
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As set out in Chapter 2, our countries represent specific types of political set-
tlement, as defined in terms of the relative dominance of the ruling coalition and 
the relative degree of institution-building that has taken place in each context 
(see Figure 10.1). This typological approach defines Uganda and Rwanda as domi-
nant-personal settlements, albeit with Uganda tending towards a weaker and more 
personalized direction than Rwanda, and Bangladesh and Ghana as competitive 
clientelist. Because of the longer-term and deeper process of state-building that has 
taken place in South Africa and India, we characterize these as more advanced 
versions of each of these types, with South Africa dominant-institutionalized and 
India as competitive-institutionalized. This framing helps go beyond a focus on 
formal institutional arrangements, to reveal how different configurations of polit-
ical power shape how institutions actually function in practice.
Table 10.1 presents a brief overview of where our countries stand in relation to 
the adoption and implementation of anti-domestic violence legislation, based on 
their political settlement type.
A comparative analysis of our findings suggests that the dominant party set-
tlements (Rwanda, Uganda, and South Africa) moved more swiftly to adopt 
anti-domestic violence legislation than governments operating within compet-
itive settlements (Ghana, Bangladesh, and India). Whereas dominant coalitions 
took about two to three years to pass legislation in response to demands from 
women’s activists, this process generally took longer in more competitive settings: 
nearly four years in Bangladesh, five in Ghana, and 12 in India. The formulation 
of implementation plans to enact the legislation also shows a somewhat similar 
pattern: dominant party settlements moved faster to formulate implementation 
plans, within a year or two after the law was passed, whereas in competitive settle-
ments the plans were delayed, taking more than three years in Bangladesh, whilst 
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Figure 10.1 Political settlement type by case-study country.
Source: Authors, adapted from Levy 2014.
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In terms of actual implementation, all case-study countries suffer from 
a failure to invest sufficiently in training personnel and allocating financial 
resources. Interestingly, the best and the worst performers among the six, in 
terms of training, resources, setting up of shelters, crisis centres, and other oper-
ational architecture, are Rwanda and Uganda, respectively. Both of them have 
dominant party settlements, but since the mid-2000s, there has been a grow-
ing divergence between the trajectories of each country, with Rwanda’s ruling 
coalition becoming both more dominant and committed to institution-building 
than the increasingly vulnerable and personalized type of settlement that has 
emerged in Uganda. There are also significant ideological differences between 
the ruling elites in each of these two countries in terms of the commitment of 
dominant leaders to women’s rights, something we return to later. The fact that 
all three of our competitive settlements—Ghana, Bangladesh, and India—have 
achieved slow rates of progress at best—as has South Africa, where the ANC 
retains its dominance within a politically institutionalized system of multiparty 
competition—again raises questions as to whether multiparty democracies nec-
essarily offer promising contexts for the achievement of gender equity.
However, the influence of a country’s political settlement over the pace and 
extent of policy reforms on domestic violence cannot be understood purely in 
terms of its type. In Table 10.2, and in line with the power domains approach set 
out in Chapter 2, we identify the key dimensions of the political settlement and 
the domain of women’s interests in each country, in order to enable an analysis 
of how each of these helped shape the pace, nature, and extent of progress made. 
In terms of the political settlement, we draw attention not only to the type of set-
tlement, but also to political settlement dynamics (with regards to electoral pro-
cesses and the shifting balance of power between contending social groups over 
time) and the ideological stance of ruling coalitions on gender equity. In terms 
of the domain of women’s interests, we focus on the presence of women in the 
legislature, the strength of the policy coalition formed to promote policy reforms 
on domestic violence, and the extent and nature of the women’s movement expe-
rience of previous struggles. Table 10.2 illustrates the cross-country comparison 
based on factors that relate to both political settlement dynamics and the domain 
of women’s interests.
From the comparisons that Table 10.2 enables, we argue that the pace of adopt-
ing legislation against domestic violence in these countries, and the actors that 
mattered in the process, were influenced by the underlying configuration of power 
within specific political settlements and the ability of the policy coalition promot-
ing gender equity to navigate this complex terrain from the domain of women’s 
interests. Countries with a high proportion of female parliamentarians tended to 
move to adoption more swiftly, although whether this relationship was a causal 
one varies by case. How ruling elites were influenced to support or block the anti- 
domestic violence legislation was influenced by shifting political settlement dynam-
ics involving changes in the balance of power and institutional developments, often 
through the holding of elections and the changing levels of holding power amongst 
groups resistant to gender equity. Paradigmatic ideas on gender also played a key 
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role here; ruling elites with an ideological, and not merely instrumental, commit-
ment to gender equity moved faster and further to adopt and implement reforms, as 
the Rwanda-Uganda comparison illustrates. In most other cases, women’s movement 
actors were forced to compromise their policy demands in the face of opposition 
from dominant constructs of gender. The strategies deployed by the policy coalitions 
promoting reform, both in terms of coalition-building and framing demands, were 
strongly influenced by previous episodes of mobilization and negotiation around 
gender equity within the domain of women’s interests. In some cases, transnational 
ideas and events helped provide specific openings that shifted elite incentives in 
progressive directions. The next section explores these interactions in more depth.
Beyond inclusion to influence: how political settlements shape both 
women’s inclusion and the negotiation of gender equity
At first glance, there seems to be a positive correlation between the level of 
women’s political inclusion and the pace at which anti-domestic violence leg-
islation was passed, as the countries with significant women’s presence in the 
parliament (Rwanda, Uganda, South Africa) moved faster than countries with 
limited numbers of women in parliament (Bangladesh), particularly those with no 
gender quotas (Ghana and India). However, both our comparative findings and 
in-country process tracing suggest that the presence or absence of quotas does not 
in itself offer a compelling explanation for how politics shaped the adoption of 
anti- domestic violence legislation, but rather needs to be understood in relation 
to the nature of and interaction between the political settlement and domain of 
women’s interests in specific contexts.
First, the differing levels of women’s political inclusion in our countries are 
themselves directly shaped by the ways in which political settlements have been 
formed therein, as illustrated by the presence of quotas for women’s inclusion in 
South Africa, Rwanda, Bangladesh, and Uganda, and their absence in Ghana 
and India. Our research shows that the history of how settlements evolved and 
changed in these countries closely shaped the adoption of gender quotas, par-
ticularly in terms of whether women’s claims for inclusion were politicized dur-
ing those critical junctures when settlements were negotiated. For Rwanda and 
Uganda, women were able to make stronger claims for political inclusion, based on 
their active participation during the armed struggles and their role in the revolu-
tionary forces that contested earlier settlements and brought new ones into being. 
In South Africa, women’s key role in sustaining the anti-apartheid struggle and 
strong presence with the African National Congress meant that they were able 
to renegotiate claims for inclusion during the transition period. In India, though 
women played a key role in the independence struggle, they were not perceived 
as a ‘class’ that required special measures for political representation. Women 
themselves did not make claims for affirmative action in the political realm at 
this point, arguably missing a critical window of opportunity. The growing dom-
inance of a new politics of identity focused on caste and religion meant that in 
later years, women’s claims for reservations in the parliament raised fears about 
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how these measures would be used to advance the interests of Hindu upper-caste 
groups, leading such demands to be ignored. Reservations were introduced only 
at the local government level, where such risks were perceived to be lower. In 
Bangladesh, women’s participation in the anti-authoritarian movement legiti-
mized their claim for greater political inclusion after the transition to democracy, 
when women’s movement actors were formally consulted for the first time by the 
neutral caretaker government in 1991. Moreover, suffering endured by women 
in Bangladesh during the war with Pakistan in 1971, and also the conflict in 
Rwanda during the 1994 genocide, highlighted the key role played by women at 
major political junctures and legitimized their claims for inclusion in both cases. 
In Ghana, on the other hand, the gender quota established after independence 
was abolished during the dictatorship period. When the current settlement was 
negotiated in the early 1990s in a context of stability, women’s claims for inclu-
sion were not as strongly politicized as in the other countries, partly because 
female political agency had been largely co-opted by the wife of the then dom-
inant leader.
The question of whether the level of women’s political inclusion shaped the pro-
gress of gender equity reforms similarly needs to be firmly located within deeper 
patterns of power and politics, and also the particular nature of the domain of 
women’s interests within each country. It certainly did not help that the propor-
tion of female MPs was low in the three countries that were slowest to respond to 
demands for anti-domestic violence legislation—namely Bangladesh, Ghana, and 
India. However, in the other cases where there were sizeable numbers of female 
MPs, it is not clear from our process-tracing efforts that this was the most influ-
ential factor in shaping the passage of legislation. In Uganda, for example, female 
MPs were not the most significant actors in framing the agenda, determining the 
strategy, or maintaining the pressure on the executive and bureaucrats to ensure 
that the legislation was written and passed. The key role was played by the women’s 
movement. Moreover, once the bill was tabled, some male MPs emerged as playing 
as important a role within parliament as the female MPs (see Chapter 4). Apart 
from Rwanda, where the anti-domestic violence legislation was enacted through 
normal parliamentary processes that involved a leading role for female parliamen-
tarians, in all other settings women’s movements had to engage in significant coa-
lition-building activities and identify allies in multiple venues of political and civil 
society. Table 10.2 also reveals that ideational factors mattered here, particularly 
the strength of ideological commitment to women’s rights amongst ruling elites and 
the ways in which policy coalitions framed their claims in relation to paradigmatic 
ideas within the political settlement.
Overall, then, our in-country process tracing and comparative analysis both 
strongly identify the type of political settlement as the most compelling expla-
nation for the different speeds with which countries adopted anti-domestic 
violence legislation. The specific pathways through which this took place, how-
ever, were not only shaped by the type of political settlement, but also by the 
broader interactions between this domain of power and the domain of women’s 
interests. From a power domains perspective, the main causal mechanisms at 
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play here that link political settlement type and dynamics to processes of policy 
reform on gender equity are as follows:
First, the presence of dominant ruling coalitions with very little prospect of 
being overturned presented women’s movements with a clear target for their advo-
cacy campaigns, unlike in competitive political settlements, where women’s move-
ments often found it difficult to register their concerns and to operate in open 
political market places dominated by political parties characterized less by pro-
grammatic agendas than by more instrumental concerns. According to political 
settlements theory (Khan 2017), the security that dominance offers to ruling coa-
litions may enable them to adopt a longer-term and more developmentalist vision.
Second, the democratic deficit that is apparent in some dominant settlements, 
such as Rwanda and Uganda, may help incentivize rulers to seek popular legitimacy 
through other means, whereby the relative absence of political and civic rights is 
compensated for through the delivery of social rights. Leaders in both countries 
cast themselves as ‘developmentalists’, and this trade-off between political and soci-
oeconomic progress is typical within ‘developmental states’ (Leftwich 1995). These 
pressures do not pertain in competitive contexts, where citizens are—in theory at 
least—free to campaign effectively to secure their rights.
Third, in dominant settlements, women emerge as a more significant con-
stituency in terms of helping ruling coalitions to maintain themselves in power 
than in our competitive settings. This is both because of the different challenges 
involved in building winning coalitions in dominant rather than competitive set-
tings, and some specific aspects of our cases, whereby delivering on women’s rights 
was more important to holding together a winning coalition in dominant settle-
ments. In particular, the ruling coalitions in both Rwanda and Uganda are led by 
representatives of minority ethnic groups that have a strong sense of their vul-
nerability with regards to the social configuration of power in each country. The 
early efforts that both the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the National Resistance 
Movement undertook to include women as a key constituency within their move-
ments arguably reflected the imperative to broaden their social base, as much as 
a commitment to women’s rights. Maintaining a winning and dominant coali-
tion in such contexts thus requires paying greater attention to building alliances 
with marginal groups than in competitive settings, where the opposition lines 
are often drawn around different forms of identity (e.g. ethno-regional in Ghana, 
caste/religion-based and regional in India, dynastic in Bangladesh). A similar 
dynamic was at play in South Africa, where the corporatist nature of the ruling 
ANC movement rested on its capacity to maintain all major social constituencies 
together within the same broad coalition, including the influential women’s wing.
Fourth, once common ground had been found between the women’s movement 
and the ruling coalition—a process that was more contested in ideological terms 
in some contexts than others, as discussed later—dominant settlements (except 
for Uganda, where the ruling coalition has become increasingly weak) were also 
able to deliver legislative change and move towards implementation more rapidly 
than their counterparts in competitive political settlements because of both the 
lack of parliamentary opposition and their stronger grip on the public bureaucracy. 
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As noted in Chapter 2, the vulnerability to overthrow that ruling elites experi-
ence in competitive settings tends to reduce their time horizons and increase their 
incentives to use the public bureaucracy primarily for maintaining party loyalties, 
as opposed to protecting rights and delivering public goods.
Fifth, the institutional axis of the political settlements typology deployed here 
was also influential. Where institutions function according to personalized rather 
than impersonal logics—as in the cases of Bangladesh, Ghana, and Uganda—
informal networks and relationships were particularly critical to feminist activ-
ists. This was much less apparent in South Africa, where the relative strength of 
public institutions and the strong involvement of lawyers rendered this a largely 
formalized process, whilst in India a mixture of formal and informal institutions 
proved significant. In Rwanda, the apparent presence of a state-building project 
also enabled a largely formal process to take place through parliamentary consul-
tation. We return to some of these strategic approaches later, when we discuss the 
capacity and nature of the policy coalitions in more depth.
Finally, in terms of implementation of the domestic violence law, Rwanda, with 
its dominant party settlement and developmental vision, was the most advanced 
compared with all other countries studied. The gender ministry, which was 
tasked with the main coordinating role, was given adequate resources, and the 
key delivery agencies (police, health centres) had their performance closely mon-
itored. Countries such as India and South Africa, with higher levels of bureau-
cratic capacity, have also made strides in setting up the necessary operational 
architecture and developing a clear implementation plan. However, the perfor-
mances of different states and provinces vary, and there are significant gaps in 
capacity, enforcement, and coordination at the national level. As for countries 
where bureaucracies have been politicized to a large extent—which was the case 
in the competitive clientelist countries of Ghana and Bangladesh and also dom-
inant-personalized Uganda—implementation has occurred much more slowly. 
The weakness of the women’s ministry as a coordinating body for implementing 
the domestic violence law within each country has also limited the extent to 
which implementation was undertaken.
These findings offer a salutary reminder that the formal presence of ‘democratic’ 
political institutions is not an automatic guarantor of faster progress towards gender 
equity, a finding some feminist scholarship has already highlighted (Waylen 2014). 
Elections certainly played a part in several of the processes identified here, particu-
larly in competitive settings and also where dominant coalitions perceived them-
selves to be more vulnerable to overthrow (as in Uganda). However, this was not 
necessarily in the sense of political parties campaigning on a programmatic agenda 
or of greater political space enabling women’s voices to be heard, but rather because 
elections helped reshape certain political settlement dynamics in directions that 
women’s movements were able to capitalize on (as discussed later). In one notable 
case, it was actually the suspension of competitive party politics—in Bangladesh, 
whereby a technocratic caretaker government takes charge during election periods—
that enabled the anti-domestic violence agenda to progress. The point here is not 
to challenge the legitimacy of democracy—something that we and most feminists 
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would hold to be of value in and of itself, because of its insistence on political equal-
ity amongst all citizens—but rather to point out that competitive electoral processes 
can have very different implications in this regard, depending on the configuration 
of power that they operate within and the strength and quality of institutions—that 
is, the political settlement. As discussed in the closing section of this chapter, this 
has strategic as well as academic significance and should alert activists both to the 
dangers of complacency within nominally democratic settings and also to the room 
for manoeuvre that may exist in less democratic contexts.
We now turn to some of the more specific ways in which our two domains of 
power interacted to produce particular outcomes in our cases. We focus in par-
ticular on the organizational and ideological power of different social groups in 
political settlements, the importance of political settlement dynamics, the nature 
and strength of the women’s movements and the coalitions they built, and the 
influence of transnational ideas and actors.
Strength of the ruling coalition and the holding power 
of opposing forces
Political settlements shaped not only the pace at which anti-domestic violence 
legislation was adopted, and the extent to which this was implemented in our 
six countries, but also the routes through which this occurred. The strategies that 
the women’s movements were able to deploy to promote anti-domestic violence 
legislation, including those used to counter resistance from other groups, were 
profoundly shaped by the configuration of power and the nature of institutions 
that characterized the political settlement in each case. As discussed in the final 
section of this chapter, this has important strategic implications for aligning the 
promotion of gender equity reforms with particular political contexts.
In the dominant-personalized settlements of Rwanda and (in particular) 
Uganda, the support of the president was essential, whereas in South Africa’s 
more institutionalized version of a dominant settlement, the ruling party’s sup-
port was the more critical factor. The relative lack of political space for mobili-
zation beyond these dominant actors inevitably meant that alliances had to be 
built with and within dominant ruling coalitions. In contrast, activists operating 
within competitive clientelist settlements were confronted with a broader range 
of potential allies and also opponents, some of whom had considerable holding 
power and could act as veto players with regards to gender equity reforms. Given 
the difficulties that vulnerable ruling coalitions have in confronting powerful 
social groups, and with conservative religious groups wielding veto power due 
to their considerable organizational and ideological resources in Bangladesh, 
Ghana, and India, this closely shaped the ways in which advocates sought to gen-
erate support for the legislation and also how they framed their case. As discussed 
in the next section on ideas and discursive strategies, this involved a mixture of 
confrontation and reframing in pursuit of compromise and co-optation.
The shifting balance of power between different social groups was signif-
icant here. In Bangladesh, the main opponents of anti-domestic violence 
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legislation—namely conservative Islamist groups—were being confronted with 
a war crimes tribunal at a critical moment in the legislative process. This helped 
remove one powerful veto group from the fray and expedited the enactment of 
the law. The Catholic Church is a powerful force in both Ghana and Uganda 
and given its conservative sensibilities on women’s rights, it had to be navigated 
carefully by women’s movements in these countries; this stood in contrast to 
Rwanda, where the Church’s complicity in the genocide had left it without the 
legitimacy to challenge the will of the ruling coalition. The struggle to pass leg-
islation against domestic violence in India was the most protracted of our cases; 
this struggle was, to a significant extent, because of the unwillingness of the rul-
ing party to antagonize groups on whose support they relied, particularly those 
promoting Hindutava, who held specific views about women’s position, status, and 
rights within Indian society (see Chapter 9). This struggle between contending 
social groups within given political settlements was, of course, not defined simply 
in terms of the organizational power that each possessed, but also by competing 
ideas on gender equity and women’s rights that each was capable of mobilizing.
Paradigmatic ideas and wars of position over gender equity
Political settlements are constituted by the ideas, as well as the interests, of the 
groups that contend with each other for power and influence. In Chapter 2 we 
argued that the gendered nature of the paradigmatic ideas that help maintain 
and legitimize political settlements in general, and specific ruling coalitions in 
particular, would influence the nature of elite commitment to the promotion of 
anti-domestic violence legislation. Our comparative analysis shows that, unsur-
prisingly, the legislation moved forward more rapidly where paradigmatic elite 
ideas were aligned with respect for women’s rights and gender equity and where 
their commitment to enacting an anti-domestic violence law was predominantly 
ideological rather than instrumental in nature (see Table 10.2). As noted ear-
lier, this is most apparent in our dominant settlements, where ruling coalitions 
have longer-term time horizons. However, there is also a direct link to political 
movements that took power with the ideological aim of transforming the basis of 
citizenship. In South Africa, for example, women’s rights and gender equality 
were closely linked to the discourse on rights and full citizenship that provided 
legitimacy to the African National Congress (see Chapter 6), whilst citizen-
ship rights for women had formed a key part of the post-conflict settlement in 
Rwanda. In contrast, in the competitive settlements of Bangladesh, Ghana, 
and India, as well as in weakly dominant Uganda, paradigmatic ideas on gen-
der-transformative change were not central to the maintenance or legitimacy 
of the ruling coalitions in place when demands for legislation against domestic 
violence started to be raised.
The contrast between Rwanda and Uganda is instructive here. The commit-
ment to women’s rights, particularly around bodily integrity, was central to the 
political settlement in Rwanda. It was perceived as one of the core ideas that pro-
vide legitimacy to the ruling coalition, which has its founding roots and rationale 
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in the problems created by the genocide in relation to which the current political 
settlement was forged (see Chapter 5). This commitment was both instrumental 
and ideological in nature: instrumental because the heavy loss of men during the 
genocide meant that women needed to be fully incorporated into the economy 
(which required according them ownership rights over land and protection of their 
bodily integrity) and also the polity. But also ideological because respect for wom-
en’s rights fitted with the president’s vision of Rwanda as a modern nation, within 
which the basis of citizenship was to be transformed, from one defined by race 
and ethnicity to one based on a shared (post-ethnic) national identity. The initial 
commitment to women’s rights in Uganda shared similar origins in the ambitions 
of a political movement apparently dedicated to transforming state–citizen rela-
tions and empowering marginal groups. However, the apparent respect for wom-
en’s rights in Uganda within this project soon emerged as a highly instrumental 
means through which a winning coalition could be maintained, with female MPs 
treated largely as a vote-bank within the wider patronage machine, as Ahikire 
(2003) and Goetz (2003) argued some time ago. The ideological respect for women 
amongst ruling elites in Bangladesh may have had a weaker effect because it lacked 
an instrumental counterpart (with women not seen as important to coalition- 
building here) and also because of the somewhat patrician and protective elite view 
of women as victims that has prevailed in Bangladesh since the (often sexual) vio-
lence visited on them during the war with West Pakistan, a key moment in the 
formation of Bangladesh’s foundational settlement (Hossain 2017).
The nature of paradigmatic ideas around women’s rights and gender equity 
had a powerful influence over the strategic approach of women’s movements in 
our cases. In most cases, the anti-domestic violence policy coalition deliberately 
framed their case in terms of ideas that were in alignment with rather than dis-
ruptive of dominant ideas. For example, activists generally avoided framing their 
case in the contentious language of ‘women’s rights’, opting instead to reframe 
the need to legislate against domestic violence within a largely religious discourse 
regarding the sanctity of ‘family life’ and in line with a concern for ‘development’, 
by demonstrating the anti-development impact of domestic violence (e.g. loss of 
labour, healthcare costs). This occurred from the outset in Uganda, Bangladesh, 
and India. In Rwanda, advocates in parliament were already largely assured of 
elite political support, as discussed earlier, but sought to further extend their 
constituency of support by framing men as protectors of women, drawing on the 
forms of masculinity associated with brotherhood and fatherhood, rather than 
husbandry. Women’s activists in Ghana initially deployed a rights-based discourse, 
until slow progress encouraged them to switch frames to a more family-centred 
approach. These (re)framings enabled policy coalitions to overcome resistance and 
win the active support of certain key players—including the Catholic Church in 
Uganda, traditional leaders and the Church in Ghana, and male parliamentarians 
in Bangladesh and India—thus helping to expedite the passing of the legislation.
However, such compromises also affected the scope and content of the legis-
lation that was passed, including the failure to include provisions against mar-
ital rape in Uganda, Ghana, and Bangladesh. Women’s movements, wary of a 
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backlash from Islamist groups in Bangladesh, deliberately left this out, along with 
provisions to protect non-married cohabiting couples, fearing that opponents 
would accuse ruling elites of sanctioning promiscuity, or of challenging the rights 
of men over their wives. Such compromises are arguably understandable, given 
the level of ideological opposition to more radical change and given that address-
ing domestic violence was not central to the interests or the survival of the ruling 
coalition in most of our countries. In this way, potentially transformative policy 
reforms were recast into more ameliorative forms during the political process that 
secured legislative change, through the exclusion of more radical challenges to 
patriarchal control over women’s bodies (Htun and Weldon 2010).1
Changes in political settlement dynamics
Shifts in political settlement dynamics help to explain how the anti-domestic vio-
lence policy agenda gained traction at specific points in time in the six case-study 
countries. These shifts particularly influenced the pace of policy adoption and 
the commitment of the ruling coalition to pursue the anti-domestic violence pol-
icy agenda. In Rwanda, the political settlement dynamics were relatively stable, 
although this needs to be seen in the context of the major earlier shift of the 
political settlement, which saw women’s entitlements to political inclusion and 
other rights become embedded. South Africa is similar in this respect; the set-
tlement reached between different groups during the post-democratic transition 
period, particularly in framing the new constitution and in recognition of women’s 
significant role in the liberation struggle, meant that both women’s political inclu-
sion and concerns with gender equity were strongly entrenched. In these contexts, 
then, there was no need for a further shift to help enable advocates make the case 
for anti-domestic violence legislation from outside the ruling coalition.
In our competitive settlements, and also weakly dominant Uganda, where com-
petitive pressures were increasing over the 2000s, the more finely balanced config-
urations of power left ruling coalitions more vulnerable to smaller shifts therein. 
Elections played significant roles here and emerged as enabling factors in Ghana, 
Bangladesh, India, and also increasingly competitive Uganda. This seemed to be 
driven less by programmatic political party campaigns than the sense of vulner-
ability that elections introduce for ruling elites and the incentives this creates 
to reach out to new constituencies or re-embed existing ones. In Bangladesh, as 
noted earlier, it was actually the suspension of the normal functioning of com-
petitive clientelism in order for a caretaker government to hold the elections that 
allowed the anti-domestic violence policy coalition to gain traction within the 
government on this issue. Later, when Bangladesh reentered competitive politics, 
a reduction in the holding power of the Islamist parties, combined with the need 
for the ruling coalition to garner support from secular groups, including women’s 
rights groups, influenced the ruling coalition to take up the anti-domestic violence 
legislation as a policy issue. This opportunistic approach generated a rather weak 
and instrumental form of policy commitment. In Ghana, violence against women 
was politicized around both the 2000 and 2008 elections, although the change 
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of government in Ghana in 2008, and the associated turnover of ministers and 
bureaucratic staff that is characteristic of competitive clientelism, slowed down 
the implementation process. In Uganda, the ruling party was shaken by the 
sight of grassroots women from rural areas, where it draws its main constituency, 
marching on parliament demanding an anti-domestic violence law in the run-up 
to the 2011 elections (see Chapter 4). In India, the 2004 elections swept to power 
the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), which was more sympathetic to women’s 
rights than its predecessor; the inclusion of anti-domestic violence law as a part of 
the Common Minimum Programme by the Left within the UPA created pressure 
on the Congress to deliver.
Policy coalitions and the capacity to navigate shifting 
political settlements
The ability of women’s movements to navigate dominant interests and ideas in their 
respective political settlements was shaped by their capacity to build effective policy 
coalitions. In Uganda, Ghana, Bangladesh, India, and South Africa—which, unlike 
Rwanda, lacked a political leader who had already signalled support for the reform 
agenda—women’s movements had to mobilize widely and forge alliances across the 
different domains of the state, the bureaucracy, executive, and the parliament. The 
slower progress made in competitive settlements—Ghana, Bangladesh, and India 
(before 2004)—in adoption of the law reflected the low levels of female/feminist 
influence within several key domains, including the parliament and the relevant 
state and gender machinery, which undermined the coalition-building effort. In 
Ghana, the minister for women was opposed to the reforms in the early stages, and 
in India under NDA, some expansive provisions within the draft law were removed. 
In Ghana and Bangladesh, it was only after the women’s ministry came to be led 
by a former women’s movement activist that the agenda gained momentum. This 
underlines both the importance of individual agency within personalized settle-
ments, but also the broader point that women’s inclusion in the political sphere is 
insufficient unless women also maintain a presence in multiple other sites of power 
(Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2014).
Coalition-building, by its nature, takes place along largely informal lines. 
Informal relations between women’s activists and femocrats, parliamentarians, 
and political leaders proved vital in all of the countries. In South Africa, close 
personal relations between the women parliamentarians and women activists, as 
well as close links between femocrats in the gender machinery, were critical for 
moving the agenda forward. In Uganda, the policy coalition members were able 
to use the personal networks of women MPs to diffuse opposition from male par-
liamentarians. In Ghana and Bangladesh, the policy agenda moved ahead much 
faster once the women’s ministry came to be led by former women’s rights activists 
with strong personal relationships within the women’s movement. In Bangladesh, 
the women’s minister also used her close personal relations with the prime min-
ister to influence the decisions in the Cabinet and to pass on relevant informa-
tion to the anti-domestic violence policy coalition. In India, the policy coalition 
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benefited from having critical links with the women parliamentarians from the 
Left parties during the UPA regime (after 2004). They also used the influence 
of the members of the National Advisory Council set up by the UPA and with 
whom they had close links. These findings demonstrate that exploiting informal 
relationships can be a key strategy for policy coalitions seeking to promote gender 
equity within contexts where formal rule-based processes may not work to their 
advantage. Informal relationships can enable access to key parts of the state and 
help diffuse resistance. The extent to which informal networking was influential 
across all political settlements, including in those settlements where institutions 
had made greater progress towards operating along more impersonal lines, sug-
gests that this is an important avenue through which women in the Global South 
are able to generate higher levels of agency than would be expected from their 
structural position within political contexts. As discussed later, this offers strong 
support for those seeking to forge a new research agenda around the role of infor-
mal institutions in promoting women’s rights (Waylen 2017) and for extending 
this into the Global South (Nazneen 2017).
History matters: how policy legacies and earlier feminist struggles 
shape the contemporary negotiation of gender equity
The legacies of earlier policy reforms around gender equity, and of the strug-
gles by women’s movements to achieve them, mattered across all country cases. 
These histories helped shape the strategies deployed by coalitions in support of 
domestic violence law and shaped the scope of what was deemed possible. In 
Rwanda and South Africa, there was more space for policy coalitions to move 
faster and be more ambitious because contentious policy and legal reforms had 
already been passed. In Rwanda, more controversial legislation that secured 
co-ownership of land for women, and protected them from rape and sexual 
violence, had been established several years before legislation against domestic 
violence was proposed. In South Africa, the women’s movement had already 
ensured the inclusion of the gender equality clause in the constitution, which 
undermined arguments from traditional leaders that customary law should take 
precedence. In contrast, the defeat experienced by the women’s movement in 
Uganda around the co-ownership bill in the mid-2000s strongly informed their 
more ameliorative approach to claim-making around domestic violence, even 
whilst the experience also helped sharpen their strategic capabilities to navigate 
powerful interests and ideas. In Bangladesh and India, the policy coalitions had 
similarly learnt from their failures to reform personal laws, but also from successes 
in getting laws passed addressing violence against women; this had taught them 
the importance of having allies, both inside and outside the state, including the 
media, the importance of deploying personal relations, and of framing issues in 
a way that diffuses resistance from the religious right and male resistance in par-
liament. In Ghana, the women’s movement arguably struggled because it lacked 
such experience. Most earlier gains for women’s rights had been handed down as 
acts of patronage by a previous First Lady, including a little-known provision for 
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co-ownership delivered by presidential fiat under the dominant ruling coalition 
of President Rawlings in the 1980s, rather than fought for by activists. This mode 
of ‘rights-through-patronage’ deprived the women’s movement of the opportu-
nity to build its political capabilities and gain experiential learning about how to 
negotiate gender equity, and left the movement bereft of either protection or the 
means to mobilize effectively once that era closed.
Summary and strategic implications
This comparative analysis of the politics of negotiating gender equity in the Global 
South, with a focus on legislation against domestic violence, has sought to move 
beyond the inclusion-to-influence debate. By conceptualizing the politics of gender 
equity as the outcome of interactions between two power domains—the political 
settlement and the strategic domain of women’s interests—we have sought to draw 
attention to the ways in which both deeper and broader patterns of power and pol-
itics shape women’s inclusion and their influence in particular types of context. In 
this final section, we briefly summarize the main findings and address some of the 
implications that flow from this, both for future research on the politics of gender 
equity and for strategic responses to the problem of domestic violence, which con-
tinues to afflict the lives of one in three women in the Global South.
In relation to the inclusion-to-influence debate (e.g. Escobar-Lemmon and 
Taylor-Robinson 2014), the proportion of female MPs in parliament does not 
emerge from either our in-country process tracing or comparative analysis as hav-
ing a defining influence over the passage of anti-domestic violence legislation. 
Rather, women’s political inclusion and the influence that flows from it both need 
to be situated in relation to other features of both the political settlement and the 
domain of women’s interests in given contexts. First, women’s political inclusion 
is closely shaped by the ways in which political settlements are formed over time 
in particular contexts, often in relation to major political upheavals. Second, we 
find that the type of political settlement that prevailed when claims for anti- 
domestic violence legislation started to be made in particular contexts offered 
the most compelling explanation for the pace and extent to which the legislation 
was adopted across our six cases. The ability of the women’s movement to forge 
a policy coalition capable of forming strategic alliances and compelling policy 
framings that aligned with the interests and ideas of the dominant actors within 
the settlement was critical. These coalitions included female parliamentarians, 
but they were seldom the most significant actors in processes that also involved 
critical roles for activists, lawyers, male politicians, femocrats (both male and 
female), religious leaders, and political leaders. We also found that the particular 
routes through which progressive policy change occurred in our cases was closely 
shaped by the type of political settlement, particularly with regards to the holding 
power of different social groups and the paradigmatic ideas of ruling elites.
Political settlements matter in several ways then. Above all, we found that the 
configuration of political power matters, whereby ruling coalitions with higher 
levels of dominance and elite cohesion were able to achieve legislative change 
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more rapidly and generally more effectively than their counterparts in compet-
itive clientelist settings, where women’s movements generally had to struggle 
longer and harder to effect change. This runs counter to the prevalent expecta-
tion that more democratic contexts will generally provide a more conducive con-
text for the realization of women’s rights. As stressed earlier, this does not imply 
a criticism of democracy, but rather acts as a salutary caution for those engaging 
in the politics of gender equity from an academic or strategic perspective. In aca-
demic terms, it involves moving beyond a focus on formal institutions, to examine 
how underlying forms of power and politics shape how they actually function in 
practice, particularly in terms of the incentives that confront ruling elites from 
the specific configurations of power that they confront. We come to the strategic 
implications later.
Our findings emphasize, however, that the interests of elites cannot be con-
sidered without an understanding of the paradigmatic ideas that help to bind 
certain sets of elites together. By borrowing from feminist discursive institution-
alism, we were able to trace how the politics of ideas played a significant role 
at several levels. At the level of paradigmatic norms, passing legislation against 
domestic violence was taken to be an unwanted encroachment onto patriarchal 
notions of male autonomy and thus faced resistance—but not as a foundational 
attack on more fundamental male ‘rights’ over women’s bodies and property. 
This meant that the campaigners for the legislation had to align their case with 
alternative paradigmatic ideas that had the support of powerful players, including 
beliefs around the family, the importance of economic development, and also of 
becoming a ‘modern’ nation within an international community with specific 
norms around gender equity. Ideas and evidence were important at lower levels of 
problem framing, particularly in terms of new evidence on the levels of domestic 
violence and campaign material built around high-profile cases, which helped to 
bring the issue to the political and public attention.
The insights generated here flow directly from the power domains framework 
that we deployed in our comparative case-study investigations. This framework, 
which integrates insights from recent advances in two related fields—the politics 
of development and feminist literature on politics and gender—enabled us to track 
how the interplay among interests, ideas, and institutions shaped progress towards 
gender equity in particular contexts. By insisting on locating actors and their ideas 
within wider and shifting relations of power, the framework was able to capture the 
interplay of agency and structure in ways that have often been treated separately in 
the literature on gender and politics. In methodological terms, the operationali-
zation of a political settlements typology through comparative case study research 
acts as a complement to existing studies that rely on large-n survey-based work 
(Htun and Weldon 2012) or one-off case studies, and it arguably goes further in 
terms of identifying the causal pathways towards change within different types of 
political context (George and Bennett 2005). This focus on particular types of 
context also has important strategic implications, particularly for policy actors 
operating across multiple contexts, in that it helps move beyond the sense that 
each situation is entirely different towards a sense that some strategic responses 
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may be more effective in certain (specified) types of context. To be sure, the fact 
that we have only operationalized this approach in six countries, and with regards 
to one policy area, limits the extent to which wider claims can be made here. More 
work is required, both to extend the range of countries to include more examples of 
the different types of political settlement identified here and to test the framework 
in relation to other types of gender equity policy, ideally from across the spectrum 
of ‘ameliorative’ and ‘transformative’ types.
What do these findings mean for gender advocates 
and policymakers?
What do the preceding findings mean, particularly for gender advocates, women’s 
movement actors, and national and international policymakers? In closing, we 
focus in particular on the importance of coalition-building and discursive fram-
ing and of ensuring that these are closely attuned to particular contexts through 
an iterative process of political analysis. Such efforts require not only greater sup-
port from international actors in terms of resources, but also different modes of 
operation. Finally, we stress the importance of moving beyond a focus on securing 
policy adoption towards a much stronger focus on implementation.
The primary implication of the analysis offered here is that efforts to promote 
gender equity reform need to be closely attuned to the type of political settlement 
in given contexts, with a particular focus on the dominant actors, incentives, and 
ideas that prevail therein, and their shifting nature over time. Elections and the 
changing fortunes of organized groups may provide openings that policy coalitions 
can capitalize on. Whereas gaining the support of the political leadership is likely 
to be critical in dominant settlements, women’s movements operating within 
competitive clientelist settlements may have to look beyond the highly politicized 
realm of party politics and start by forging alliances within the bureaucracy.
Across all settlement types, the building of coherent and well-resourced pol-
icy coalitions is a first-order priority for promoting contentious policy agendas in 
generally unpromising contexts. This has relevance for both civil society actors 
regarding how they mobilize and also for international development actors, who 
are increasingly aware of the need to engage in supporting such coalitions to 
emerge and prosper (DLP 2012). The fact that such coalition-building can take 
a long time, is often highly political, and needs to respond rapidly to windows 
of opportunity as they arise, suggests that a much higher degree of flexibility is 
required from donors in terms of how they operate. It is notable that democratiza-
tion in and of itself does not raise the likelihood of women being included in pol-
itics in larger numbers or of women being able to influence the policy agenda; this 
should alert activists both to the dangers of complacency in democratic settings 
and to the room for manoeuvre that may exist in less democratic contexts.
The fact that ideas play such an important role in struggles to promote gen-
der equity opens up a considerable range of implications for political and policy 
actors. Our finding that gender equity policies are likely to be adopted and imple-
mented more rapidly and fully when they are in line with the ideas of the ruling 
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coalition suggests the significance of aligning the policy frames and discursive 
strategies accordingly. However this ‘going with the grain’ approach (Levy 2014), 
which is increasingly popular amongst development agencies, is not without its 
drawbacks. This is particularly apparent where the compromises made in this pro-
cess of alignment lead to diluted and potentially incoherent forms of legislation 
that are very difficult to implement and may undermine the overarching goal of 
transforming the power relations that underpin gender inequalities. Resolving 
this dilemma is no simple matter. It is possible that simply getting legislation 
passed will open up space for more radical measures down the line. Evidence from 
our country cases does not offer much scope for optimism on this front as yet, as 
with the failure of the women’s movement in Uganda to gain traction for a bill 
on marital rights in the aftermath of is success on domestic violence. However, 
given the lengthy time periods over which new norms become established, it is 
too early to judge progress on this front.
What is imperative here is that national and transnational advocates need to 
undertake political economy analysis in an ongoing and iterative way to monitor 
windows of opportunity for advocacy work, to inform their policy engagement 
strategies, and to stay abreast of the trade-offs involved in this process. It is notable 
that this did take place at least to some extent in some of our cases, as with the 
women’s movement in Uganda undertaking a political analysis to inform their 
highly astute campaign strategy of coalition-building and framing. However, it is 
also notable that this analysis focused only on the process of securing the legisla-
tive changes, rather than extending to the process of implementation. Neither the 
women’s movements nor the international agencies that provided some of their 
funding seemed to take sufficient account of the fact that perhaps the biggest chal-
lenge would not be that of policy change, but of policy implementation. Steps 
that may have helped here would have been to include a stronger role for actors 
responsible for policy implementation within the process of policy adoption—to 
close the gap between rule-makers and rule-takers (Waylen 2014)—and to include 
a focus on securing implementation within the strategic plans of policy advocates.
The capacity to implement difficult policy agendas, such as anti-domestic 
violence legislation, varied when it came to different types of settlement. The 
capacity to implement seems to be stronger in dominant party settlements with 
hierarchical and increasingly institutionalized governance arrangements. In such 
contexts, donors and civil society actors would be advised to work within such 
structures, rather than to offer non-state alternatives. In more competitive cli-
entelist settings, where political commitment is weaker and the public bureau-
cracy often more politicized, there is a stronger rationale for a multi-stakeholder 
approach to both provision and monitoring (Levy 2014). In all cases, there are 
strong grounds for building the capacity of gender machineries within govern-
ment, including in terms of their capacities to coordinate across ministries.
Transnational support for gender equity mattered in each of our cases, in terms of 
donor funding and South–South learning and the rise of a global agenda of women’s 
rights involving the international women’s movement and United Nations. South–
South learning, particularly at the regional level, is currently gaining ground as 
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a way for advancing a rights-based agenda. While South–South exchange is 
not a new area within the feminist movement, regional and cross-regional 
exchanges on women’s rights (apart from Latin America) have been under-
funded and under-researched, and this is an area that requires urgent attention 
(Nazneen 2018). Our analysis also reveals how donors should strategically engage 
in promoting contentious issues and gaps in their behaviour. It is important 
that transnational actors from beyond the region are in the background rather 
than foreground of such efforts, to avoid local policy coalitions being branded as 
‘Western’ within countries increasingly keen to exercise sovereignty. However, 
the apparent reluctance of transnational actors to get involved in the longer-term 
work of ensuring that policy is implemented has created an oversight and capacity 
gap that needs to be overcome as a matter of urgency.
The politics of securing anti-domestic violence legislation in the Global 
South is determined by the complex interplay of interests, ideas, and insti-
tutions within overlapping domains of power. By setting these processes out 
in detailed comparative perspective, we hope to have contributed to a deeper 
understanding of how women’s rights can become protected in law. The chal-
lenge now is to extend this understanding into other fields of gender equity and 
to move beyond a focus on the adoption of progressive policies towards a better 
understanding of how they can be implemented in ways that secure social jus-
tice for women, and the societies they live in.
Note
 1. In this sense, it might be more useful to distinguish between laws on gender that 
touch on doctrinal, as opposed to nondoctrinal, issues, with the DVA being non-
doctrinal, whereas issues pertaining to marriage, divorce, and inheritance can be 
considered to touch on doctrinal concerns (Htun and Weldon 2010).
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The editors and contributors to this volume have set themselves an extremely 
ambitious and difficult task—analysing under what conditions governments in 
the Global South will introduce policies to reduce gendered inequalities—with 
the aim of developing a ‘new conceptual framework for exploring the politics 
of gender equality in the Global South’. They have produced a fascinating and 
thought-provoking book that gives us some important new insights, particularly 
into the adoption of domestic violence policy and the roles played by different 
types of political settlement. But I will suggest in this commentary that, on their 
own, the results of this endeavour are not enough to develop the new framework 
they are advocating. However, I will also suggest ways to build on their very valu-
able insights that could get us nearer to the goal of developing the much needed, 
more nuanced, and contextual analyses of the politics of gender equality in the 
Global South, which may also open up new research agendas.
To elaborate these arguments, I adopt a slightly different emphasis to the one 
taken in the volume. Rather than highlighting what is new and different about 
the research presented here, as the editors have done in their chapters, I will 
fit this work into the latest systematic comparative research on state action on 
women’s rights, as exemplified by Mala Htun and Laurel Weldon’s (2018) new 
book that came out just as this volume was completed and does many of things 
that Nazneen and Hickey (see Chapter 1) are calling for. I will show how Htun 
and Weldon’s (2018) findings and the work showcased here are complementary, so 
bringing them together and building on the insights of both can provide us with 
some potentially fruitful ways forward. Achieving this aim requires several things: 
first, placing domestic violence policy, as the subject of this volume, into its wider 
context—namely as only one type of gender equality policy among many—with 
inevitable limits, both to its generalizability to other gender equality policies, and 
to the possibility of developing a comparative framework based on those findings.
Second, I suggest moving away from the volume’s starting point of a critique 
of what Nazneen and Hickey characterize as the ‘inclusion-to-influence’ and the 
politics of representation approach. The editors are right to critique the various 
positions that they include in the inclusion-to-influence debate and to question 
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their relevance to this endeavour. As they correctly conclude, many of the 
debates—such as around descriptive and substantive representation and particu-
lar notions of women’s interests that are brought together under this umbrella—
are not necessarily the most relevant or appropriate starting point to answer the 
questions the editors are posing, nor are they the ones used exclusively by gender 
and politics scholars within this field. Instead, using Htun and Weldon’s frame-
work as a starting point allows us to focus directly on the nature of gender equality 
policy, thus moving the analysis away from looking primarily at women actors. In 
particular, it necessitates differentiating between different types of gender equal-
ity policy.
Finally, I agree with Nazneen and Hickey that their findings help to reveal the 
micropolitics of negotiating gender equity by using insights into the roles of formal 
and informal institutions, as well as networks both inside and outside the state—
including in the bureaucracy, legislature, and the executive. This focus, together 
with the important insights about different regime types derived from the political 
settlements approach, can provide some crucial missing dimensions to frameworks 
like Htun and Weldon’s (2018). Extending Htun and Weldon’s analysis by opening 
up the state’s ‘black box’ can give more nuanced analyses of the roles of different 
types of state and political settlement in promoting gender equality policies.
I elaborate these arguments by examining the nature of domestic violence pol-
icy as a gender equality policy, locating it in the wider context of gender and 
politics research, and conclude by discussing how the research agenda featured in 
this book can help develop better answers to the fundamental question posed in 
it: under what conditions do governments in the Global South introduce policies 
aimed at reducing gendered inequalities? My short and inevitably partial com-
mentary therefore focuses primarily on the volume’s theoretical, conceptual, and 
methodological arguments, rather than an in-depth consideration of the fascinat-
ing empirical material presented in the case studies.
Domestic violence policy and the generalizability 
of gender equality issues
My starting point is that the assumptions that underpin many of the premises in 
this book about the generalizability of the insights gained from the analysis of 
domestic violence policy to other areas of gender equality policy need to be inter-
rogated, rather than assumed to be justified. First, we need to consider whether 
one of the book’s stated aims—generalizing the findings from the six case stud-
ies considered here to the Global South as a whole—is possible. Although the 
authors do not specify what they mean by the term Global South, the case selec-
tion is unlikely to represent that diversity. The six case studies are all located in 
Asia and Africa, and all, apart from Rwanda, share a British colonial past. In 
particular, there are no cases from Latin America, so the implications of their 
analysis for Latin America are left unaddressed. This matters, for several rea-
sons: Latin America is an important region in the Global South, with a very 
different colonial history to the majority of Asia and Africa; there is now a huge 
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and sophisticated literature on the adoption of gender equality policy, including 
domestic violence policy, in various parts of Latin America (Htun 2003, Blofield 
2006, Franceschet 2010, Haas 2010, Blofield and Haas 2013). Therefore, although 
the choice of cases analysed here was limited by the parameters of the particular 
research programme within which the work was undertaken, more discussion of 
the potential narrowness of the case selection might have been useful.
Second, and of central concern to the arguments in this volume, there are very 
significant limits to the generalizability of the findings about domestic violence 
as a policy area. Using Htun and Weldon’s (2018) framework, developed from 
the primarily quantitative analysis of seven gender equality policy domains in 
70 countries at four points in time (1975, 1985, 1995, and 2005) as our starting 
point, it is possible to divide gender equality policy into several distinct areas: 
status, class, and doctrinal policies, as well as policies that combine these three 
elements. Status policies advance women’s rights primarily for women as a sta-
tus group. These comprise doctrinal status-based policies, such as family law or 
abortion legality, that challenge religious doctrine, cultural traditions, and sacred 
discourse, or nondoctrinal status-based policies, such as quotas or legal equality in 
the workplace. In contrast, class-based policies advance women’s rights primarily 
as a class group and include nondoctrinal class-based policies, such as parental 
leave or public funding for childcare, as well as doctrinal class-based policies, 
such as public funding for abortion and contraceptives. All class-based policies 
provide more equal access to resources among women of different social classes 
and, because they use state power to modify existing economic arrangements, 
class-based policies are more likely to be adopted by left wing parties. Status-based 
policies are less likely to challenge established state–market relations, and doctri-
nal issues, such as reproductive rights, are more likely to challenge core tenets of 
religious and cultural beliefs (Htun and Weldon 2018).
So, as Htun and Weldon (2018) are keen to emphasize, factors that are impor-
tant for some issues will not be so salient for others. Therefore, for Htun and 
Weldon (2018, p. 16), each women’s rights issue takes on a different constella-
tion of institutions that together comprise gender, and each involves different 
actors, activates different cleavages, and motivates different kinds of conflict. 
Doctrinal issues such as abortion rights will engage church–state relations, 
whereas class issues such as the provision of childcare will animate the politics 
of redistribution and the responsibility of the state and market for social pro-
vision, often promulgated by left wing parties (Htun and Weldon 2018, p. 16). 
Therefore, Htun and Weldon’s delineation of the varying factors involved in 
the adoption of different gender equality policies, including violence against 
women (VAW), highlights why it is not possible to generalize from one issue 
to another. As the typology makes clear, violence against women, of which 
domestic violence is a part, is an archetypal status issue that will often engen-
der less resistance than other, often more controversial, doctrinal issues.
However, Htun and Weldon’s analysis of VAW policy and Nazneen and Hickey’s 
conclusions do share many common factors. In keeping with findings presented in 
the case studies in this volume, Htun and Weldon concur that the role of women’s 
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movements and international factors are particularly salient in the case of VAW 
policy. But, in contrast to Nazneen and Hickey, Htun and Weldon do not judge 
the effectiveness of women’s movements in terms of women’s involvement in pol-
icy coalitions or their capacity to forge alliances, which is central to Nazneen and 
Hickey’s emphasis on negotiation. For them, the strong women’s movements that 
are particularly key to policy change around VAW are measured in terms of organ-
izations, protest, and public opinion. But, as also highlighted in this volume (and 
by many other gender scholars), Htun and Weldon find that international fac-
tors, particularly international norms and the ratification of CEDAW, are highly 
significant. Nazneen and Hickey additionally draw our attention to the impor-
tance of South–South and regional links between women activists as an area that 
requires greater investigation (Waylen 2015). Perhaps unsurprisingly, given their 
typology, for Htun and Weldon (2018) left parties and religion—two elements 
that Nazneen and Hickey also explore in less detail (despite their emphasis on 
ideas)—do not play important roles in the adoption of domestic violence policy, 
in contrast to some other areas of gender equality policy.
Furthermore, in keeping with Nazneen and Hickey’s conclusions about domestic 
violence policy, Htun and Weldon (2018, p. 240) find the role of women in parlia-
ment in getting gender equality policies adopted to be less significant than they had 
anticipated in their 70 cases. But they hypothesize that women MPs may be critical 
actors in preventing the rollback of gender equality measures already in existence. 
Women’s policy agencies also do not appear to be the crucial actors that some schol-
ars would argue. And although feminist movements have a strong and immediate 
impact for status issues like domestic violence, they matter less for some family issues 
like maternity leave. For Htun and Weldon (2018, p. 243), development and democ-
ratization figure less strongly than they had expected—again, a finding echoed in 
Nazneen and Hickey’s conclusions. Htun and Weldon also argue that a colonial (and 
also communist) legacy is important because countries that have been subject to 
Western colonialism tend to have weaker states in the post-colonial period.
Many of the findings presented in this volume are therefore very much in tune 
with important recent work by gender scholars like Htun and Weldon (2018). 
But they can pertain only to domestic violence as a status issue. As a result, 
there are important limits to the generalizability from domestic violence policy 
adoption to other gender equality policies. Therefore, if we consider the two 
areas just discussed—the potential generalizability from the six case-study coun-
tries and the generalizability from domestic violence policy to other areas of gender 
equality—the analysis of domestic violence policy becomes only the starting point 
for the investigation of other areas of gender equality policy. To broaden the analysis 
to other gender equality issues, a range of other factors must be considered.
Ways forward?
If we recognize the important insights, and not just the limitations, of the anal-
ysis generated by Nazneen and Hickey’s approach, we can start to use them to 
expand and carry on where Htun and Weldon’s (2018) analysis ends (as it cannot, 
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for example, because of the large number of cases it examines, explore particular 
contexts in any depth). A core strength of Hickey and Nazneen’s framework is its 
attention to the internal dynamics of individual polities. They move two areas 
that need to be considered in more detail to the foreground: (1) the implications of 
the different forms of state and political settlement for gender equality policies; 
and (2) opening the black box of the politics of negotiating gender equity, so that 
we can explore more effectively the formal and informal rules, norms, and net-
works that have an effect outside and inside the state—whether in the executive, 
bureaucracy, and legislature—and the links between them.
An important contribution made by the political settlements framework is 
its in-depth consideration of the dynamics of different types of polities (other 
gender scholars have only done this to a limited degree). The key elements of 
this analysis are found in Chapter 10, where Nazneen and Hickey flesh out the 
importance of political context through a comparative analysis of their six cases. 
They divide them into different types of political settlement: they are either com-
petitive or dominant, depending on the level of challenge ruling elites face from 
those excluded from the ruling coalition, and are either personalized or institu-
tionalized, depending on the extent to which institutions operate on personalized 
logics. For Nazneen and Hickey, Uganda and Rwanda are dominant personalized 
regimes, and Bangladesh and Ghana are competitive clientelist regimes. In con-
trast, South Africa is a dominant institutionalized polity, and India is a compet-
itive institutionalized polity. A comparative analysis of the six cases finds that 
although all countries introduced domestic violence policies in the period under 
consideration, those with dominant party settlements (Rwanda, Uganda, and 
South Africa) adopted domestic violence policies more quickly than competitive 
clientelist countries (Ghana, Bangladesh, and India).1
Nazneen and Hickey’s argument that the different speeds of domestic violence 
policy adoption in the six case-study countries can be explained by the type of 
political settlement is an important one. They show us how the support of the 
president is important in dominant personalized systems, such as Rwanda and 
Uganda, but that the role of the dominant party is critical in a dominant institu-
tionalized setting, such as South Africa. They argue that there are multiple fac-
tors that contribute to the greater speed in dominant party settlements: adopting 
domestic violence policy can help make up for a democratic deficit; women are 
often a more significant constituency for ruling coalitions in dominant party 
settlements; dominant parties can deliver more than parties in a more compet-
itive context; it is clearer who to pressure in a dominant party settlement; and 
women could use informal networks more effectively. One key implication of 
their analysis is the important role of policy coalitions—showing how coalitions 
are built with, and within, the ruling coalition. They also highlight how shifts 
in the political dynamics are also important in determining whether the issue of 
domestic violence gained traction. Additionally they point to the importance of 
the longer-term and deeper process of state building in many of these more 
institutionalized polities, such as South Africa and India. Focusing closely on 
the nature of the state and political settlement in each case can therefore enable 
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us to examine its impact on a range of other gender equality policies, such as 
reproductive rights and employment rights. This division of polities by the type 
of political settlement is an interesting dimension that should be explored in the 
analysis of other cases and policy areas. Indeed, this is one area where additional 
cases from other parts of the Global South, such as Latin America, would be 
very valuable, and it is certainly an aspect to develop in further research using 
this framework.
The second area for further research this volume points us to is the deeper 
analysis of the inner workings of state institutions and, in particular, their infor-
mal as well as formal dimensions. Any understanding of the adoption of gen-
der equality policies is only partial without an understanding of the gendered 
rules, norms, and practices that help determine why and how certain policies get 
adopted, while others do not. Clearly, more knowledge of the informal networks 
and alliances—both within the state as well as those that link critical gender 
actors inside and outside the state—is crucial for furthering our understanding. 
Opening the black box of the executive and the bureaucracy to see exactly how 
their gendered processes play out is therefore an important, but as yet incomplete, 
task (Chappell and Waylen 2013, Waylen 2017). As part of this, a final dimension 
to be explored further is the resistance that can be so powerful in blocking gen-
der equality policy reform. It is centrally important to determine for each type of 
gender equality reform exactly who the different opponents are, their strategies, 
how they form alliances with a range of other actors, and how these depend on 
the precise nature of the reform (Capoccia 2016). Research emerging from this 
book could, for example, compare different policy types (in Htun and Weldon’s 
framing) in each of the six cases (namely in the different forms of political set-
tlement). Widening the range of case-study countries could also yield important 
results. For example, a doctrinal status issue like family law or a class-based non-
doctrinal issue like childcare provision or parental leave could be compared in 
different cases using concepts highlighted in this book, such as informal networks 
and norms, to give us more nuanced understandings of how gender equality poli-
cies are adopted in different contexts.
Conclusion
This book has much to offer students of gender and politics in furthering our 
understanding of how gender equality policies are adopted in the Global South. 
The comparative analysis of six carefully chosen cases gives us some fascinat-
ing mid-range findings that complement the already-existing single case and the 
large-n studies like Htun and Weldon’s (2018) new analysis of gender equality 
policies in 70 countries. Nazneen and Hickey and all the other chapter authors 
have provided us with important details of the specifics of political context by 
using the concept of a political settlement and in-depth studies of how and why 
domestic violence policy adoption takes place in six cases, as well as a compara-
tive analysis of how political settlements affect one gender equality policy. The 
volume therefore adds much to the gender and politics scholarship.
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However, to avoid the danger of over-generalizing from the findings of one 
particular policy area examined in only six cases to all gender equity policies 
in the Global South, I have argued that it might be more productive to place 
the important research contained in this volume into a different context. In the 
spirit of Joni Lovenduski’s (2016, p. 517) call for slow science, which values what 
has gone before without claiming to overturn it, the starting point could be the 
exciting recent systematic comparative research into the politics of gender equity 
(rather than a critique of the literature on inclusion to influence and the substan-
tive and descriptive representation of women’s interests). The research outlined 
in this volume could then be integrated fully into the developing of compara-
tive research agendas on different gender equality policies in different polities. 
It would then make the significant contribution to the collective development 
of the larger-scale theoretical and conceptual understandings of the conditions 
under which governments in the Global South (and more broadly) introduce pol-
icies to reduce gendered inequalities that it aims for.
Note
 1. Although they also have a slightly different way of breaking down their polities, 
in which India is characterized as institutionalized in one version but clientelist in 
another.
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In this volume the editors and the contributors treat the challenge of advanc-
ing gender equality policy as what it is: a profoundly complex political struggle. 
Whether women’s rights activists are able to build a broad constituency, forge 
alliances, negotiate effectively with opponents, and cement policy advances—let 
alone see them implemented effectively—depends on a bewilderingly complex 
set of conditions relating to history, culture, and the nature of the institutions—
public and private, formal and informal—in which these struggles are located. 
Nazneen, Hickey, and Sifaki, the editors of this volume, propose that we organize 
our thinking about these conditions by exploring the ‘power domains’ within 
which feminists launch their equality demands, most notably the national polit-
ical settlements and domains of women’s interests within and across which fem-
inists seek leverage. To build comparability across the six national contexts, one 
area of policy is focused upon in each case: the prevention of, and response to, 
domestic violence.
In this commentary I offer some reflections on some of the organizing concepts 
in this book and suggest ways of continuing to enrich the ongoing quest for what 
Molyneux calls the ‘favourable political circumstances’ that deliver a ‘workable 
formula for the delivery of social justice within which women’s interests, diverse 
though they be, are given recognition’ (2001, p. 160).
No shortcuts to power: the seduction of expecting that 
inclusion will produce influence
‘The forging of a common front among women is the result of politics, not the 
premise of politics’ (Htun and Weldon 2018, p. 10, fn.6, emphasis added). With 
this compact sentence tucked into a footnote, Mala Htun and Laurel Weldon 
deftly explain what is wrong with assumptions that the inclusion of women in 
public decision-making will influence policy-making and implementation towards 
feminist outcomes. As with any other set of political interests advanced by any 
social group, the project of generating broad consensus as to the logic and justice 
of these interests is a long-term struggle against opposition, requiring negotiation, 
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creative framing to transform what had been private nonissues into matters for 
public action, tactical concessions at times, a good sense of timing and sequenc-
ing, and building alliances that go beyond the social group itself. Whether the 
social group—in this case, women, a huge and diverse collection in all societies—
identifies itself as a group or collectivity at all, or perceives common interests at all, 
is also the outcome of politics. Unlike other social groups, women’s rights advo-
cates face a foundational obstacle in engaging with public authority: that public 
institutions and the stuff of politics are historically predicated on the exclusion of 
women and of gender equality issues.
Nazneen, Hickey, and Sifaki correctly point out that if we treat women’s polit-
ical inclusion (particularly when its measure is the limited indicator provided 
by the proportion of parliamentary seats held by women) as the sole or main 
independent variable determining the prospects for gender equality policies, we 
learn very little. This has been confirmed robustly by both quantitative and qual-
itative analyses by a range of feminist political scientists, perhaps most strikingly 
in the careful work, individually and jointly, of Htun and Weldon (Weldon 2002, 
Htun 2016, Htun and Weldon 2018), who distinguish between institutional con-
ditions and policy characteristics shaping both the leverage of feminist policy 
activists and the strength of opposition, neither of which are much affected by 
relative numbers of women in public office. My own work, particularly the 2003 
book with Shireen Hassim, No Shortcuts to Power: African Women in Politics and 
Policy-Making, and more recent work with Rob Jenkins (2018), has grappled with 
the determinants of women’s ‘political effectiveness’ in policy-making. Having 
myself moved between academia and promoting women’s rights in a competitive 
policy-making arena (the United Nations), I have direct experience of the limits 
of expecting that the feminization of policy-making will alter informal power 
dynamics in path-dependent institutions.
While I agree that the phenomenon of women’s inclusion is neither the first 
nor the most important condition for progressive outcomes, I also think that the 
prevalence of the ‘inclusion-to-influence’ expectation is overplayed in this col-
lection. Few feminist political analysts expect that more women in public office 
will automatically and necessarily make a difference to outcomes, recognizing 
that without political and economic conditions favouring policies that redistrib-
ute resources and power between women and men, women in public office are 
not a powerful presence for feminism but have simply increased their ‘presence 
in power’, experiencing ‘inclusion without representation’ (Htun 2016). In what 
follows, I will be referring to the considerations that can build the effectiveness of 
feminists in their policy engagements (inside or outside of public office).
That said, there are still reasons why women’s inclusion in public decision- 
making remains a significant concern and may disrupt power domains. First, hold-
ing and exercising power—political, economic, and military—continues to be a 
profoundly masculine project. While numbers of women in representative politics 
have doubled since 1995, they are still not significant and not close to parity. This 
is not just a democratic justice issue. It suggests that the realm of contestation 
over what is desirable in social order and organization continues to be perceived 
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as a male prerogative. Disrupting that prerogative remains a vital project, with the 
potential to introduce changes in the culture and subjects of decision-making and 
the character of politics. Women’s engagement in the domain of what Chantal 
Mouffe, cited in Chapter 2, calls ‘the political’—the antagonistic dimension of 
struggles between social groups for power and resources—requires tactical and 
cultural innovation to introduce the politically unfamiliar issues that women, 
if they are feminists, tend to politicize—like reproductive rights, sexual and 
gender-based violence, and sexuality. The engagement by feminists in ‘the politi-
cal’ requires migration within and between power domains—the domain of wom-
en’s interests and broader ‘political settlements’. Politicizing women’s interests in 
democratic contexts inescapably requires recognition of the antagonism—or 
struggle over resources and power—between women and men. Converting this 
to what Mouffe calls ‘agonistic pluralism’ (1993)—deliberative democracy based 
on respectful debate between equals—is a recent and still extremely incomplete 
feminist achievement that resides in treating abuses of women’s rights as public 
issues and women as humans and full citizens. The exclusion of women and of 
women’s issues from the political has been a deliberate process; their inclusion 
continues to be a vital project.
Second, the performance of leadership, the tactics of alliance-building, the 
repertoire of short- and long-term strategies of policy insurgents, and the specific 
role that women in executive roles can play (Annesley and Gains 2010, Chappell 
and Waylen 2013) tend to get lost or underplayed when we dismiss or downplay 
the significance of women’s inclusion and the ways in which that inclusion can 
promote feminist alliance-building. This element of agency cannot be captured 
in large-n studies or in efforts to identify specific enabling conditions and patterns 
and their workings across different contexts. Yet this is part of what the study of 
politics is about. Female politicians—and, in particular, both female and male 
feminist politicians—are still anomalies, and their tactical decisions in environ-
ments of significant constraint deserve close analysis.
The contributors to this volume would not disagree with these points, and 
indeed one of the delights of reading the country-specific chapters is the extent 
to which they do illuminate the vital role of individual women’s leadership and 
tactics, as well as the significant roles played by spoilers on the anti-feminist 
side, for instance Museveni’s personal intervention in Uganda to scupper the 
spousal co-ownership clause in the 1998 Uganda land law. The book’s qualita-
tive approach, the limited number of cases (though it might have been useful to 
include examples from Latin America), helps to draw out the impact of tactical 
decisions by women’s rights activists, and their opponents.
A focus on women’s inclusion can illuminate the role of agency and strat-
egy. In relation to this, a point that emerges from all of the country studies, and 
which is perhaps under-celebrated by the editors, is the emerging significance of 
women and feminists amongst power elites. The crucial roles played in advanc-
ing new domestic violence policies—outside of state institutions, and over and 
above the pressure from the women’s movement—by feminist lawyers, journalists, 
and human rights advocates, working in cautious partnership with political and 
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bureaucratic leaders, appears vital to the eventual success of most of the policy 
battles described by the contributors. This would not have been the case even 
25 years ago, simply because there were fewer women and feminists in these posi-
tions, outside or inside the state. This is a secular development of enormous sig-
nificance and surely will affect the shape of political settlements to come, as more 
women enter the power professions, or what Sklar calls the ‘governing elites’—the 
bureaucratic, political, economic, and often military core policy circle surround-
ing the executive (Sklar 1987).
While the insulation of elected officials from bureaucrats is prized in Weberian 
visions of an effective administration and accountable politicians, analysts of 
informal institutional dynamics (c.f. Waylen 2017) show that this insulation is 
almost always a fiction. There is a high degree of ‘fusion’ between political and 
bureaucratic elites in developing countries (Schneider and Heredia, 2003, p. 19). 
That this fusion could work to advance gender equality policy, as opposed to 
obstructing it, is an under-examined possibility, yet this seems to have been an 
important dynamic in propelling the policy outcomes described in the case-study 
chapters, particularly in India, where for a time, the fusion included connections 
between the centre Left leaders of the 2004 United Progressive Alliance coa-
lition and the prominent social justice activists in the newly formed National 
Advisory Council.
Feminist engagement in political settlements
This collection focuses attention on how women and feminists have engaged 
in the power settlements that tend to cement existing distributions of privilege, 
but that are always subject to contestation. The settlements analysed in the book 
are typologized as dominant personal (Uganda and Rwanda), competitive clien-
telist (Bangladesh and Ghana), dominant institutionalized (South Africa), and 
competitive institutionalized (India). This typology focuses on the degree of con-
testation faced by ruling elites and the extent to which the executive has been 
captured by specific individuals/families or is open to alternation in power-holding 
by institutionalized (not personalized) parties. Every one of these countries identi-
fies as a democracy, but this typology helps to reveal how they vary in democratic 
depth and character. Each chapter offers fascinating insights into how feminist 
policy activists have identified entry points to advance their policy proposals and 
how they go on to negotiate within the political settlement. A crucial problem 
each national story addresses is the significant limit experienced by many wom-
en’s movements in asserting their importance to ruling elites, or in exercising 
political leverage, given their relatively weak capacity to deliver bloc votes or 
rents or to substitute for the support provided by traditional elites. Most chapters 
reiterate how women are relatively marginal to political settlements, particularly 
as systems become more competitive and therefore more focused on short-term 
vote-winning strategies. In clientelist systems, where parties selectively dispense 
patronage rather than develop programmatic agendas, feminist long-term social 
change agendas tend not to be welcome.
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The focus on political settlements is useful in exposing strategies of feminist 
policy advocates to create electoral and other incentives for ruling coalitions to 
take on their concerns. The chapters on Uganda, Rwanda, Ghana, and South 
Africa reveal the precarious balancing act between autonomy and co-optation 
that women’s movements perform in seeking public support for their agendas. On 
the whole, this has not gone well. It turns out that facilitating women’s political 
presence is a useful short-term legitimating tactic for leaders in dominant personal 
systems, providing a veneer of democratic inclusiveness. Public space (seats in par-
liament and the administration) is ceded to women in exchange for their support, 
converting autonomous movements into supplicants, creating what, in a chilling 
image, Ahikire and Mwiine in this volume call ‘clients on their knees’ (Chapter 4).
In a World Development article on rethinking power and institutions in the 
context of neoliberal development, Kashwan et al. (2018) argue that a drawback 
of the political settlements approach is an assumption that reform-minded pol-
icy entrepreneurs must adapt to existing settlements (Kelsall 2016), rather than 
attempt to alter them. This is particularly the case when political settlements are 
in equilibrium, when it has been a long time since any kind of institutional rup-
ture (i.e. via conflict) or formal renegotiation (such as constitutional reform). This 
orients analysis to the types of incentives that reformers can offer (rents, voting 
blocs, international approval and legitimacy) to achieve incremental (ameliora-
tive, not transformative) policy advances. The alternative is reform by stealth, 
significant policy advances disguised as tactical retreats or given an instrumen-
tal gloss with a promise they will serve other objectives besides advancing wom-
en’s rights. This is indeed how many of the policy processes in this volume are 
described—as accommodation, not transformation. But political settlements can 
be renegotiated—these are never done deals, even though the winners in these 
arrangements always present them as such.
One pressing question for feminist activists—and a question deserving of more 
analysis in a volume like this—is why political actors who are explicitly against 
women’s rights and for patriarchy appear, particularly lately, to be more effec-
tive than feminist coalitions at renegotiating political settlements. This is the 
case with chauvinistic nationalists whose atavistic interpretations of religious 
doctrine, often with a negative perspective on aspects of women’s rights, gener-
ate social support and political leverage. This has happened with Hindu chau-
vinists in India and Christian evangelists in Uganda, and a persistent threat to 
women’s rights has been mounted by Islamic groups in Bangladesh. In Chapter 7 
on Bangladesh, Nazneen shows how this threat has been faced down, time and 
again, by secular forces. The women’s movement in Bangladesh cleverly and con-
stantly renews narratives of women’s vital role in the independence struggle and 
of the connection between women’s freedoms and Bangladeshi national identity, 
in contrast to the malingering collaborationist associations of hard-line Islamic 
groups. A comparison between India and Bangladesh on this matter might be 
illuminating to identify reasons why India’s robust democracy has succumbed to 
an ethnic chauvinist ruling coalition, while Bangladesh’s much weaker and cha-
otic version of democracy continues to resist fundamentalist forces.
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Another feature of political settlements analysis is the identification of connec-
tions between power asymmetries and the distributive outcomes of economic pol-
icy. On the whole, this volume does not address this, perhaps because the focus is 
on domestic violence policy, which does not immediately appear to intersect with 
economic policy, nor does it necessarily imply massive public expenditure obliga-
tions in the way that, for instance, free contraception or gender-sensitive social 
protection, such as pensions for women who have not worked outside the home, 
do. Different policies invoke different types of resistance, a point I will address in 
the next section. In relation to the political settlements discussion, however, it is 
worth pointing out that the time period in which most of the domestic violence 
policy struggles in this volume occurred was also a period in which neoliberal eco-
nomic policies, in most of the case countries, were creating new winners and los-
ers in the economy, creating the possibility for new elites to attempt state capture 
and, in some cases, changing the composition of the social groups marginalized 
from economic opportunities (MacLean 2010). More discussion of how chang-
ing economic conditions can transform political settlements, and the extent to 
which these economic conditions have created opportunities (or closed them) 
for feminist activists, would have been valuable, particularly because, in times of 
fiscal constraint, many types of gender equality policies can come under attack 
(Annesley et al. 2014).
Finally, a major player in political settlements the world over is the military. The 
military (and connected security services) is a profoundly masculinized domain of 
power, and in no country have women yet achieved a significant institutional pres-
ence in the top military command. In countries that have relatively recently emerged 
from war, such as Uganda and Rwanda, or from experiences of military government 
(Ghana and Bangladesh), the military’s role in political settlements is fresh in the 
popular memory, as is its de facto veto power over political settlements that it does 
not favour. Some reflection on the dynamic this introduces when it comes to gender 
equality policies would be valuable. The perspective of security forces may not be 
irrelevant to the success of the domestic violence policy in Rwanda, for instance, 
where a logic of protection is compatible with the self-perception of the social pro-
tection role of security forces in a context of heightened awareness of the pervasive-
ness of violence against women, thanks to extensive truth-telling and prosecutions 
regarding sexual violence in the 1994 genocide.
Power domains and policy domains
One of the most intriguing but least developed propositions in this book is that 
the prospects for gender equality (in this case, domestic violence) policy are 
shaped in part by overlapping ‘power domains’. Three major domains are men-
tioned in Chapter 2: the ‘political settlements domain’, which is the broad arena 
of the polity; the ‘domain of women’s interests’, which is an arena of political 
competition in its own right; and the ‘domain of households/communities’. In 
each domain, incentives, institutions, and ideas interact at a number of lev-
els (local to transnational) to determine what issues and approaches dominate. 
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The case-study chapters engage rather unevenly with this concept, and the 
editors acknowledge that the major focus of the entire book is primarily the 
first two domains. Fuller engagement with this concept might see each power 
domain broken down even further—for instance, within the political settle-
ments domain, the power cultures of the military and of business leaders are 
significantly different to those of the bureaucracy, legislature, and executive. 
Within the domain of women’s interests, there are elite versus grassroots power 
cultures and important dynamics of race, caste, disability, age, etc., that shape 
the design and prospects of gender justice campaigns.
A major dynamic shaping the way power domains react to feminist policy propo-
sitions regards the nature of the policy that is being proposed—the extent to which 
it challenges class differences between women, the assumed prerogatives of men 
to greater social and political power than women, or control over women’s bodies. 
This is the crucial insight of the work of Htun and Weldon (2018), explained care-
fully in Georgina Waylen’s commentary in this volume (Chapter 11). Htun and 
Weldon explore a very wide range of variables that determine whether states and 
societies are able to accept policies that raise women’s status in relation to men or 
that raise poor women’s status in relation to elite women. Some of their work is 
relevant to the political settlements focus—they note differences between states 
founded on principles of universal equality and identity-neutral citizens versus states 
that recognize group-specific interests and integrate group-based bargaining to 
public decision-making. The latter, which would include corporatist arrangements, 
such as are found in South Africa, are sometimes able to accommodate collective 
bargaining on the basis of gender interests. States with an official religion and for-
mal or informal theocratic engagement in politics tend to be the least propitious 
for feminist challenges to class or status differentials because of the way ‘doctrine’ is 
permitted to trump the logic of human rights-based justice arguments.
As Waylen points, out, the significant differences in the type of opposition gen-
erated by feminist proposals for domestic violence policy versus, say, reproductive 
rights policies or gender-equal social protection systems means that there are lim-
its to the extent to which the analysis of the policy fate of domestic violence policy 
can be read as an indicator of feminists’ political effectiveness—or as a signpost to 
relevant conditions determining prospects for other types of gender equality pol-
icy. Domestic violence prevention and response (in ways that empower women) 
is an important way to change women’s status in relationships. It does generate 
resistance because patriarchal legislators are loathe to challenge men’s privileges 
in their private lives, and in every single case-study chapter, opponents expressed 
fears that it would destroy ‘the family’. But no authority in a nominally demo-
cratic state can condone violence against women—and this, crucially, includes 
religious authorities. In addition, as mentioned earlier, policies to address violence 
against women can lend themselves to a logic of protection rather than women’s 
empowerment, which fits with paternalistic interpretations of the role of (male) 
power-holders, thus eliminating some obstacles to policy adoption.
While it would significantly complicate the analytical framework, the addition 
of a focus on different policy types within the power domains framework might 
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show that different types of gender equality policies (according to whether they 
address class, status, or doctrine) ignite opposition from different actors within 
power domains. This would focus tactical action on the specific institution and 
actors most likely to resist or undermine policy advances.
Conclusion
Grounding the analysis of the fate of domestic violence policy in a power 
domains analysis provides a welcome approach to understanding the com-
plex politics of pursuing feminist policies. It takes us a great distance from any 
assumption that gender determines political interests, which lies at the heart of 
the inclusion-to-influence trajectory. While I have suggested that the prevalence 
of the inclusion-to-influence focus has been exaggerated, it has to be admitted 
that there is one arena in which this focus is alive and well: in international 
gender and development policy, particularly in some approaches to democracy 
assistance. Bilateral and, particularly, international policymakers’ allergy to 
engaging with the political (in Mouffe’s sense of the word) has found in women 
a useful vehicle for supporting civil society diversification and (it is assumed) 
democratization. While this is hardly a major area of democratization support, 
and while noone (I hope) would begrudge efforts to deliver resources to women’s 
organizations, or to building women’s capacities to engage in local government 
planning processes, or to run for national office, questions do need to be asked 
about causal assumptions being made about women’s numeric presence in public 
decision-making and democratization.
Nowhere is this mistake of assuming that women’s inclusion adds up to social 
justice and gender equality influence more striking than in contemporary processes 
of explicit political settlement-making, which is to say, peace agreements. The sig-
nificant paucity of women participants in these almost always nontransparent pro-
cesses, which are limited to only a very few negotiators and make no pretence to 
democratic principles, has been a concern of the international community since 
the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1325 in 2000. Some of the 
advocacy related to women’s inclusion frames women’s participation as instru-
mental for peace. Quantitative analysis by Paffenholz et al. (2016), for instance, 
suggests that women’s civil society engagement in peace processes increases the 
chances that an agreement will last two years by 20 percent. Stone (2015) sug-
gests that women participating as witnesses, signatories, or negotiators increase the 
chances of a five-or-more-years’ lifespan for an accord by 35 percent. This big pic-
ture analysis, unfortunately, yields little detail about the brass tacks of negotiations 
and the tactics used by women to build inclusiveness—let alone gender-equality 
provisions— into peace agreements and their implementation. In these very specific 
and explicit moments of negotiating power, there are opportunities for women, fem-
inist constituencies, and allies to leverage women’s interests into the political settle-
ment. Thinking about women’s inclusion as a numbers project, ignoring the ways 
they seek to engage in and transform politics, will not help them find that leverage.
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The urge to identify conditions under which the laws, policies, and practices of 
public authorities change to women’s advantage is an imperative for feminist pol-
icymakers the world over. However, there are no clear or common pathways to pol-
icy advances. This is not just because of the tremendous complexity of each policy 
context and of each policy struggle, but also because of the surprising resilience 
of opponents, who can tolerate some advances in women’s rights, but then can 
retaliate in unpredictable ways at unanticipated moments. For instance, a surge of 
backlash against what had been assumed to be givens in relation to women’s rights 
(i.e. in relation to abortion), is taking place in some contexts, not necessarily in 
what are assumed to be more tradition-based societies of the Global South, but in 
the advanced economies of the developed world. The sustainability of feminist 
policy gains is in question the world over. In situating the analysis of the causes of 
progress in the antagonisms of politics and specifically in the deal-making, explicit 
or implicit, involved in power-sharing, this volume shows how hard—and how 
vital—it is to institutionalize gender equality leadership and ideas at the heart of 
political settlements. The ongoing challenge for feminists is to fundamentally alter 
the balance of power in these settlements, to transform them, so that women’s par-
ticipation and gender equality objectives are neither alien, nor easily reversed, nor 
contingent on the patronage of a single leader or dominant coalition.
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